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EVALUATING BEPS: A RECONSIDERATION OF




The Financial Crisis of 2008 and Great Recession that followed have exac-
erbated income inequality within and between countries. In the aftermath of the
economic turbulence, politicians have turned their attention to the twin problems
of individual tax evasion and corporate tax avoidance. U.S. legislators enacted
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FACTA), leading to the United States
signing a series of Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) for the exchange of tax
information.  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) developed the Multilateral Agreement for Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters (MAATM) and initiated the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
project to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance globally.  Although these efforts
were well-intended, this Article argues that the tax policy response to the Finan-
cial Crisis and Great Recession has ultimately been inadequate. The problem,
which is discussed in-depth in the sections that follow, is the benefits principle.
Part I of this Article introduces the primary weakness of the benefits princi-
ple: the reliance on source-based taxation for active income and residence-
based taxation for passive income requires cooperation by too many jurisdic-
tions. This section provides three case studies of individual tax evasion and cor-
porate tax avoidance to illustrate the principle’s shortcomings. Part II focuses
on the individual tax evasion problem. This section analyzes the FATCA, IGA,
and MAATM responses and explains why these measures are likely to fall short.
Part III focuses on corporate tax avoidance. This section examines the BEPS
response and its inadequacies. Part IV proposes an alternative to international
tax policy based on the benefits principle. This section argues that reversing the
benefits principle by taxing passive income primarily at source and active in-
come primarily at residence will more effectively reduce individual tax evasion
and corporate tax avoidance in the developed and developing world.
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INTRODUCTION
The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed
have raised anew the problem of how to address growing inequality within
and between countries. These intra- and inter-country dimensions of inequal-
ity have widened in this century, and the Great Recession has made both
problems worse. The current rise of populism in the United States and Eu-
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rope and the vehement reactions to a tide of migrants from poorer to richer
countries show how these two problems are intertwined.1
Sixteen years ago, the first author examined the challenge that global-
ization and tax competition pose to the fiscal viability of the post-World War
II welfare state.2 He argued that if tax evasion by rich individuals and tax
avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs) continues to undermine the
ability of developed and developing countries to provide adequate social in-
surance for their citizens, a violent reaction against globalization may end
the current era of open borders, just like World War I curtailed globalization
a century ago. In 2016, we worry that the inadequate tax response to the
Great Recession is escalating anti-globalization sentiments, embodied in the
United States by the success of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, and in
Europe by an even more virulent rejection of the European Union’s open
border policies.3
Following the Financial Crisis and ensuing austerity, politicians have
turned their attention to the twin problems of tax evasion and tax avoidance.
On the individual tax evasion front, U.S. legislators enacted the Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010. This law led to the signing of
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) between the United States and 115
other countries (and counting) for the exchange of tax information. The
IGAs led the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) to develop Common Reporting Standards (CRS) and the Multilat-
eral Agreement for Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM),
which has been adopted by over eighty countries (though only signed but not
ratified by the United States).4
1 See, e.g., Peggy Noonan, Opinion, Trump, Sanders and the American Rebellion, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://on.wsj.com/1QavpWY.
2 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
3 See Noonan, supra note 1; Why is EU Struggling With Migrants and Asylum?, BBC R
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286.
4 On FATCA, IGAs and MAATM, see generally Allison Christians, What You Give and
What You Get: Reciprocity Under a Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement on FATCA, 31
CAYMAN FIN. REV. 24 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292645; Allison Christians, The Du-
bious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why it Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 565 (2013), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2280508; Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries:
Will FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256587;
Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L, REV. 304 (2012), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2497998; J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of
FATCA and its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1969123; Susan C. Morse, Why FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the U.S.
Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252843; Susan C.
Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999101; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, IGAs vs.
MAATM: Has Tax Bilateralism Outlived its Usefulness? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law, Research
Paper 384, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392702; Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Export-
ing FATCA (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), reprinted in 142
TAX NOTES 1245 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389500;  Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA:
An Evolutionary Moment for the International Tax System (Georgetown Law Faculty, Working
Paper No. 160, 2012), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/160; J. Richard
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On the corporate tax avoidance front, the OECD and G20 launched the
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013, culminating with
the release of a series of action reports in October 2015.5 Commenting on the
project, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria stated:
Base erosion and profit shifting affects all countries, not only eco-
nomically, but also as a matter of trust. BEPS is depriving coun-
tries of precious resources to jump-start growth, tackle the effects
of the global economic crisis[,] and create more and better oppor-
tunities for all. But beyond this, BEPS has been also eroding the
trust of citizens in the fairness of tax systems worldwide. The mea-
sures [presented in the action reports] represent the most funda-
mental changes to international tax rules in almost a century: they
will put an end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better alignment
of taxation with economic activity and value creation, and when
fully implemented, these measures will render BEPS-inspired tax
planning structures ineffective.6
Is Mr. Gurria justified in his optimism? We think not. As the Article
discusses in the sections that follow, the benefits principle is the problem.
Under the benefits principle, active (business) income is taxed primarily at
source, while passive (investment) income is taxed primarily at residence.7
Formed in 1923, this compromise between the claims of residence and
Harvey, Jr., FATCA - A Report From the Front Lines (Villanova Law Pub. Policy, Working
Paper No. 2013-3001, 2012), reprinted in 136 TAX NOTES 713 (2012), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2122491.
5 On BEPS, see, e.g., Pascal Saint-Amans and Rafaelle Russo, The BEPS Package: Prom-
ise Kept, 70 IBFD Bulletin for International Taxation 4 (2016); Hugh J. Ault, Some Reflections
on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195
(2013); Itai Grinberg, Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy, GEO. L. J.
(forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652894; Adam H. Rosenzweig, Building a Frame-
work for a Post-BEPS World, 74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1077 (2014); Richard J. Vann, Policy Fo-
rum: The Policy Underpinnings of the BEPS Project—Preserving the International
Corporation Income Tax, 62 CAN. TAX J. 433 (2014); Hugh J. Ault et. al., Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for Reform (Bos. Coll. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 324, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459646; Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS? (Univ. of Fla. Coll. of
Law, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 15-40, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2408034;
Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 703, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2497770; Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 702, 2014), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2373549; Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: Getting a ‘Fix’ on Recent
International Tax Policy Developments (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15-20, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605144.
6 Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS
Project for Discussion at G20 Finance Ministers Meeting, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-g20-beps-project-
for-discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm.
7 On the benefits principle and its origins, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRO-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW ch. 1 (2015); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxa-
tion of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
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source countries still serves as the foundation of the international tax re-
gime.8 It is embedded in over 3000 bilateral tax treaties as well as the do-
mestic laws of the United States and most other countries. In accordance
with the benefits principle, FATCA, the IGAs, and MAATM are designed to
enforce residence-based taxation of passive income, while BEPS represents
an attempt to improve source-based taxation of active income.9 Against this
orthodoxy, this Article reconsiders the benefits principle and offers modifi-
cations of existing policies to develop a more effective international tax
regime.
Part I introduces the primary weakness of the benefits principle: the
reliance on source-based taxation for active income and residence-based tax-
ation for active income requires cooperation by too many jurisdictions. This
section provides three case studies of individual tax evasion and corporate
tax avoidance to illustrate the principle’s shortcomings.  Part II focuses on
the individual tax evasion problem. This section analyzes the FATCA, IGA,
and MAATM responses and explains why these measures are likely to fall
short. Part III focuses on corporate tax avoidance. This section examines the
BEPS response and its inadequacies. Part IV proposes an alternative to inter-
national tax policy based on the benefits principle. This section argues that
reversing the benefits principle by taxing passive income primarily at source
and active income primarily at residence will effectively reduce individual
tax evasion and corporate tax avoidance in the developed and developing
world.
I. ILLUSTRATING THE TAX EVASION AND TAX AVOIDANCE PROBLEMS
Taxation at residence is traditionally justified because most passive in-
come is earned by individuals whose residences are relatively easy to deter-
mine. However, tax havens provide secret avenues for the flow of funds
from the residence countries to the countries in which the funds are invested.
Since the relaxation of exchange controls in the 1980s, tax competition to
attract funds has led source jurisdictions to abolish withholding taxes on
such income. Consequently, a wealthy person can route her investment
through a tax haven conduit, resulting in no taxation at source (because there
are no withholding taxes) or at residence (because the residence country
does not know about the investment given secrecy in the tax haven).
Preventing this erosion of the tax base through the exchange of information
Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301
(1996).
8 See Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification,
supra note 7. R
9 On FATCA, IGAs and MAATM, see, e.g., Blank & Mason, Exporting FATCA supra
note 4. On BEPS, see, e.g., Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of Interna- R
tional Tax Principles, supra note 5. R
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as envisaged by the MAATM would require the cooperation of every tax
haven.
Taxation at source has been justified because active income is generally
earned by corporations that have no fixed residence. However, since the
1980s, tax competition has led many source jurisdictions to offer tax holi-
days to MNEs, while residence jurisdictions have become reluctant to tax
MNEs on their global income to remain competitive without other jurisdic-
tions. As a result, most MNEs are not taxed at source or residence. Reducing
this tax avoidance would likewise require the cooperation of countries that
currently compete with each other to provide tax holidays. Three recent ex-
amples illustrate the tax evasion and tax avoidance on cross border income
that results from the shortcomings of the benefits principle:10
A. Individual Tax Evasion—Sam Wyly11
Sam Wyly is a rich Texas businessman. In 2006, Forbes estimated his
net worth as $1.1 billion. He and his brother Charles made their money in
computers, a steakhouse chain, and Michael’s Arts and Crafts, which they
bought in 1982 and sold in 2006 to a group of private equity firms, including
Bain Capital, for $6 billion. Sam is a major philanthropist: a $10 million gift
resulted in the naming of Sam Wyly Hall at the University of Michigan Ross
School of Business. He is also an avid Republican. In 2004, Sam Wyly
helped finance the “Swift Boat” ad campaign that scuttled John Kerry’s bid
for the presidency.
But Sam Wyly is now bankrupt. In 2006, a hearing of the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) revealed that he had been
evading U.S. tax laws by hiding his money in trusts in the Isle of Man, a
notorious tax haven. He began by transferring stock options from his various
companies to the trusts, which were managed by Isle of Man trustees. The
nominal trust beneficiaries were two foreign charities, but the six Wyly chil-
dren were contingent beneficiaries, and the trustees understood that at Sam’s
death the children would become the true beneficiaries and collect the funds.
In the meantime, the trusts were free to exercise the stock options and
use the stock for investments, with the understanding that ten years down the
road they would have to make annuity payments to Sam. Sam obtained an
opinion from a law firm that this arrangement worked to defer taxes on the
income gained from exercising the options until he began receiving annuity
payments years later. But the linchpin of the legal opinion was that the off-
shore trusts were independent actors when, in fact, Sam exercised total con-
10 The examples in sections I.A. and I.B. appear in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International
Tax Evasion and Avoidance: What Can Be Done? THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (May 26, 2016),
http://prospect.org/article/international-tax-evasion-what-can-be-done. The examples have
been reprinted in this Article with minor editing to conform to the Harvard Business Law
Review style requirements.
11 See supra text accompanying note 10. R
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trol over the trust assets, secretly using the investment profits to operate
businesses and buy real estate, jewelry, and artworks in the United States.
The Wylys’ secret control over their offshore funds was revealed in the PSI
hearing.
In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Sam
and Charles Wyly with securities fraud based on Sam’s hidden control of the
offshore trusts. In 2014, a jury found him liable. To avoid paying a $300
million judgment, he filed for bankruptcy, which triggered a tax assessment
for his failing to pay any taxes on hundreds of millions of dollars in offshore
income since 1992.  After a prolonged court battle, in June 2016, a federal
judge in Texas ordered Wyly to pay $1.1 billion in taxes and penalties.12
How many Wylys are hiding their money from the IRS, with no PSI
hearing to bring their misdeeds to light? We will probably never know. A
recent estimate of the global costs of illegal tax evasion by the economist
Gabriel Zucman was $200 billion, but this is probably too low since esti-
mates for the United States alone range from $20 billion to $70 billion.
Every time a Swiss banker talks, many billions in U.S. tax evasion are re-
vealed. The IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program has netted over $6
billion and counting.
And this is only for illegal tax evasion by individual taxpayers. Because
the evasion hides taxable income, it is hard to quantify with any precision.
Corporations are another story, because what they are doing is legal tax
avoidance—manipulating their books to avoid taxation—and therefore the
magnitudes can be better quantified. As of the end of 2015, U.S.-based
MNEs had more than $2 trillion in offshore profits in low-tax jurisdictions.
This amount, which translates to about $700 billion in U.S. taxes avoided, is
mostly income that was economically earned in the United States and shifted
offshore to jurisdictions like Singapore, Ireland, or Luxembourg, which have
effective tax rates in the single digits.
B. Corporate Tax Avoidance—Apple and Caterpillar13
How do the MNEs avoid taxes? A couple of examples can suffice. Ap-
ple Inc. is the world’s largest company by market capitalization. Most of its
billions in profits relate to intellectual property developed at its headquarters
in Cupertino, California. But for tax purposes, most of the profit is booked in
its Irish subsidiaries—which we will call Apple Ireland.
Some of the profit-shifting is achieved through a “cost sharing agree-
ment.” Cost sharing is a concept developed in IRS regulations in the 1980s,
but it became more significant due to the increasing importance of intellec-
12 Katy Stech, Judge Hands Entrepreneur Sam Wyly a $1.1 Billion Tax Bill, WALL ST. J.
(June 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-hands-entrepreneur-sam-wyly-a-1-1-bil
lion-tax-bill-1467144226.
13 See supra text accompanying note 10. R
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tual property. The idea behind cost sharing is this: when a U.S.-based MNE
begins a new research project (for example, a search for a drug to treat a
certain disease), it can agree to share the costs of development with its off-
shore subsidiaries. Then, if the project is successful, the parties share the
profits in the same proportions. For example, if Apple Ireland contributed
80% of the costs of developing the iPhone 6, it would get 80% of the profit.
Importantly, none of the actual work is done by Apple Ireland. Apple just
gives Apple Ireland the money and Apple Ireland pays it back as its contri-
bution to the research costs.
Why would the IRS regulations permit this? Because if the research
failed, then the taxpayer would lose its ability to deduct the costs sent off-
shore. The more of the cost sent offshore, the more deductions would be at
risk. So the IRS thought there was a natural limit to taxpayer willingness to
share costs with offshore affiliates.
That analysis may have been true for Big Pharma, which usually waits
to enter into cost sharing with an offshore affiliate until a drug has passed its
initial trials and is well on its way to a patent, and then battles the IRS over
valuation issues at the time the cost-sharing agreement was executed. But
the same analysis makes less sense for Apple, since it faces lower R&D risk
for its new products, such as the iPhone 6, than Big Pharma companies do
for their new drugs.
There is another trick involved in Apple Ireland’s profitability. Another
portion of its profits derive from countries where Apple sells the iPhones.
Apple Ireland licenses the right to use Apple’s brand and intellectual prop-
erty to Apple affiliates in other countries. Those affiliates in turn pay Apple
Ireland hefty royalties, which operate to shift the sales profits gained in those
countries to Ireland.
Before 1997, such a scheme would not have worked, because the royal-
ties received by Apple Ireland would have triggered a tax in the United
States under so-called Subpart F, which was designed to prevent foreign
corporations from taking advantage of inconsistencies between U.S. and for-
eign tax law. But in 1997, the Clinton administration adopted a rule called
“check the box.” Under “check the box,” Apple Ireland can, for U.S. tax
purposes, treat all of its foreign affiliates as if they did not exist as separate
entities, and treat the money they paid to Apple Ireland as income earned in
Ireland. The result is that, for U.S. tax purposes, there are no royalties and no
U.S. tax triggered by them, because Apple Ireland treats the money as its
own sales income.
The Obama administration came in promising to repeal “check the
box;” this was the biggest international revenue raiser in the first Obama
budget. But by its next budget in 2010, the administration recanted under
pressure from the MNEs. Recently, Obama signed into law a five-year ex-
tension of a provision (first enacted by a Republican Congress as a “tempo-
rary” measure in 2006) that enshrines “check the box” in the tax law.
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Finally, the PSI hearing revealed two Irish-specific tricks used by Ap-
ple. Ireland has a tax rate of 12.5 percent, far below the U.S. rate of 35
percent. But Apple did not want to pay even 12.5 percent. Its solution: for
U.S. tax purposes, Apple Ireland is treated as an Irish company because it is
incorporated in Ireland, so it is not taxed by the United States. But for Irish
tax purposes, Apple Ireland was treated as an American company because it
is “managed and controlled” from California. As a result, Apple Ireland
claimed it was a tax resident nowhere. On top of that, Apple negotiated a
sweetheart tax deal with Ireland for its Irish income, which resulted in its
paying a tax rate of less than 2%.
These types of tricks are used by most U.S.-based MNEs. If the primary
driver of value of a U.S.-based MNE is intellectual property developed in
the United States, the Apple scheme can simply be replicated.
But what if the value derives from more traditional, tangible items?
Some U.S.-based MNEs do pay higher taxes (e.g., car companies). But
others try to avoid tax nevertheless. Caterpillar Inc. is a good example.
Caterpillar does not make a lot of money on the heavy equipment it
manufactures. But it does profitably sell replacement parts. Before 1999,
Caterpillar bought the parts from unrelated manufacturers and stored them at
its warehouse in Morton, Illinois. When a dealer requested a part for a cus-
tomer overseas, Caterpillar “sold” (but did not actually ship) the part to a
Swiss subsidiary, which in turn sold the part to the unrelated dealer.
The problem, according to accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC), was that Caterpillar’s sale of the part to its Swiss subsidiary triggered
U.S. taxes. Much better, PwC said, would be if the parts were sold by the
manufacturer directly to the Swiss subsidiary, which could then sell them to
the dealer. The result was that Caterpillar continued to run its parts business
from the United States, but declared 85% or more of the parts profits in
Switzerland.
In addition, PwC came up with a way to lower Caterpillar’s U.S. tax
without requiring Caterpillar to change its operations. PwC’s solution was
for the manufacturers to bill the Swiss subsidiary for the parts but continue
to ship them to the Illinois warehouse, which continued to transport them to
Caterpillar’s foreign customers. If the parts were shipped overseas, they were
deemed to have been “owned” by the Swiss subsidiary, and PwC devised a
virtual inventory to track them, even though the parts were indistinguishably
commingled in the warehouse. The result was that Caterpillar continued to
run its parts business from the United States, but declared 85% or more of
the parts profits in Switzerland.
The IRS has now challenged this billing arrangement, which resulted in
shifting some $2.4 billion in Caterpillar profits from the United States to
Switzerland. A grand jury has issued subpoenas under a criminal investiga-
tion for tax fraud.
But the disturbing fact is that the whole story would not have come to
light but for a whistleblower, who alerted both PSI and the IRS. And while
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Caterpillar is facing a court challenge, in most cases of corporate tax avoid-
ance, like Apple, the IRS’s hands are tied, because what Apple did may have
been legal under the U.S. tax code.
C. Assessing the Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance Problems
The problem with this state of affairs is that the progressive income tax
cannot be maintained in the absence of taxing cross-border flows. The
wealthy can more easily earn cross-border income. The result has been a
worldwide shift to taxing consumption rather than income. But consumption
taxes are regressive and cannot by definition reach the unconsumed income
of the rich.14 Without progressive taxation, it will not be possible to maintain
the public’s commitment to social insurance that is globalization’s main de-
fense against growing inequality.
To preserve the income tax in the twenty-first century, multilateral solu-
tions are needed. MAATM and BEPS are both multilateral, but they are
hampered by the fact that there are too many residence jurisdictions for pas-
sive income and source jurisdictions for active income. If we reversed the
benefits principle, so that passive income is taxed primarily at source and
active income at residence, far fewer jurisdictions will need to cooperate.
For passive income, the number of source jurisdictions is much smaller
than residence jurisdictions. Portfolio investment flows overwhelmingly to a
small number of jurisdictions—the United States, the European Union, and
Japan. Even Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) mostly
attract portfolio investment through mutual funds that are relatively easy to
tax. Thus, if the “big three” can coordinate to reinstate a withholding tax on
interest, dividends and royalties flowing from them, most of the problem of
taxing passive income can be solved. Crucially, money cannot stay in tax
havens and earn decent rates of return, so the cooperation of tax havens is
not needed, unlike in the case of the MAATM. For active income, about
90% of MNEs are headquartered in the G20, and none of those countries
have a tax rate below 20%, so if they taxed their MNEs currently on a coor-
dinated basis and restricted the ability to move out most of the problem
would be resolved.15
14 On the shift to consumption taxes, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, supra;
note 2. On the inability of consumption taxes to reach the unconsumed income of the rich, see R
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111
YALE L. J. 1391, 1407 (2002) (reviewing Joel B. Slemrod, Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic
Consequences of Taxing the Rich (2000)); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents and Regressivity:
Why the United States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT, 105 TAX NOTES 1651, 1653
(2004).
15 For the location of the world’s 100 largest MNEs, see Liyan Chen, The World’s Largest
Companies 2015, FORBES (May 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/05/06/
the-worlds-largest-companies/#4ebf4ea14fe5 (89% are in G20 countries). For the tax rates of
the G20, see HM Treasury, Budget 2012, H.C. 1853, at 33 (Mar. 21, 2012).
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We suggest reconsidering the benefits principle in light of the reality of
globalization. We should tax passive income primarily at source and active
income primarily at residence. Importantly, this approach does not preclude
the alternative. Once passive income is taxed at source, taxpayers may be
able to credit the tax upon declaring it to their residence country. In parallel,
once active income is taxed at residence, a credit can be given to source
country taxes if the source country responds to the limitation of tax competi-
tion by re-imposing its tax. But the key is that the income has already been
taxed, so that no double non-taxation ensues even if taxpayers do not declare
the income (in the case of passive income, where the residence rate may be
higher) or source countries choose not to tax in the case of active income.
The sections that follow further develop this Article’s reconsideration of the
benefits principle.
II. FATCA, IGAS AND MAATM16
In 2010, the United States revolutionized the international taxation of
individuals with the enactment of FATCA. The Act arose as a response to the
UBS AG aiding and abetting tax evasion by U.S. citizens.17 FATCA imposes
a 30% withholding tax on the U.S. source income of any “foreign financial
institution” that has not shared information on its account holders who are
U.S. citizens or residents.18 In response, foreign banks and other financial
institutions strongly objected to the policy for two main reasons.
First, banks claimed that it imposed unreasonable compliance costs.19
The fundamental problem stems from the fact that the United States has
since 1861 taxed its citizens living permanently overseas, and as a result,
FATCA applies to many such expatriates who have no intention of hiding
their income from the IRS (in fact, most of them do not owe any taxes to the
United States because of the earned income exclusion of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (IRC) section 91120 and the foreign tax credit of IRC section
90121). This complaint could be addressed by stopping the taxation of citi-
zens living overseas.22
16 This section is based in part on Avi-Yonah and Gil, IGAs vs. MAATM, supra note 4. R
17 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, What Goes Around Comes Around: Why the US is Responsi-
ble for Capital Flight (and What it Can Do about It), 2–3 (U of Michigan Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 307, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208553.
18 I.R.C. § 1471 (2015).
19 See Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, supra note 4, at 304, 336 R
20 I.R.C. § 911 (2015); see also Internal Revenue Service, Foreign Earned Income Exclu-
sion – Requirements, I.R.S.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/For
eign-Earned-Income-Exclusion—-Requirements (last updated May 14, 2015).
21 I.R.C. § 901 (2015).
22 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens (March 25, 2010). Univer-
sity of Michigan Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 10-009, 2010;
University of Michigan Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 190, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578272
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The second problem with FATCA was that many foreign countries have
taxpayer confidentiality laws that preclude banks from sharing account in-
formation with the IRS. Under the modern version of Article 26 of tax trea-
ties and the Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), such
prohibitions should not bar the exchange of information, but many treaties
have not been updated to reflect the new norms. Consequently, the banks
argued that they faced a serious dilemma of either violating the laws of their
home country or being subjected to the FATCA penalty.
The U.S. Treasury responded by negotiating a series of IGAs with the
governments of various countries with which the United States has either a
tax treaty or a TIEA. Under the IGAs, foreign governments are responsible
for collecting the necessary information from their banks and for transmit-
ting the information to the IRS. In return, under some IGAs, the United
States has agreed to collect information on its residents who have accounts
in U.S. banks and share it with the foreign governments. The difference, of
course, is that the United States taxes its citizens living overseas, so it has
many more taxpayers with accounts in foreign financial institutions than the
foreign country is likely to have in U.S. banks.23
It is not clear that the IGAs are permitted under FATCA because the
legislation requires direct submission of the information by the Foreign Fi-
nancial Institutions (FFIs) to the IRS. Nor is it clear that the Treasury has the
authority to enter into IGAs under the tax treaties and TIEAs.24 But the main
concern about the IGAs is that they enshrine the bilateral model of tax infor-
mation exchange that has dominated the twentieth century.
There are good reasons to believe this bilateral model does not work,
especially when IGAs are signed with countries, such as the Cayman Is-
lands,25 that have no interest in reciprocity. The alternative is MAATM. In
response to the Financial Crisis and the outrage it caused in Europe about tax
evasion by the wealthy, the OECD proposed MAATM,26 which provides for
the automatic exchange of information and appears to overcome the problem
of non-reciprocity that bedevils the tax treaties, bilateral TIEAs, and IGAs.
A. The Scope of the Tax Evasion Problem
Technological advances have made it easier for companies and individ-
uals to shift income and capital among countries to reduce their global tax
23 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 389
(2010).
24 See Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why It Matters), 69
TAX NOTES INT’L 565 (2013).
25 For a list of TIEAs, see OECD, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2014).
26 OECD, Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (June 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/ENG-Amended-Convention.pdf [here-
inafter MAATM].
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amount by using tax haven jurisdictions. The OECD has recognized this
phenomenon as a Harmful Tax Competition.27 Although the ability of indi-
viduals to shift their capital income without being taxed is subject to sub-
stantial limitations,28 capital-income shifting still exists, especially in
situations where the taxpayer relies on the lack of information-sharing be-
tween different countries around the world29 by not reporting her income.30
In response, a significant effort has been made to force tax haven countries
to share their information31 about foreign taxpayers who utilize the lack of
information exchanges between countries, while enabling the tax havens32 to
enjoy the investment of capital in their jurisdiction.
With the benefit of this information, tax researchers have been able to
define the scope of the problem in terms of lost tax revenue. The Tax Justice
Network, a non-profit organization, reports that the amount of equity held
offshore by individuals alone was about $11.5 trillion, with a resulting an-
nual loss of about $250 billion in taxes.33 A study conducted by the Congres-
sional Research Service indicates that tax evasion by individuals through
setting up foreign corporations in tax havens and channeling the income to
these foreign companies results in an estimated $70 billion a year deficit to
the U.S. Treasury.34 Economist Gabriel Zucman used financial asset report-
ing to calculate an estimate of $200 billion of lost income tax revenue per
year worldwide,35 which is significantly below other estimates, but provides
a useful lower bound.
27 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998), http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Harmful Tax Competi-
tion]. Under the OECD definition for tax havens, a country that does not share information
about transactions that occurred within its jurisdiction is also a potential tax haven.
28 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet it Moves: A Tax Paradigm for the 21st Century
(University of Michigan Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper No. 59,
2013), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/59.
29 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A 10th Anni-
versary Retrospective (University of Michigan Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers
Archive: 2003–2009, Working Paper No. 89, 2008), http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps-olin/
art89.
30 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 20 (2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R40623.pdf.
31 See Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary Ret-
rospective, supra note 29, at 4–7. R
32 The OECD recognized that a country that does not provide information about its tax-
payers is also a tax haven.
33 Tax Justice Network, Briefing Paper – The Price of Offshore (Mar. 2005), http://
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore.pdf.
34 GRAVELLE, supra note 30, at 29. R
35 GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS
31 (2015).
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B. Lack of Information
Tax evasion has become a central concern of the major economies
around the world. Accordingly, the global finance system has developed
agreements for the exchange of information to increase the ability of its tax
systems (both civil and criminal) to enforce its rules on sophisticated taxpay-
ers.36 In particular, the OECD has targeted countries whose lack of trans-
parency allows them to function as tax havens.37 Just before the Financial
Crisis, the first author argued that the OECD has achieved significant pro-
gress in the field of information exchange.38 However, lack of transparency
is still a major problem globally. As long as some countries provide tax
shelters, the OECD may win the battle, but lose the war.
Our assessment is based on two factors. First, in a competitive financial
world, some countries will always be willing to host trillions of dollars to
attract investment in their infrastructures.39 Second, sophisticated internal
law, such as that which exists in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), facilitates
tax evasion.40 BVI laws “require no identification of shareholders or direc-
tors, and require no financial records.”41 Thus, even if the BVI provides
information about its taxpayers, it is unlikely that information will be use-
ful.42 Consequently, the taxpayer has no real concerns.
With the information-exchange problem in mind, the United States
started signing bilateral treaters and TIEAs with countries around the
world.43 The United States signed over sixty bilateral treaties,44 which usu-
ally permit the exchange of civil and criminal information.45 In addition, the
36 See Kevin Jestin, Mutual Legal Assistance in Tax Matters: Recent Trends and Challenge
Ahead 1 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/Jestin2008.pdf.
37 See OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 27, at 28–29. R
38 See Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary Ret-
rospective, supra note 29, at 783, 783–84. R
39 Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?
93 J. OF PUB. ECON. 1058–1068 (2009) (stating that tax haven countries are usually quite
affluent).
40 GRAVELLE, supra note 30, at 21. R
41 Id.
42 Id
43 See Chris Horton, The UBS/IRS Settlement Agreement and Cayman Island Hedge
Funds, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 357, 372
44 Avi-Yonah and Gil, IGAs vs. MAATM, supra note 4, at 5. R
45 See IRS, Internal Revenue Manual pt. 5 ch. 21 § 2 (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part5/irm_05-021-002.html. (“The U.S. has over [sixty] bilateral tax treaties with other
countries, and over [twenty] Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) in effect with
various countries and jurisdictions where a bilateral tax treaty is not in place. These treaties
and agreements facilitate the exchange of information, and generally allow for mutual assis-
tance for both civil and criminal investigations. The tax treaties allow for information ex-
change by specific request, and in most cases, through spontaneous and automatic exchanges
as well.”).
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United States signed TIEAs with over twenty countries.46 However, the ef-
fectiveness of the TIEAs agreements is in doubt.47
Between 2006 and 2010, the United States and other countries ex-
changed 5111 information requests.48 But only 894 were outgoing requests.49
Two factors inhibited the outgoing requests. First, “most of these agreements
are restricted to criminal matters, which are a minor part of the revenues
involved and pose difficult issues of evidence.”50 Second, the complexity of
the information that the IRS is required to provide to get information dis-
couraged outgoing requests.51 Generally, the IRS must provide a specific
taxpayer name to retrieve any information and the reason that the taxpayer is
under investigation. For example, the United States signed a TIEA with the
Cayman Islands in 2004. According to the TIEA, the United States must
provide very specific information to the Cayman Islands to get information
about a U.S. taxpayer.52 As a result, the TIEA is more of a confirmatory than
discovery tool.53
In addition to tax treaties, in 2001, the IRS established the Qualified
Intermediaries (QI) Program.54 Under the program, a QI, such as a bank, is
required to identify the payment and, in some types of investments where the
beneficiary is a U.S. resident or any profit is subject to withholding,55 the QI
must notify the IRS about the transaction without disclosing the name of the
taxpayer.56 The QIs are required to withhold any tax amount and send the
payment to the U.S. Treasury.57 UBS was a QI.  After its scandal,58 the effec-
tiveness of the QI program was questioned.59 Although UBS was a QI, in-
stead of discovering the identity of the beneficiary account, the bank created
shell companies for its clients in the Cayman Islands to hide their identities.
46 Id.
47 See GRAVELLE, supra note 30, at 26. R
48 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-730, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S INFOR-
MATION EXCHANGES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH BETTER PER-
FORMANCE INFORMATION 22 (2011).
49 Id.
50 GRAVELLE, supra note 30, at 20. R
51 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-730, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S IN-
FORMATION EXCHANGES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH BETTER PER-
FORMANCE INFORMATION 8–10 (2011).
52 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Cayman Islands for the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes, U.S.-Cayman
Is., Nov. 29, 2013, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/treaties.
aspx?loc=60367d5a-48c4-4b82-8fd6- fd6e00763d5d.
53 Horton, supra note 43, at 373. R
54 Susan C. Morse, Qualified Intermediary or Bust?, 124 TAX NOTES 471 (2009).
55 See I.R.C. § 871(a) (2014). See I.R.C. § 862(a) (2010).
56 See Morse, supra note 54, at 472. R
57 Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tax Agency to Strengthen Program to Catch Offshore Tax Eva-
sion, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/business/worldbusi-
ness/15iht-15tax.14499852.html.
58 Lynnley Browning, U.S. Ends Inquiry of UBS Over Offshore Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/business/17tax.html.
59 See GRAVELLE, supra note 30, at 26. R
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However, there has been some progress since 2008. For example, in
2009, UBS agreed to disclose about 4450 American clients suspected of us-
ing the bank’s offshore services to evade taxes.60 But this was a small frac-
tion of the more than 24,000 U.S. accounts held by the bank. Moreover, only
a small portion of the 4450 names were prosecuted.61 In parallel, FATCA and
the IRS’s offshore voluntary compliance initiative have had some success.
But both policies are inherently limited because they apply to only U.S. re-
sidents (including U.S. citizens) and can be avoided by putting assets in a
bank that has no U.S. assets (hence avoiding FATCA penalty tax exposure)
in a jurisdiction that does not comply with MAATM.
C. The Revenue Rule and Non-Assistance in the Collection of Taxes
As the global economy becomes more interconnected, tax collection is
becoming more complex. Even if a country has determined the right to tax
liabilities of its taxpayers, collection can be a difficult task. When a taxpayer
lacks any assets in the country that is trying to make the collection, very
limited solutions are available to that country. For example, in India v. Tay-
lor,62 the government of India sought taxes from a company registered in the
United Kingdom, but trading in India. The House of Lords held that India
could not enforce its collection of taxes through a British court:
“[T]here is a well-recognized rule, which has been enforced for at
least 200 years or thereabouts, under which these courts will not
collect the taxes of foreign States for the benefit of the sovereigns
of those foreign States; and this is one of those actions which these
courts will not entertain.”63
In United States v. Harden,64 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California held for a deficiency of $639,500.15 against
the respondent. When the United States tried to enforce the judgment, it
could not locate any of the respondent’s assets in a U.S. jurisdiction. Conse-
quently, the United States tried to enforce the judgment in a Canadian court
based on a Canadian contract. However, like the House of Lords in the
United Kingdom, the Supreme Court of Canada held that no Canadian court
would enforce the revenue laws of another country:
60 Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Disclosed Offshore Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/global/18irs.html.
61 Zach Lowe, Six Months Later: Still a Good Deal for UBS?, THE AMLAW DAILY (Aug.
18, 2009), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/08/six-months-later-a-good-deal-
for-ubs-.html
62 Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v. Taylor, [1955] AC
491 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
63 Id.
64 United States of America v. Esperanza P. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366 (Can.).
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“[T]he argument that the claim asserted is simply for the perform-
ance of an agreement, made for good consideration, to pay a stated
sum of money must also fail. We are concerned not with form but
with substance, and if it can properly be said that the respondent
made an agreement it was simply an agreement to pay taxes which
by the laws of the foreign state she was obligated to pay.”65
Although countries may enforce private judgments in fields like torts
and contracts, when they are faced with a request to force foreign judgments
in criminal, antitrust and tax law, the request will be denied.66 The obvious
result is a decrease in the ability of countries to enforce their laws even when
public policy is not an issue.  This phenomenon arises, in part, from one
country viewing the enforcement another country’s law within its territory as
“an extraterritorial intrusion.”67 In this respect, despite the dramatic evolu-
tion of international tax practice in the last decades,68 cooperation between
countries on a voluntary basis remains limited.
D. Article 27 under the OECD Model of the Tax Convention on Income
and Capital
In January 2003, the OECD added Article 27—The Assistance in The
Collection of Taxes—to its Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital.69
Article 27 outlines rules for contracting parties who wish to collaborate in
collecting taxes across country boundaries. A brief review of the rules
reveals a painstaking process for collaboration.
Under paragraph 1, a country will provide assistance to the other coun-
try upon a request to collect taxes within the foreign country. According to
the Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention (CAMTC),
paragraph 1 is very flexible and subject to negotiation among the contracting
countries based on their local laws. In addition, according to the CAMTC,
the article is an elective. The collection of taxes is not limited to the type of
taxes covered by Article 2 and most importantly, is also enforceable against
people who are not entitled to the benefits derived from the convention.
Paragraph 4 allows a contracting country to require temporary relief
before a final judgment is made against the taxpayer to safeguard future
collection. The aforementioned provision combined with paragraph 6 is very
65 Id.
66 See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo. 43 HARV. INT’L. L. J., 161
(2002).
67 Alan R. Johnson, Lawrence Nirenstein & Stephen E. Wells, Reciprocal Enforcement of
Tax Claims Through Tax Treaties, 33 TAX LAWYER 469, 470 (1980).
68 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law (U. Mich. L. Sch.
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 7, 2004) (for the evaluation and the impact of the interna-
tional law on the practice).
69 See OECD, Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, art. 27 (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf.
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interesting. According to paragraph 6, the “validity or the amount of a reve-
nue claim of a Contracting State shall not be brought before the courts or
administrative bodies of the other Contracting State.”70 An interesting ques-
tion is whether paragraph 6 should also apply when temporary relief is pro-
vided (e.g. seizure), and whether the foreign court has the right to determine
whether the request is reasonable on the strength of the evidence. A review
of the CAMTC supports the hypothesis that any judicial proceeding will take
place in the country that asks for assistance in the collection of taxes.
E. Article 27 – The U.S Treaties in Practice vs. the OECD Model
The MAATM convention operates at the international level, similar to
other multilateral conventions, such as the Geneva Convention. Another
traditional way to address tax issues between countries is through bilateral
conventions. Although the U.S model tax convention of 2006 lacks any ref-
erence to assistance in the collection of taxes, the United States has signed
treaties that include provisions relating to assistance in collection of taxes in
a foreign country.71 These provisions appear in two forms: general enforce-
ment and limited enforcement.72
General enforcement provisions outline general mutual assistance in the
collection of taxes within a foreign country.  This provision appears in trea-
ties with Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.73  A re-
view of paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the convention between the United
States and Sweden74 reveals that the assistance applies to any type of tax that
is covered by Article 2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 27 stipulate that when
a country files75 a tax claim against a person’s assets in another country, the
latter country will enforce the claim as if the liability were in its jurisdiction.
Paragraph 4 states that “the assistance provided by the article shall not be
accorded with respect to the citizens, companies, or other entities of the state
to which the application is made, except when the enforcement is against a
person who enjoyed the convention although he was not entitled to.”76 The
application of Article 27 varies from treaty to treaty. For example, under the
tax convention between the United States and Canada77 is not applicable
70 Id. at art. 27, ¶ 6.
71 IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 45, at pt. 5 ch. 21 § 2. R
72 See Johnson et al., supra note 67, at 472–473. R
73 IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 45, at pt. 5 ch. 21 § 2. R
74 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Sweden for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 27, Swed.-U.S., Sept. 1, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-
29.
75 See IRM 5.21.7.4, Mutual Collection Assistance Requests (MCAR) (Nov. 13, 2015)
(outlining the procedure for filing a claim).
76 Id.
77 Tax Convention, art. 27, Canada-U.S. Sept. 26, 1980, as amended by the Protocols
signed on June 14, 1983, March 28, 1984, March 17, 1995, and July 29, 1997, https://
www.fin.gc.ca/treaties-conventions/USA_-eng.asp.
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against a Canadian citizen if, at the date of the tax deficiency, the taxpayer
was a citizen of the Canada. Under this provision, the United States would
have won the case of United States v. Harden.
Why does the United States vary its application of Article 27? The an-
swer is hidden in the late 1960s, when a broad collection of provisions was
deleted from the U.S model.78 Three hypotheses can explain the withdrawal
of the provisions: (1) the IRS performed very limited collection abroad
under the treaties that included “general enforcement” provisions;79 (2) dur-
ing the years following World War II, countries were more sensitive to mea-
sures that could be expressed as a foothold in their territory;80 and (3) there
was a development of independent agreements that are more limited. As a
result, the United States entered a collection provision only when a conven-
tion was renegotiated and assistance of tax collection provisions was
included.81
Limited enforcement provisions outline assistance in collection of taxes
where a person or entity enjoys the benefits provided by the treaty, even
though they are not entitled. Consequently, the application of the provision
is narrow and limited to very specific situations.82 For example, a limited
enforcement paragraph can be found under the U.S.-Iceland convention:
Each of the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect on behalf
of the other Contracting State such amounts as may be necessary
to ensure that relief granted by the Convention from taxation im-
posed by that other State does not inure to the benefit of persons
not entitled thereto.83
A similar approach can be found under the treaties with Luxemburg (1996),
Germany (1989), Austria (1996), and the United Kingdom (2001).84
F. Multilateral Conventions for Tax Collection Assistance
Due to a historic problem of tax collection by countries within a foreign
country, jurisdiction countries have begun to sign mutual agreements. The
first agreement appeared in 1950 as a multilateral convention among
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux85 countries) for tax
78 THE NEW US-BELGIUM DOUBLE TAX TREATY: A BELGIAN AND EU PERSPECTIVE 558
(Anne Van de Vijver, et al. eds., 2009).
79 Id.
80 See Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, supra note 4, at 314. R
81 Johnson et al., supra note 67 at 469–70. R
82 Id. at 475–76.
83 Tax Convention, art. 25, Ice.-U.S., Oct. 23, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-17.
84 See THE NEW US-BELGIUM DOUBLE TAX TREATY: A BELGIAN AND EU PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 78, at 558. R
85 A collective name for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, especially with ref-
erence to their economic union.
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collection assistance.86 Under the convention, the Benelux countries agreed
to enforce the collection of tax in their territory for the foreign country. In
1972, the Nordic convention was signed with similar principles.87 Following
the success of the Nordic convention, the OECD started to draft a new con-
vention in 1988 to reverse the lack of cooperation between OECD countries
in collecting taxes.88 At first, only a few countries signed the convention.89
Two decades later, the OECD opened the convention on MAATM90 for sig-
nature. In the first two years, about fifty countries signed the MAATM con-
vention. By 2016, the convention had over eighty signatories.
The MAATM convention is designed to create a global network that
deals with tax evasion cases.91 The model of the MAATM convention is
based on a combination of tax exchange provisions and administrative assis-
tance in the collection of taxes. Under the model, countries that have signed
the convention enjoy “cross-border tax co-operation including exchange of
information, multilateral simultaneous tax examinations, service of docu-
ments, and cross-border assistance in tax collection, while imposing exten-
sive safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information
exchanged.”92 One advantage of the convention is the flexibility that it offers
to countries by reserving the right to provide no information or assistance in
the collection of taxes.93 A country can exclude the collection of taxes in its
jurisdiction either at the time of signing, ratification, or a later date.94 For
example, Poland withdrew its reservations concerning assistance in tax col-
lection when it joined the European Union.95
G. The Tax Evasion Problem Reconsidered
The current state of affairs is as follows: the United States has FATCA
and a set of bilateral IGAs, but FATCA has loopholes (most obviously, using
a bank with no U.S. source income exposure). The IGAs have come under
86 Jestin, supra note 36 at 3. R
87 Id. at 3–4.
88 Id. at 4.
89 OECD, Background brief: The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters and New Protocol, (June 5, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-informa
tion/backgroundbrieftheconventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmattersandnewproto
col.htm [hereinafter OECD, MAATM Background].
90 See MAATM, supra note 26; see also OECD, Convention on Mutual Administrative R
Assistance in Tax Matters, (Feb. 2016), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/
conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm.
91 See generally Grinberg, Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy, supra
note 5. R
92 OECD MAATM Background, supra note 89; OECD, Updated Multilateral Tax Conven- R
tion now Open to All Countries (Nov. 2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-infor
mation/updatedmultilateraltaxconventionnowopentoallcountries.htm.
93 MAATM, supra note 26, at art. 30. R
94 OECD, MAATM’s flyer (June 5, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-infor
mation/ENG_Convention_Flyer.pdf.
95 Id.; see also MAATM, supra note 26, at art. 30. R
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legal challenge in Canada and depend on actual government cooperation to
be fully implemented. The Obama Administration won in court on the valid-
ity of regulations requiring U.S. banks to collect information on payments of
interest eligible for the portfolio interest exemption,96 but in the absence of
knowledge about the true beneficial owners, it is not clear that this informa-
tion will be of any use even if exchanged under the IGAs. Moreover, foreign
governments that have signed IGAs can, in many cases, be expected to be-
have like they do under the older TIEAs: namely, pretend to cooperate, but
not do so in practice.
The OECD has Article 27, but this has not been implemented in most
treaties, and the United States has generally not included it in its treaties or
its model. Nor is it clear that courts are willing to overturn the revenue rule,
despite the United States Supreme Court’s Pasquantino decision.97 In addi-
tion, the problem with MAATM is two-fold: the United States has not rati-
fied the convention so that it may become a huge tax haven for the rest of
the world and even a small non-cooperating jurisdiction may be able to de-
rail it.
H. The Limits of BEPS Project in Addressing the Financial
Secrecy Issue
One of the missions of BEPS project is to ensure transparency, while
promoting increased certainty and predictability. Action 5 focuses on the
transparency of harmful tax practices in intellectual property (IP) regimes.
Action 12 requires taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning ar-
rangements. Action 13 reexamines transfer pricing documentation. Despite
these reports, the issue of financial secrecy has not received enough attention
in the BEPS project. Bilateral and multilateral actions are needed to address
the financial secrecy issue.
Since 2009, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Infor-
mation for Tax Purpose has been the main international body working on the
implementation of the international standards on tax transparency. The Fo-
rum currently has 130 members and fifteen international organizations par-
ticipating as observers. The OECD explains:
There are two internationally agreed standards on exchange of in-
formation for tax purposes: Exchange of Information on Request
(EOIR); Automatic Exchange of Information Portal (AEOI). All
member jurisdictions have committed to implementing the interna-
tional standard on EOIR.  More than [ninety] countries and juris-
dictions have committed to implementing the new standard on
96 See Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
97 See, e.g., European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2005)
(limiting the scope of Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
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AEOI. Work is currently underway to implement this Standard,
with the first exchanges occurring on a very ambitious timeline of
2017 and 2018.
The global standard for automatic exchange of financial account information
was approved by the OECD Council on July 15, 2014. Under the standard:
[Jurisdictions] obtain financial information from their financial in-
stitutions and automatically exchange that information with other
jurisdictions on an annual basis. It sets out the financial account
information to be exchanged, the financial institutions required to
report, the different types of accounts and taxpayers covered, as
well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by finan-
cial institutions.
Although AEOI will facilitate the discovery of some tax evasion, there is a
long way to go to eliminate the information asymmetry created or exacer-
bated by domestic financial secrecy regimes and practices. For instance, as
Switzerland is “the old grand-daddy of tax havens” the surprising demise of
Switzerland’s legendary banking secrecy regime was not easy to achieve. As
observed by political economy professor Patrick Emmenegger:
Switzerland is structurally dependent on the economic welfare of
its largest banks, and Swiss banks are again structurally dependent
on access to the [U.S.] financial market. This advantage along
with the [UBS scandal enabled the United States to compel] Swit-
zerland to make a series of bilateral concessions on the banking
secrecy. In [the] spring [of] 2012, Switzerland accepted group
requests for client files by the [United States] in cases of adminis-
trative assistance. In December 2012, Switzerland had agreed in
principle with the [United States] on how to implement FATCA.
These Swiss concessions to the [United States] once again fueled
multilateral efforts by demonstrating the continued need to act on
banking secrecy and by providing a focal point for collective
action.
The successful unilateral action by the United States against Swiss banks not
only rooted out the barrier for the U.S. Department of Justice and the IRS to
acquire the files of American taxpayers from the Swiss banks, but also paved
the way for collective action to overcome Switzerland’s resistance to interna-
tional tax cooperation. Switzerland adopted the Standard for Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information in 2014.
But, the unanswered question is, if the United States withdraws its pres-
sure on the next successor of Switzerland, what will be the effective strategy
to make the multilateral actions sustainable and viable? Emmenegger be-
lieves the international community likely will have to wait for the next
“demonstration effect” before new substantial improvements are possible.
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Although we appreciate his concern about the challenge for the viability of
multilateral actions, we do not believe the international community’s only
choice is to wait for the demonstration effect of another legal battle between
a powerful residence country and another tax haven.
The modernization of international tax governance, including the global
efforts in fighting against BEPS should neither count on the luck associated
with the tax evasion scandal nor on any single white knight among the vic-
tim countries. Instead, the sustainable multilateral actions should be built
upon the rule of law, including but not confined to rational core values,
coherent institutional arrangements, and effective methodologies for achiev-
ing voluntary practices on the part of the governments, financial institutions,
and taxpayers.
Public shaming of wrongdoing countries and financial institutions has
been an effective solution to ensure the compliance of international tax law
because of reputational concerns. To improve the credibility of the blacklist,
the peer review process of AEOI group should be impartial, transparent, and
inclusive. Each blacklisted country should have the opportunity to be heard
and to explain before the final decision is made by the AEOI group.
In addition to the banking secrecy, other financial secrecy regimes, in-
cluding anonymous trusts and foundations and shell companies held by
nominal shareholders for anonymous shareholders, need to be regulated
from the perspective of international tax law. Examined from the domestic
law, either in the form of statutes or decided cases, the private relationships
in the structure of anonymous trusts and foundations and shell companies are
legal. However, the sole purpose of such legal structures is to avoid taxation
created by tax law. While recognizing the validity of the private legal rela-
tionship based on anonymous structures, we urge the international commu-
nity to restrict the abuse of anonymous structures for illegal BEPS purposes.
All nominal owners of the taxable properties for the beneficiary owners
should be obligated to report the information to the local tax authority,
which shares such information with the tax authority in other jurisdictions.
Of course, the confidentiality of such information should be well protected
from being abused by irrelevant individuals or institutions.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE BEPS PROJECT
On October 5, 2015, two years after announcing the Action Plan, the
OECD and G20 released the final BEPS package of thirteen reports, which
cover fifteen actions. The BEPS package represents the first substantial ren-
ovation of international tax standards in almost a century. Its mission is to
align the location of taxable profits with the location of economic activities
and value creation. Some generally accepted principles of international tax
law, including the single tax principle, the benefit principle, the anti-discrim-
ination principle, and the transparency principle are incorporated in the re-
ports. Despite considerable progress, there are many shortcomings with the
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BEPS project due to the short two-year framework. Hence, the BEPS project
is not the final destination of international tax law reform. Rather, it is the
first step toward the modernization of global tax governance in the long run.
A. New Shoes on the Old Road: an Old Approach for the
New Destination
The primary problem with the BEPS project is that although the new
destination has been defined, new principles and new rules have not been
established. Instead, the old principles have been strengthened by a patch up
of current rules. The core principle of international tax law is the single tax
principle, which requires eradication of double taxation and double non-tax-
ation. Unfortunately, governments and MNEs have focused on fighting
double taxation at the expense of double non-taxation. As a result of this
singular focus, the main theme of traditional international tax law has been
the eradication of double taxation. Accordingly, the mission of the BEPS
project is to prevent and eliminate the double non-taxation. As the G20 lead-
ers note, “profits [should be] taxed where economic activities occur and
where value is created.” In this respect, the new direction of international
tax law reform in the BEPS project is to safeguard the single tax principle.
It is well known that the rickety international tax regime, including
rules and underlying principles, is one of the primary root causes of BEPS
opportunities. As a result, the new direction demands revolutionary changes
to current approaches. The ideal roadmap for the BEPS project is supposed
to replace the old principles with a new principle, and to redesign the rules
based on the requirement of the new principle. Unfortunately, many old
principles of international tax law have been preserved in the final BEPS
package. This approach has substantially compromised the value of the new
principle, and made the legal reform of international tax look more like the
patch-up of existing rules and principles.
As a result of the patch-up, complete renovation of current international
tax law has not happened and genuine new rules guided by the new principle
have not been formulated. Instead, the patch-up work has produced complex,
discretionary, uncertain, costly, and contradictory rules. It remains difficult
to translate all the new rules into the reality. Moreover, even if the BEPS
project is implemented as outlined, it remains possible new BEPS opportuni-
ties to arise or arbitrariness by tax authorities to compromise the implemen-
tation’s effectiveness. The BEPS project is also silent on the basic concepts
of residence and source, and where profit should be considered to be earned.
Without the support of new principles for new rules, it remains very chal-
lenging to achieve the new destination of aligning the taxation of MNE prof-
its with economic activity.
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B. The Survival and Continuity of Notional and Illusionary Independent
Entity Principle and Arm’s Length Principle
The traditional international tax law is designed and interpreted based
on the assumption that the various constituent entities or members of MNE
groups are independent of each other and conduct transactions with each
other at arm’s length. While criticizing the independent entity theory as a
fundamental flaw of the existing rules, the BEPS Monitoring Group, an ac-
tive tax advocate group, identified a new but implied approach in the G20
mandate to treat the MNE group as a single firm, and ensure that its tax base
is attributed according to its real activities in each country. This approach
means that the new destination of taxing MNEs where economic activities
occur and value is created is unlikely to be achieved, without treating the
MNE group as a single firm.
We support the single unitary entity principle. The G20 mandate could
be interpreted as both a new direction and a new guiding philosophy, which
requires all the BEPS actions should serve the purpose of taxing MNEs
where economic activities occur and value is created in the most efficient
manner. Unfortunately, the BEPS project did not make the implied principle
explicit.  Instead, it continued to emphasize the independent entity principle,
while attempting to counteract its harmful consequences. Virtually all of the
new rules of the BEPS package are still built on the notional principle of
independent entity.
The orthodoxy of independent entity taxation has two basic assump-
tions. First, the members of the MNE group are regarded as equal, separate,
and independent legal entities. Second, the contracts between the related par-
ties in the MNE group are freely negotiated at arm’s length, and the terms of
the contract are fair and reasonable dealings. However, these assumptions do
not really exist in commercial reality.
The primary commercial reality is that the MNE group operates more
like a single, unitary entity or enterprise rather than separate independent
entities or enterprises. This cohesion is made possible by the controlling
power of the parent corporation. As traditional international tax law stub-
bornly insists on the old concept of independent entity, MNEs have been
encouraged to incorporate dozens and even hundreds of affiliates all over the
world to undertake aggressive BEPS schemes. Because of the controlling
power of the parent corporation, it is unlikely to find a real arm’s length
transaction in the reality. In fact, the related party contracts within the corpo-
rate group are always concluded without genuinely free, competitive, and
transparent bargaining and negotiations.
If the BEPS project is designed on the principle of single unitary entity,
the BEPS countermeasure will be much more simple and effective, as inter-
group transactions will be disregarded, and the profit or tax base will be
attributed to its real activities which generate the profit and create the value
in the jurisdictions. Unfortunately, many actions of the BEPS project, in-
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cluding but not confined to Action 2 on hybrid mismatches, Action 7 on
permanent establishment, and Actions 8–10 on transferring pricing, rely on
the legal fictions of independent entity and arm’s length transactions.
C. The Survival and Continuity of the Problematic Benefits Principle
The OECD declared that the goal of BEPS package is “to tackle BEPS
structures by comprehensively addressing their root causes rather than
merely the symptoms. Once the measures are implemented, many schemes
facilitating double non-taxation will be curtailed.” One of the root causes is
traditional benefit principle, which has guided the allocation of global profits
in the past decades, and has created many BEPS opportunities. Unfortu-
nately, the BEPS project failed to replace the benefit principle. Instead, the
BEPS package maintains residence jurisdictions for passive income and
source jurisdictions for active income.
BEPS concerns will be more effectively addressed if passive income is
primarily taxed at source and active income is primarily taxed at residence.
This new philosophy will help build a win-win framework international tax
governance that will benefit developed countries and developing countries.
Moreover, the conflicts between the domestic demand for tax revenue and
domestic policy to attract foreign direct investment will be better balanced,
and the MNEs and domestic firms will be offered a level playing field.
D. Limited Inclusiveness and Multilateralism
Global challenges need global solutions. BEPS, as a global concern, is
made possible by uncoordinated tax rules at domestic and international
levels. Accordingly, the global solutions need to be based on inclusive and
multilateral global governance. This approach means that all countries
should be offered equal opportunities to shape the outcome of the global
solutions. Although the OECD and G20 have made great efforts in organiz-
ing many non-member countries and non-governmental organizations to par-
ticipate in the development of the BEPS package, the inclusiveness and
multilateralism of the BEPS project is limited.
Major OECD countries dominated the formulation of the BEPS pack-
age, which reflects compromise between developed countries. For instance,
weak measures on controlled foreign companies (CFCs), interest deductibil-
ity, and innovation box schemes are favored particularly by the United King-
dom. Although over sixty countries were directly involved in the process of
the BEPS project, they account for less than one-third of the 193 United
Nations (UN) members. As MNEs have their taxable presence around the
globe, including the non-participating countries, the effectiveness of the
BEPS project is very limited. The tax competitions between participating
and non-participating countries will continue. The race to the bottom and the
unilateral actions taken by any jurisdiction could hurt all countries.
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Although some developing countries were consulted for the BEPS pro-
ject, their core proposals were not necessarily accepted by the BEPS pack-
age. As observed by independent commentators, “some key OECD
countries opposed and succeeded in blocking the institutional reform propo-
sal from developing countries at the [Third] International Conference on
Financing for Development.” Less influential participating countries and
more than 120 non-participating counties might be hurt due to the effect of
negative spill-over arising from the implementation of the BEPS project.
These countries are weak not only because of their limited influence in the
renovation of the current rules, but also because of their limited experience
and resources to enforce the BEPS actions.
The process of public debate and consulting was relatively insufficient.
The BEPS Monitoring Group complains that they have been vastly outnum-
bered by the army of paid tax advisers and representatives of multinational
enterprises. Although stakeholder interest, including invaluable interactions
with business and civil society, saw more than 12,000 pages of comments
received on the twenty-three discussion drafts published and discussed at
eleven public consultations, it is unknown to what extent these valuable pro-
posals have been adopted by the BEPS package. More importantly, detailed
reasons for rejecting different proposals have not been published.
Given the impossibility of guaranteeing that countries and stakeholders
really had equal opportunities to influence and shape the BEPS package, the
OECD and G20 are not the truly global platform needed for comprehensive
reform of international tax law. To transform the current BEPS project into
truly global, coherent, coordinated, and inclusive actions, the UN should un-
dertake the leadership in the next stage of international tax law reform.
The third paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter of the UN recognizes
that the third purpose of the UN is to achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanita-
rian character. The fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter of the UN
recognizes its fourth purpose is to “be a cent[er] for harmonizing the ac-
tions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” We believe that
the UN will be more qualified, impartial, transparent, credible, and influen-
tial than the OECD and G20 in rewriting and renovating the international tax
rules including the BEPS countermeasures. All UN members have the right
to be heard and represented in the process of international tax law reform.
We urge that the UN Convention of Anti-BEPS should be made as the
cornerstone of the global response to BEPS in a more coherent, inclusive
and multilateral manner. Compared with the partial multilateral approach of
OECD and G20, the global BEPS actions launched by the UN will better
address the BEPS concerns and restore the integrity of international tax prin-
ciples of single tax, neutrality, transparency, and fairness.
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E. The Limits of Action 1
The digital economy has greatly expanded the platform of commerce
and reduced the cost of business transactions. However, the digital economy
has also exacerbated BEPS risks. That is why the tax challenges of the digi-
tal economy were listed as the first top priority on the agenda of BEPS pro-
ject. To address BEPS concerns in the context of the digital economy, the
Action Plan of 2013 established the Task Force on the Digital Economy
(TFDE), a subsidiary body of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
TFDE’s core mission is to “identify the main difficulties that the digital
economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules and to
develop detailed options to address these difficulties, taking a holistic ap-
proach and considering both direct and indirect taxation.” Regarding Action
1’s focus on the tax challenges of the digital economy, the OECD states:
The report analyses BEPS risks exacerbated in the digital economy
and shows the expected impact of the measures developed across
the BEPS Project. Rules and implementation mechanisms have
been developed to help collect value-added tax (VAT) based on the
country where the consumer is located in the case of cross-border
[business-to-consumer] transactions. These measures are intended
to level the playing field between domestic and foreign suppliers
and facilitate the efficient collection of VAT due on these transac-
tions. Technical options to deal with the broader tax challenges
raised by the digital economy such as nexus and data have been
discussed and analyzed.
The TFDE identified certain specific issues generated by the key fea-
tures of the digital economy that warrant attention from a tax perspective.
These include: (i) “ensuring that core activities cannot inappropriately bene-
fit from the exception from permanent establishment [PE] status, and that
artificial arrangements relating to sales of goods and services cannot be used
to avoid PE status”; (ii) “the importance of intangibles, the use of data, and
the spread of global value chains, and their impact on transfer pricing”; (iii)
addressing opportunities for tax planning by businesses engaged in VAT-
exempt activities.
Although Action 1 “considered several options to address the broader
tax challenges raised by the digital economy, including a new nexus in the
form of a significant economic presence, none of these options were recom-
mended at this stage.” However, OECD and G20 countries have agreed to
monitor developments and analyze data over time to address the tax chal-
lenges raised by developments in the digital economy.
Action 1 was unable to propose all the solutions to the BEPS concerns
in the digital economy for the following two reasons. First, although the
digital economy has exacerbated BEPS risks, it has not generated genuinely
unique BEPS issues. Almost every BEPS issue is directly or indirectly rele-
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vant to digital economy. Additionally, all the BEPS actions interconnect and
interact with each other in the digital economy. Therefore, the ideal Action 1
report would focus on universal philosophy and methodology of the BEPS
project from the perspective of digital economy. It is challenging and unwise
for the TFDE to produce some unique measures in parallel with other mea-
sures of the BEPS project. Second, the staggered time frame of the BEPS
Project makes it impossible for TFDE to foresee and analyze the effective-
ness of the future BEPS package in addressing BEPS concerns in the digital
economy. For the same reason, it is difficult for TFDE to “evaluate the ulti-
mate scope of the more systemic tax challenges in the area of nexus, data,
and characterization, and potential options to address them.”
However, the limitations of Action 1 report could be overcome by
“continuing research on the broader tax challenges of the digital economy,
and by proposing detailed and viable options to address those challenges,
with appropriate focus on multi-sided business models and the participation
of users and consumers in value creation.” On the one hand, TFDE needs to
assist the implementation of other BEPS actions, such as Action 3 on CFC
rules, Action 7 on artificial avoidance of PE, Actions 8–10 on transfer pric-
ing. On the other hand, TFDE should update the Action 1 report based on
the experience, performance and outcomes of the BEPS Project. As planned
by TFDE, a supplementary report reflecting the outcomes of the continuing
work will be finalized by December 2015.
We doubt whether the intended outcomes of the BEPS project would be
available for assessment, given the fact that the implementation of the fifteen
actions is a lengthy process domestically and internationally. In our opinion,
the Action 1 report should be updated regularly based on the changing busi-
ness models of digital economy.
F. The Limits of Action 2
The main purpose of hybrid mismatch arrangements is to generate ex-
cessive deductible interest payments via either intra-group or third party
loan. In the Action 2 report, the OECD states:
Hybrid mismatch arrangements can be used to achieve unintended
double non-taxation or long-term tax deferral by, for instance, cre-
ating two deductions for one borrowing, generating deductions
without corresponding income inclusions, or misusing foreign tax
credit and participation exemption regimes. Country rules that al-
low taxpayers to choose the tax treatment of certain domestic and
foreign entities could facilitate hybrid mismatches. While it may
be difficult to determine which country has in fact lost tax reve-
nue, because the laws of each country involved have been fol-
lowed, there is a reduction of the overall tax paid by all parties
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involved as a whole, which harms competition, economic effi-
ciency, transparency and fairness.
To establish international coherence of corporate income taxation, the mis-
sion of Action 2 is to develop model treaty provisions and recommendations
regarding the design of domestic rules to neutralize the effect (e.g., double
non-taxation, double deduction, long-term deferral) of hybrid instruments
and entities.”
The Action 2 report identifies a common approach that will facilitate
the “convergence of national practices through domestic and treaty rules to
neutralize the effects” of hybrid mismatch arrangements. The report pro-
vides internal law recommendations and an OECD Model treaty
recommendation:
Internal laws [should] . . . deny a dividend exemption in respect
of payments that are deductible in the country of residence of the
payor, and to prevent taxpayers from using hybrid transfers to du-
plicate credits for source-country withholding tax. To avoid double
taxation and to ensure that the mismatch is eliminated even where
not all the jurisdictions have adopted the rules, the recommended
rules are divided into a primary response and a defensive rule. The
defensive rule only applies where there is no hybrid mismatch rule
in the other jurisdiction or the rule is not applied to the entity or
arrangement.
In addition, the Action 2 report proposes including a new provision in the
OECD Model Tax Convention to ensure that an entity that is a hybrid entity
under the tax laws of two treaty countries is eligible for treaty benefits in
appropriate circumstances but that treaty benefits are not allowed for income
that neither treaty country treats as income of one of its residents:
[These recommendations] will help to prevent double non-taxa-
tion by eliminating the tax benefits of mismatches and to put an
end to costly multiple deductions for a single expense, deductions
in one country without corresponding taxation in another, and the
generation of multiple foreign tax credits for one amount of for-
eign tax paid. By neutralizing the mismatch in tax outcomes, but
not otherwise interfering with the use of such instruments or enti-
ties, the rules will inhibit the use of these arrangements as a tool
for BEPS without adversely impacting cross-border trade and
investment.
The solutions of Action 2 are soft recommendations, instead of mini-
mum standards. Although countries have agreed to a general tax policy di-
rection in neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, it is
difficult to achieve the agreements on minimum standards at this stage. As a
result, the Action 2 has to choose a common approach to encourage the
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countries to converge over time through the implementation of the recom-
mendation at the levels of internal law and bilateral treaties.
However, it is not clear how long it will take the countries to converge
in a harmonized way because changes of domestic law are left to the free
choice of sovereign states based on the consideration of complex factors
including different legal traditions. Some jurisdictions might wish to con-
tinue to treat certain instrument as indebtedness, while others might continue
to treat it as equity. For similar reasons, some jurisdictions will continue to
treat certain hybrid entities and reverse hybrid entities as fiscally transparent
conduits, while some jurisdictions will continue to treat them as separately
taxable entities.
If a few countries are very slow in the convergence process, the whole
process of convergence will be delayed. Although all countries may argue
that their own measures or paths are consistent with the right direction of the
BEPS project, the real consequences might depart from the direction origi-
nally decided by the BEPS project. Even worse, it is possible that a few
jurisdictions will return to the race to the bottom. In this event, the original
direction of neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements might
be compromised in some jurisdictions.
We propose that the international community replace the common ap-
proach by global minimum standards. To better coordinate Action 2 with
other relevant Actions, in particular on interest expense deduction limita-
tions, CFC rules and treaty shopping, the latter Actions should also be up-
graded to minimum standards.
G. The Limits of Action 3
Many MNEs set up affiliated non-resident taxpayers, and route income
of a resident enterprise through the non-resident affiliate. Although the
OECD has not done significant work on CFC rules in the past, thirty coun-
tries participating in the BEPS project, including the United States intro-
duced CFC rules and other anti-deferral rules to address the BEPS concerns.
According to the OECD, “While CFC rules in principle lead to inclusions in
the residence country of the ultimate parent, they also have positive spillover
effects in source countries because taxpayers have no (or much less of an)
incentive to shift profits into a third, low-tax jurisdiction.”
As the CFC rules in many countries do not always counter BEPS in a
comprehensive manner, Action 3 aims at upgrading the CFC rules. The re-
port outlines building blocks of effective CFC rules, while recognizing that
the policy objectives of these rules vary among jurisdictions. The report
states, “The six building blocks includes definition of a CFC, CFC exemp-
tions and threshold requirements, definition of income, computation of in-
come, attribution of income and prevention and elimination of double
taxation.” Action 3 also “identifies the challenges to existing CFC rules
posed by mobile income such as that from intellectual property, services and
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digital transactions, and allows jurisdictions to reflect on appropriate policies
in this regard.”
The recommendations of Action 3 are not minimum standards. The rec-
ommendations provide flexibility to implement CFC rules and design op-
tions that could be implemented to be compliant with EU law. However,
they are “designed to ensure that jurisdictions that choose to implement
them will have rules that effectively prevent taxpayers from shifting income
into foreign subsidiaries.”
Strong CFC rules are supposed to play an important role in tackling
BEPS schemes. Action 3 should serve as a backstop to transfer pricing and
other rules. Unfortunately, the CFC rules in the Action 3 are very weak. The
building blocks in this Action are soft recommendations based on best prac-
tices, instead of hard minimum standards. In particular, the threshold for
defining CFC income is very low. The weak CFC rules could be explained
by the stubborn insistence on the tax incentives by some OECD countries, in
particular the United Kingdom. According to the BEPS Monitoring Group,
the United Kingdom and other countries “belie their assertions that they
wish to see effective solutions to the problem of taxation of MNEs.”
It is unlikely that Action 3 will effectively reduce and deter the motiva-
tion of MNEs to abuse the system of exemption or deferral of tax on foreign
income, and to shift income from operating affiliates in source jurisdictions
to the tax havens. Moreover, the race to the bottom is likely to continue to
attract the headquarters of MNEs. Traditional tax havens will  continue their
behaviors, while other countries will be motivated to adopt low effective tax
rates on foreign income or exempting such income altogether to attract for-
eign direct capital.
Although compromise is inevitable in the process of developing Action
3, the OECD and G20 should seek a win-win solution by maximizing the
common denominator of international tax. We urge the international com-
munity to strength the weak CFC rules of Action 3, adopt full-inclusion CFC
rules in the future, and replace the recommendations with minimum
standards.
H. The Limits of Action 4
Although the tax rules have significant influence on the location of debt
within MNE groups, the loopholes of international tax rules enable BEPS
schemes to be achieved by excessive deductible payments such as interest
and other financial payments. The MNEs can multiply the level of debt at
the individual entity level via intragroup financing. The unregulated deduct-
ibility of interest expense can give rise to double non-taxation in inbound
and outbound investment scenarios. Accordingly, the mission of Action 4 is
to “develop recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules
to prevent base erosion through the use of interest expense . . . and other
financial payments that are economically equivalent to interest payments.”
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The Action 4 report recommends an approach based on “a fixed ratio
rule, which limits an entity’s net deductions for interest to a percentage of its
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), as
measured under relevant tax principles.” This approach includes a “corri-
dor” of possible ratios between 10% and 30% for adoption by countries. In
addition, Action 4 includes factors that countries should take into account in
setting their fixed ratio, including “[a] worldwide group ratio rule that al-
lows an entity to exceed this limit in certain circumstances may supplement
this approach.” Action 4 is expected to ensure that an entity’s net interest
deductions are directly linked to the taxable income generated by its eco-
nomic activities and foster increased coordination of national rules in this
space.
As lower transaction cost and more business opportunities are the core
features and advantages of the corporate group, it is extremely abnormal for
the interest deductions to be greater in aggregate than each corporate group’s
consolidated interest costs to third parties. Theoretically speaking, if the in-
terest cost of intragroup loans is unreasonably higher than the loans from
third parties, the group and its members would reduce the interest loans. But
the reality does not support this logic. One of the pressure areas for the
BEPS concerns is that intragroup debt usually exceeds the firm’s overall bor-
rowing from third parties, and the interest deductibility is excessive. The
limitation of deductions of interest should be strong enough to root out the
BEPS opportunities.
Unfortunately, the Action 4 report is not minimum standard. It facili-
tates the convergence of national rules in the area of interest deductibility.
Therefore, its success depends on voluntary coordination between and
among countries on enacting new domestic rules. If the progress of imple-
mentation and operation of the recommendations is not satisfactory as antici-
pated, the effectiveness of this Action will be compromised. It is very
challenging for the jurisdictions to address excessive deductible payments
and competitiveness considerations and ensure that appropriate interest ex-
pense limitations do not themselves lead to double taxation.
More problematic is the substance of Action 4, which prioritizes an
interest deduction cap within a suggested band of 10% to 30%, with the
option of using apportioned consolidated interest costs if they are higher.
The formula of fixed cap does not match best with every sector and firm.
That is why the Action 4 report recognizes the need to develop suitable and
specific rules that address BEPS risks in banking and insurance industries.
Although it does make sense to respect the specific features of banking and
insurance industries, other industries might also claim the special treatments
from the BEPS project. It is not realistic to design the specific rules for every
firm, industry, or sector.
Before the proposal of a fixed cap was adopted, there were other better
proposals. For example, based on the doctrine of unitary entity, a proposal
suggested apportionment of the MNE group’s consolidated interest expenses
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based on EBITDA. However, the initial proposals have been “watered down
to recommendations prioritizing a fixed cap.”
We recommend that interest deductions may not be greater in aggregate
than each corporate group’s consolidated interest costs to third parties. The
recommendations in Action 4 do not prohibit countries from seeking better
alternative solutions for effective control of interest deductibility. If the
countries have no choice other than following the default recommendation
of a fixed cap on deductions, they should use the lowest limit to deter ag-
gressive interest deductions by MNEs. In fact, even the lowest limit still falls
in the range of unrelated loans. Furthermore, coordination is always impor-
tant to prevent the MNEs from defeating all of the countries by abusing the
different rules around the world.
I. The Limits of Action 5
Harmful tax practices, especially preferential regimes together with a
lack of transparency in connection with certain rulings, have been widely
used by MNEs for artificial profit shifting. In response, the OECD has called
for proposals “to develop solutions to counter harmful regimes more effec-
tively, taking into account factors such as transparency and substance.” To
advance this goal, the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) has been
refocused to develop more effective solutions. The mission of Action 5 “is
to revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on improving
transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related
to preferential regimes, and requiring substantial activity for any preferential
regime.”
The Action 5 report establishes a minimum standard based on an agreed
methodology to assess whether there is substantial activity in a preferential
regime. In the context of IP regimes, such as patent boxes, the “nexus”
approach achieved consensus.  The OECD explains:
This approach uses expenditures in the country as a proxy for sub-
stantial activity and ensures that taxpayers benefiting from these
regimes did in fact engage in [R&D] and incurred actual expendi-
tures on such activities. The same principle can also be applied to
other preferential regimes so that such regimes would be found to
require substantial activities where they grant benefits to a tax-
payer to the extent that the taxpayer undertook the core income-
generating activities required to produce the type of income cov-
ered by the preferential regime.
To improve the transparency of preference regimes, “a framework has been
agreed upon for mandatory spontaneous exchange of information on rulings
that could give rise to possible BEPS concerns.”
The harmful tax practices proliferating in many countries represent the
major form of race to the bottom. Such practices have triggered and in-
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creased numerous BEPS opportunities. Hence, Action 5 is designed to effec-
tively reverse the history of beggar-thy-neighbor, which damages all
countries, including the jurisdiction with harmful tax practices. Different
from the Actions 2 through 4, Action 5 establishes a minimum standard in
terms of substance and transparency, and includes the results of the applica-
tion of the elaborated substantial activity and transparency factors to a num-
ber of preferential regimes. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, Action 5
continues to be too weak to be effective.
First, the effectiveness of implementation of Action 5 is still up to vol-
untary self-regulation and self-monitoring by individual countries. Irrational
developed and developing countries could be addicted to harmful practices,
in the name of national competitiveness or attracting international capital.
Second, although the work of the FHTP will be refocused to develop
more effective solutions, no penalty could be imposed by FHTP. In fact, all
forty-three preferential regimes reviewed by the FHTP “were inconsistent
with the nexus approach.” However, there is no effective penalty against the
violators. It remains very challenging for all countries to voluntarily bring
their intellectual property regimes into compliance with the nexus approach.
Third, the application of the broad and general principles of nexus and
substance to innovation boxes might create different and divergent standards
and interpretations in different countries. The consideration of national com-
petitiveness or specific domestic circumstances might lead to new forms of
harmful preference regimes.
Fourth, some developed countries have set bad examples for the devel-
oping countries in fighting against the harmful practices. As observed by the
BEPS Monitoring Group, “the [United Kingdom’s] strong defense of its
‘patent box’ introduced in 2012 resulted in a compromise . . . with Germany,
based on a ‘modified nexus approach,’ and a transition to the new standard
by 2021.”
As the harmful tax practices always end up hurting every country, we
urge the international community to abandon the voluntary self-policing
model, and to establish mandatory monitoring model based on transparency,
accountability, condemnation, and even economic sanctions depending on
the seriousness of the harmful schemes. Harmful tax practices are unjustified
and immoral. They are against the core value of international tax law. There-
fore, it is inadequate, and even inappropriate to require countries to conduct
cost-benefit analyses of the harmful incentives.
Many countries still attempt to acquire the limited selfish benefit at the
price of negative spill-overs on the other countries. The harmful tax practices
themselves have demonstrated the failure of voluntary self-policing ap-
proach. All countries should be encouraged to behave themselves in terms of
higher standards of transparency, monitoring, review, and accountability of
tax incentives. If a country wants to win the global community’s trust, it
must take the firm initiative. To activate the monitoring function of FHTP,
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the mechanism of transparent investigation, impartial peer review, reasona-
ble reward, and adequate sanction will be indispensable.
J. The Limits of Action 6
As treaty abuse, especially treaty-shopping, may give rise to double
non-taxation, treaty abuse is one of the most important sources of BEPS
concerns. Although the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention before 2015 included a number of examples of provisions to
address treaty abuse, “[t]ighter treaty anti-abuse clauses coupled with the
exercise of taxing rights under domestic laws are expected to restore source
taxation” to some extent. Accordingly, Action 6 develops model treaty pro-
visions and provides recommendations on the design of domestic rules to
prevent granting treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances.
The Action 6 report includes a minimum standard on preventing abuse
(including abuse through treaty shopping) and new rules that “provide safe-
guards to prevent treaty abuse and offer a certain degree of flexibility re-
garding how to do so.” The rules first address treaty shopping, “which
involves strategies through which a person who is not a resident of a State
attempts to obtain the benefits of a tax treaty concluded by that State.” More
targeted rules have been designed to address other forms of treaty abuse.
Other changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention have been accepted to
ensure that treaties do not inadvertently prevent the application of domestic
anti-abuse rules. A clarification that tax treaties are not intended to be used
to generate double non-taxation is provided through a reformulation of the
title and preamble of the Model Tax Convention. The report also contains the
policy considerations to be taken into account when entering into tax treaties
with certain low or no-tax jurisdictions.
The Action 6 report outlines a three-part approach to counter treaty
abuse. First, “countries would include in treaties a clear statement that tax
evasion, avoidance, or treaty shopping is not condoned by the treaty coun-
tries.” Second, a “specific anti-abuse rule of limitation-on-benefits (LOB)
will be included in the OECD Model treaty, to ensure that there is a suffi-
cient connection between the entity and the country of residence.” Third, “a
more general anti-abuse rule, based on the principal purposes of transactions
or arrangements (the principal purposes test or PPT) will be included in the
OECD Model treaty,” so as to address situations not caught under the LOB
rule.
The three-part approach adopted by the Action 6 will help to counter
treaty abuse, but LoB articles and PPT provisions have their own pros and
cons. Although the LoB article is easily understood and applied, “a prolifer-
ation of treaty-specific varieties of LoB articles would lead to over complex-
ity in the treaties or domestic legislation.” Although the PPT provision is
general enough to cover all the treaty shopping schemes, its interpretation
and application depends on discretionary decisions of the tax authorities or
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the courts. Therefore, the success of PPT provision relies on the individual
country’s competence, expertise, and resources, especially the useful infor-
mation relevant to the treaty shopping behaviors.
Unfortunately, many developing countries do not have the necessary
capacity and information resources to make the best use of the PPT provi-
sion. To offer useful guidance and reference to the developing countries, we
urge the OECD and G20 to publish all of the latest decided cases or rulings
on the PPT article on a regular basis. To sharpen the competence of develop-
ing countries in applying the anti-abuse clauses, spontaneous, systematic ex-
change of information between treaty partners should be established to
ascertain the prerequisites for the taxpayer to enjoy treaty benefits. A more
ambitious, global, spontaneous, comprehensive, and systematic platform for
exchange of BEPS data between and among all jurisdictions should be cre-
ated in the future. CbCR is one of the important parts of this data bank.
Although the countries may vary substantially from each other in terms
of the legislation framework, judicial interpretation tools, and administrative
ability, all countries involved should do their best in endorsing the minimum
standard of protection against treaty shopping. In this way, the model treaty
provisions included in the Action 6 report will be better adapted to the speci-
ficities of individual states and the circumstances of the negotiation of bilat-
eral conventions. To reduce the treaty renegotiation cost and prevent the
emergence of new treaty shopping platforms, a clear and effective anti-abuse
provision should be incorporated as the core article of the proposed multilat-
eral convention.
Finally, another important issue is the policy considerations relevant to
treaty entitlement of collective investment vehicles (CIVs) and non-CIV
funds.98 The OECD will continue to evaluate issues related to entitlement to
treaty benefits by certain types of investment funds by early 2016.99 But it is
challenging to achieve a satisfied consensus on some key issues, as there are
different definitions of CIV in different jurisdictions. Furthermore, CIV may
be organized in different forms, including partnerships, agreements, trusts or
incorporated entities.
K. The Limits of Action 7
Current tax treaties “generally provide that the business profits of a
foreign enterprise are taxable in a State only to the extent that the enterprise
has in that State a [PE] to which the profits are attributable.” As a result of
this provision, the definition of PE in tax treaties determines whether a non-
resident enterprise must pay income tax in another State.
98 See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: PREVENTING
THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, 10, 18 (2014).
99 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 97, at 22. R
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[However,] in many countries, the interpretation of the treaty
rules on agency-PE allows contracts for the sale of goods belong-
ing to a foreign enterprise to be negotiated and concluded in a
country by the sales force of a local subsidiary of that foreign en-
terprise without the profits from these sales being taxable to the
same extent as they would be if the sales were made by a distribu-
tor. In many cases, this encouraged MNEs to replace arrangements
under which the local subsidiary traditionally acted as a distributor
by “commissionaire arrangements” with a resulting shift of profits
out of the country where the sales take place without a substantive
change in the functions performed in that country. Similarly,
MNEs may artificially fragment their operations among multiple
group entities to qualify for the exceptions to PE status for prepar-
atory and ancillary activities.
To “address techniques used to inappropriately avoid the tax nexus, includ-
ing via replacement of distributors with commissionaire arrangements or via
the artificial fragmentation of business activities,” Action 7 developed
changes to the definition of PE in Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention, which is widely used as the basis for negotiating tax treaties. Ac-
cording to the changes:
[I]f the agent habitually concludes contracts or habitually plays
the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are
routinely concluded without material modification by the enter-
prise in the name of the enterprise or for the transfer of, or the
granting of the right to use, property of the enterprise or for the
provision of services by the enterprise, the enterprise will be
deemed to have a PE. A person who acts exclusively or almost
exclusively on behalf of one or more closely related enterprises is
not considered an independent agent. The exceptions from creating
a fixed place of business for specific activities (such as storage,
display or delivery of goods) apply only if the overall activity of
the fixed place or business is of a preparatory or auxiliary
character.
Although Action 7 developed changes to the definition of PE in Article 5 of
the OECD Model Tax Convention, the changes are not substantially innova-
tive. This is because the definition of taxable presence still rests on the obso-
lete PE concept, which requires physical presence for a period of six or
twelve months in relation to the particular activity generating the profit at-
tributable to it.
Both the traditional PE definition and the proposed changes in Action
7, are based on the independent entity principle. Without disconnection be-
tween the taxable presence and the independent entity principle, it is un-
likely to make ground breaking groundbreaking progress in changing the
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definition of PE. Action 7 only targets abuse of the PE definition, instead of
rewriting the definition of PE itself. However, not all forms of abuse are
covered in this Action. The anti-fragmentation rule in Action 7 is only appli-
cable to artificial fragmentation of sales functions, but not to the artificial
fragmentation of non-sales-related functions. This means that MNEs will be
free to continue fragmentations of non-sales-related functions, and attribute
higher profits to tax havens.
According to the findings of the BEPS Monitoring Group, the propos-
als of Action 7 could only affect some MNEs, such as those engaged in
internet-based selling and which own warehouses in the country of sales.
However, the proposals would not “deal with sales of immaterial products,
or services, so they would affect physical but not electronic books, and
DVDs but not streaming services.” In fact, the MNEs have already restruc-
tured their production chains to separate basic manufacturing, which can be
allocated a “routine” profit, from functions such as R&D or design, which
may be considered high-value-adding, and “can be located where they will
be lightly taxed.” Even the rules against artificial fragmentation of sales
functions have some loopholes. For instance, although an entity will be
deemed to have a PE, if activities can be said to be “preparatory or auxil-
iary” to sales, the terms “preparatory or auxiliary” are not clearly defined.
Therefore, uncertainties and disputes are likely to arise in the future.
It should be noted that there are different legal rules in the agency,
especially the indirect agency in the civil law families and the common law
families. Different jurisdictions may have different definitions of the agent.
In European civil law jurisdictions, a commissionaire acts in its own name
for the account of a principal, but no relationship is created between the
customer and the principal. “As a commissionaire is not generally viewed as
a dependent agent by virtue of the commissionaire status, the activities and
place of business of a commissionaire are not attributed to the principal in
civil law jurisdictions. However, such arrangement could create agency in
common law countries.” Therefore, the anti-fragmentation rule should adopt
a functional approach, which should be compatible with the different legal
traditions of agency law in different countries.
According to the Action 7 report, follow-up works will be undertaken
to provide additional guidance on profit attribution to the PEs resulting from
the proposed changes, and to incorporate the proposed changes into the
Model Tax Convention. For the latter work, additional clarification on the
new treaty wording should be provided, any unintended consequences of the
changes should be addressed, and the BEPS issue related to the global trad-
ing of financial products should be considered. We urge that the limited
scope of the anti-fragmentation rule will be expanded to cover all the
schemes of abuse of the PE definition. If possible, the continuing work
should also reconsider the fundamental weakness of the ‘functionally sepa-
rate entity’ approach and reorient the future reform of anti-fragmentation
based on the single and unitary entity principle.
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L. The Limits of Actions 8–10
A major BEPS concern is transfer pricing. Transfer pricing rules, which
are described “in Article 9 of tax treaties based on the OECD and UN Model
Tax Conventions and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, are used to determine
on the basis of the arm’s length principle the conditions, including the price,
for transactions within an MNE group.” Transfer pricing rules allocates in-
come earned by a MNE among the countries in which the company does
business.
However, the existing transfer pricing rules fail in prices and efficient
allocation of the income of MNEs among taxing jurisdictions. Some MNEs
have been able to use and/or misapply those rules to separate income from
the economic activities that produce that income and to shift it into low-tax
environments. This most often results from transfers of intangibles and other
mobile assets for less than full value, the over-capitalization of lowly taxed
group companies, and from contractual allocations of risk to low-tax envi-
ronments in transactions that would be unlikely to occur between unrelated
parties.
Given that “special measures, either within or beyond the arm’s length
principle, may be required with respect to intangible assets, risk and over-
capitalization to address these flaws,” the mission of Actions 8, 9, 10 is to
assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation.  The
existing standards in this area have been clarified and strengthened, includ-
ing the guidance on the arm’s length principle, and an approach to ensure the
appropriate pricing of hard-to-value-intangibles has been agreed upon within
the arm’s length principle. Action 8, Action 9 and Action 10 are closely
connected to each other in this area.
As misallocation of the profits generated by valuable intangibles has
heavily contributed to BEPS concerns, Action 8 “develop[s] rules to pre-
vent BEPS by moving intangibles among group members. This approach
involves:
(i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of in-
tangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and
use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with
value creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules or special
measures for transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and (iv) updat-
ing the guidance on cost contribution arrangements.
Action 8 examines transfer pricing issues relating to controlled transactions
involving intangibles, since intangibles are by definition mobile and they are
often hard-to-value. To assure the appropriate pricing of hard-to-value in-
tangibles, Action 8 has devised an additional tool for countries to address the
use of information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities to un-
dervalue intra-group transfers of intangibles.
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Action 9 aims to “[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring
risks among, or allocating excessive capital to, group members.” This pro-
cess involves “ adopting transfer pricing rules or special measures to ensure
that inappropriate returns will not accrue to an entity solely because it has
contractually assumed risks or has provided capital.” The rules must align
returns with value creation. Under Action 9, contractual allocations of risk
are respected only when they are supported by actual decision-making and
thus exercising control over these risks.
Action 10 aims to “[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in
transactions which would not, or would only very rarely, occur between
third parties.” This Action adopted transfer pricing rules or special measures
to: “(i) clarify the circumstances in which transactions can be re-character-
ized; (ii) clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular
profit splits, in the context of global value chains; and (iii) provide protec-
tion against common types of base eroding payments, such as management
fees and head office expenses.” Action 10 deals with the scope for address-
ing profit allocations resulting from controlled transactions which are not
commercially rational, the scope for targeting the use of transfer pricing
methods in a way which results in diverting profits from the most economi-
cally important activities of the MNE group, and the use of certain type of
payments between members of the MNE group (such as management fees
and head office expenses) to erode the tax base in the absence of alignment
with the value-creation.
In aggregate, the Actions 8–10 report provides guidance on transfer
pricing rules that better align operational profits with the economic activities
which generate them. Additionally, the report contains “guidance on trans-
actions involving cross-border commodity transactions and on low value-
adding intra-group services.” Given the importance of these two areas to
developing countries, “the guidance will be supplemented with further work
mandated by the G20 Development Working Group, which will provide
knowledge, best practices, and tools for developing countries to price com-
modity transactions for transfer pricing purposes and to prevent the erosion
of their tax bases through common types of base-eroding payments.”
Actions 8 –10 are the most important part of the BEPS project in ad-
dressing related party transactions of MNEs. Of course, the transferring pric-
ing documentation requirements in Action 13 are also closely related to
these three actions. The purpose of Actions 8 –10 is to assure that transfer
pricing outcomes are in line with value creation. The proposals on transfer
pricing have made extensive revisions to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines, which in fact will further strengthen the discretionary power for tax
authorities to adjust them. Many proposals take the form of international
standards, which could have some direct effects as international soft law.
Although the goal is correct, the approach of Actions 8–10 is very prob-
lematic. The solutions still focus on patch up of the dysfunctional rules built
on the arm’s length principle, which again is rooted in the principle of sepa-
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rate independent entity. According to the arm’s length principle, all intra-
group transactions are supposed to be rational and reasonable as commercial
transactions between unrelated parties in comparable economic
circumstances.
To implement the arm’s length principle, Actions 8–10 make transfer
pricing rules more sophisticated and complex, so as to authorize tax authori-
ties to re-characterize the related party transactions within the MNE group.
To find the available comparables, the tax authorities are required to make
careful, informed judgement in good faith based on subjective analysis of
detailed facts and circumstances relevant to the functions, assets, and risks
actually undertaken by different group members located in different
jurisdictions.
As the approach of Actions 8–10 is inevitably subjective and discre-
tionary, the real effect of attribution of the tax base of MNEs will rely on the
interactive bargaining and negotiation between MNEs and tax authorities. If
the game is not fair enough, either under-taxation or over-taxation will arise.
To avoid under-taxation, tax authorities will tend to maximize their discre-
tionary power of re-characterizing, which might lead to the strong opposition
from the MNE taxpayers. For the similar reasoning, to avoid over-taxation,
MNEs might upgrade their aggressive BEPS schemes. As a result, both en-
forcement and compliance costs will be increased, and more disputes will be
created. Moreover, as the subjective judgement will be made independently
and separately by different national authorities, different jurisdictions might
make conflicting re-characterization conclusions on the same intra-group
transaction.
The complicated and uncertain approach of re-characterizing intra-
group transactions is most challenging for the developing countries, as they
do not have the necessary resources and expertise to administer the revised
version of Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Of course, it is also very costly or
even impossible for the developed countries to search for really precise and
genuine comparables. Although the G20 Development Working Group
promised to “help the developing countries to deal with the problem of lack
of comparables, ” it is not clear whether a simple, effective win-win solution
on pricing method will be made available in the near future. We don’t wish
to see any form of one-sided solutions, including purely subjective discretion
favored by tax authorities, and purely notational transfer pricing method fa-
vored by MNEs.
As indicated earlier, the principle of separate independent entity and the
principle of arm’s length are at most beautiful legal fictions, which do not
actually exist in the commercial reality. In fact, even the terms of transac-
tions between independent and unrelated parties are not necessarily fair and
reasonable, if the two parties do not have equivalent negotiation powers on a
level playing field. As the comparability analysis is not practical and feasible
as anticipated, we propose the formulary apportionment system based on the
single unitary entity principle. In other words, MNE group will be treated as
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single and unitary entity, and all intra-group transactions will be disregarded.
Compared with the approach of separate entity, this route will be more sim-
ple, direct, and effective in addressing the BEPS concerns arising from intra-
group related party transactions.
In fact, the OECD has already noticed the proposed alternative income
allocation systems, including formula based systems. Unfortunately, the
OECD finally refused to replace the current transfer pricing system. The
reason is not the flaw of the proposed alternatives, but the familiarity with
the current approach and the reluctance to switch to new approach by
launching ambitious reform. In the words of the OECD, “the importance of
concerted action and the practical difficulties associated with agreeing to and
implementing the details of a new system consistently across all countries
mean that, rather than seeking to the best course is to directly address the
flaws in the current system, in particular with respect to returns related to
intangible assets, risk and over-capitalization.”
As early as 2013, the OECD claimed that “there is consensus among
governments that moving to a system of formulary apportionment of profits
is not a viable way forward; it is also unclear that the behavioral changes
companies might adopt in response to the use of a formula would lead to
investment decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral than under a
separate entity approach”.
Although the US and some other states stubbornly defended and in-
sisted on the dysfunctional arm’s length principle for transfer pricing adjust-
ments and resisted alternatives, there is no credible evidence to indicate that
34 OECD members have reached clear and concrete agreement on unani-
mously opposing the system of formulary apportionment of profits based on
the single entity principle. Moreover, there are no scientific research find-
ings to indicate that the single entity approach has more weakness and less
strength than separate entity approach.
To offer easy, certain, clear and predictable solutions to the BEPS con-
cerns arising from transfer pricing, formulary apportionment methodology
should be adopted, and the allocation of assets, payroll, sales and other fac-
tors need to be restructured and weighted. This will better allocate the tax
base of MNE according to the location where economic activities and value
creation take place. Needless to say, to make the formulary apportionment
approach successful and sustainable, the principle of separate independent
entity needs to be replaced by the principle of single unitary entity.
M. The Limits of Action 11
As “significant data limitations severely constrain economic analyses
of the scale and economic impact of BEPS,” improving the availability and
analysis methodologies of data on BEPS is critical for the implementation of
the BEPS project. The original title of Action 11 was “Establish methodolo-
gies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to address it.” This
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action aims at “develop[ing] recommendations regarding indicators of the
scale and economic impact of BEPS and ensuring that tools are available to
monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and economic impact of the actions
taken to address BEPS on an ongoing basis.”
The Action 11 report slightly adjusted the original title to “Measuring
and Monitoring BEPS.” For data collection, the report defines BEPS as “ar-
rangements that achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the
jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place or by ex-
ploiting gaps in the interaction of domestic tax rules where corporate income
is not taxed at all.”
The report constructed a dashboard of six BEPS indicators, including
(1) the concentration of foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to GDP; (2)
high profit rates of low-taxed affiliates of top global MNEs; (3) high profit
rates of MNE affiliates in lower-tax locations; (4) effective tax rates of large
MNE affiliates relative to non-MNE entities with similar characteristics; (5)
concentration of royalty receipts relative to research and development spend-
ing; and (6) interest expense to income ratios of MNE affiliates in countries
with above-average statutory tax rates. This dashboard provides strong sig-
nals that BEPS exists and suggests it has been increasing over time.
The research also finds significant non-fiscal economic distortions aris-
ing from BEPS, and proposes recommendations for taking better advantage
of available tax data and improving analyses to support the monitoring of
BEPS in the future, including through analytical tools to assist countries to
evaluate the fiscal effects of BEPS and impact of BEPS countermeasures for
their countries. Going forward, enhancing the economic analysis and moni-
toring of BEPS will require countries to improve the collection, compilation
and analysis of data.
Although the final report of Action 11 conducted in-depth research on
measuring and monitoring BEPS and offered recommendations on collecting
and disseminating data to facilitate analysis of BEPS, there are some weak-
nesses. For instance, this report emphasizes that analysis of BEPS should not
rely on any one indicator, and requires that the indicators should be viewed
collectively to determine the scale and scope of BEPS. It is impossible for
each of the six indicators to have equal weight in each and every jurisdic-
tion. Unfortunately, this report has not offered a scientific and reliable
formula of differentiating the separate weights of the six indicators suitable
for the jurisdictions.
This report offers recommendations concerning data collection and dis-
semination to facilitate the analysis of BEPS for participating countries, and
proposes to collect new data under Action 5, 12 and 13. However, this report
has not proposed publishing the CbCRs worldwide to make the transfer pric-
ing information available to all countries and the public. We live in a society
of big data. Unfortunately, this report has not offered satisfactory big data
solution for the countries to use in a digital society. We believe that it is
necessary to develop a big data deployment strategy, and set up a global
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BEPS data bank as the basic platform for collecting, exchanging, dissemi-
nating and analyzing of BEPS information all over the world.
N. The Limits of Action 12
The availability of timely, targeted and comprehensive information on
aggressive tax planning strategies is extremely essential to enable govern-
ments to quickly identify risk areas. However, such information is often un-
available to tax administrations. The lack of such information is one of the
main challenges faced by tax authorities worldwide. While audits remain a
key source of relevant information, they suffer from a number of constraints
as tools for the early detection of aggressive tax planning techniques.
The mission of Action 12 is to require taxpayers to disclose their ag-
gressive tax planning arrangements by developing recommendations regard-
ing the design of mandatory disclosure rules for aggressive or abusive
transactions, arrangements, or structures, taking into consideration the ad-
ministrative costs for tax administrations and businesses and drawing on ex-
periences of the increasing number of countries that have such rules.
The Action 12 report provides a modular framework of guidance
for the countries to design and improve a regime that guarantees
early information on aggressive or abusive tax planning schemes
and their users. . . . The recommendations provide the necessary
flexibility to balance a country’s need for better and [timelier] in-
formation with the compliance burdens for taxpayers. It also sets
out specific best practice recommendations for rules targeting in-
ternational tax schemes, as well as for the development and imple-
mentation of more effective information exchange and
[cooperation] between tax administrations.
The purpose of Action 12 report is to enable the governments to have early
access to information, and to quickly respond to systemic tax risks through
informed risk assessment, audits or changes to legislation or tax policies.
However, the recommendations on requirements for taxpayers to dis-
close their aggressive tax planning arrangements are not minimum stan-
dards. Countries are free to decide whether or not to introduce mandatory
disclosure regimes. Currently, only seven countries have mandatory disclo-
sure regime in their domestic legislation. As the recommendations are not
universally mandatory, it is easy for the MNEs to avoid the mandatory re-
quirements in certain jurisdictions by incorporation in another jurisdiction
without such requirements. It is also possible for the jurisdictions to join the
race to the bottom by refusing to adopt mandatory disclosure regime. In our
opinion, mandatory disclosure rules should be introduced to each and every
jurisdiction, and the liabilities for violation of the mandatory disclosure rules
should be designed and enforced in fair and transparent manner.
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O. The Limits of Action 13
For the administration of transfer pricing, the G20 and OECD carefully
considered the asymmetry of information between taxpayers and tax admin-
istrations.100 This asymmetry could “undermine[ ] the administration of the
arm’s length principle and enhance opportunities for BEPS.”101 In many
countries, tax administrations do not have a whole picture of a taxpayer’s
global value chain.102 Divergences between approaches to transfer pricing
documentation requirements could also increase the compliance costs for
businesses.103 For these reasons, “it is important that adequate information
about the relevant functions performed by other members of the MNE group
in respect of intra-group services and other transactions is made available to
the tax administration.”104
Although MNEs demand transparency of tax law administration from
the tax authorities, they are reluctant to be transparent to the tax authorities.
BEPS opportunities are less likely to survive in a transparent international
tax environment. Better-coordinated transfer pricing documentation can in-
crease the quality of information provided to tax administrations and reduce
the compliance burden on MNEs.105 Therefore, it is urgent to “develop rules
regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance transparency for tax ad-
ministration, taking into consideration the compliance costs for business.”106
In this context, the MNEs should provide “all relevant governments with
needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic activ-
ity and taxes paid among countries according to a common template.”107
The Action 13 report outlines “a three-tiered standardized approach to
transfer pricing documentation, including a minimum standard on [CbCR].”
The OECD summarizes the approach as follows:
First, the guidance on transfer pricing documentation requires
[MNEs] to provide tax administrations with high-level informa-
tion regarding their global business operations and transfer pricing
policies in a “master file” that is to be available to all relevant tax
administrations. Second, it requires that detailed transactional
transfer pricing documentation be provided in a “local file” spe-
cific to each country, identifying material related-party transac-
tions, the amounts involved in those transactions, and the
company’s analysis of the transfer pricing determinations they
have made with regard to those transactions. Third, large MNEs




104 Id. at 23.
105 See OECD, BEPS Project, Explanatory Statement, supra note 97, at 17. R
106 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 97, at 23. R
107 Id.
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are required to file a CbCR that will provide annually and for each
tax jurisdiction in which they do business the amount of revenue,
profit before income tax and income tax paid and accrued and
other indicators of economic activities. The large MNEs refer to
those with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or exceed-
ing EUR 750 million. CbCRs should be filed in the ultimate parent
entity’s jurisdiction and shared automatically through government-
to-government exchange of information. In limited circumstances,
secondary mechanisms, including local filing can be used as a
backup. An agreed implementation plan will ensure that informa-
tion is provided to the tax administration in a timely manner, that
confidentiality of the reported information is preserved and that
the CbCRs are used appropriately.
Regarding implementation, the OECD recommended that the first CbCRs be
required to be filed for MNEs’ fiscal years starting from January 1, 2016,
while acknowledging that some jurisdictions may need time to transform the
reporting system into their domestic legislation.
For the first time, the three documentation tiers will require taxpayers to
disclose “consistent transfer pricing positions, and will provide tax adminis-
trations with useful information” of the entire picture of MNE operation,
and enable them to assess transfer pricing risks and make determinations
about whether, where, when, and how audit resources can most effectively
be deployed. By standardizing transfer pricing documentation across coun-
tries and limiting the need for multiple filings of CbCRs, “MNEs will also
see the benefits in terms of a more limited compliance burden.” According
to the OECD, “anticipation of this reporting system has already begun to
discourage aggressive tax planning.”
The annual CbCR is the most important measure in Action 13 to ensure
the minimum transparency of transfer pricing. However, there are some lim-
its to it.
First, the threshold of EUR 750 million of annual consolidated group
revenue is unreasonably high for the major MNEs in developing countries,
although this threshold is tailor made for the need of developed countries.
Such threshold will exclude many large MNEs from the CbCR requirement,
and deprive developing countries of the access to the information of MNEs
below the threshold. In fact, many large MNEs have annual consolidated
group revenue less than EUR 750 million. Needless to say, some large
MNEs will be motivated enough to manipulate their group revenue to a level
of less than EUR 750 million. In our opinion, all MNEs should be subject to
CbCR requirement.
Second, all of the transfer pricing documents are only required to be
submitted to the tax authorities, but not to the public and civil society orga-
nizations. It seems that the philosophy of this institutional arrangement is to
preserve the confidentiality of the information and to ensure the appropriate
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use by the government. However, the commercial confidentiality is not
strong enough to defeat the right of the public to information of BEPS. The
relevant stakeholders and the public need to have access to the MNEs’ trans-
fer pricing documentation. The reason is very simple, BEPS could hurt other
taxpayers and stakeholders in relevant jurisdictions. We believe that the
BEPS concerns will be more effectively addressed with the active and in-
formed participation of the stakeholders and the public based on disclosed
transfer pricing. Under the public pressure and support, the domestic legisla-
tures and tax authorities will be more diligent and competent in tackling the
BEPS issues. Of course, a high level of transparency will also benefit the
MNEs, as it will significantly reduce compliance burden, and will improve
their public image of credibility in terms of BEPS concerns.
Third, the CbCRs are only required to file with the tax authority of the
MNE’s ultimate parent entity’s jurisdiction, instead of all the tax authorities
of the jurisdictions where the MNEs have taxable business presences. To
ensure rapid availability of CbCRs, we urge the CbCRs to be shared auto-
matically and simultaneously between and among all the interested jurisdic-
tions which have good reason to believe the existence of taxable presences
by MNEs. Of course, if the MNEs’ transfer pricing documentation is made
available to the public, the double standards will be totally rooted out.
Fourth, although the content of the CbCRs covers the major issues of
transfer pricing, it is difficult to exhaust all the data needed by tax authorities
to assess the BEPS concerns arising from transfer pricing. Necessary data
should be added into the CbCRs on a regular basis.
P. The Limits of Action 14
The interpretation and application of novel BEPS rules could inevitably
introduce elements of uncertainty. To minimize and control the uncertain
outcomes and to remove double taxation as an obstacle to cross-border trade
and investment, it is necessary to “develop solutions to address obstacles
that prevent countries from solving treaty-related disputes under [the mutual
agreement procedure (MAP)], including the absence of arbitration provi-
sions in most treaties and the fact that access to MAP and arbitration may be
denied in certain cases.”
The Action 14 report outlines “a minimum standard with respect to the
resolution of treaty-related disputes[, including] . . . a strong political com-
mitment to the effective and timely resolution of disputes through the
[MAP]. The Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) will continue its efforts to
improve MAP through its recently established MAP Forum. According to
the report:
The commitment also includes the establishment of an effective
monitoring mechanism to ensure the minimum standard is met and
countries make further progress to rapidly resolve disputes. In ad-
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dition, a large group of countries has committed to quickly adopt
mandatory and binding arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties. . . .
It is expected that rapid implementation of this commitment will
be achieved through the inclusion of arbitration as an optional pro-
vision in the multilateral instrument to be developed to implement
the BEPS treaty-related measures.
MAP is the ideal win-win platform to effectively resolve treaty-related dis-
putes between two countries. However, the MAP does not always work ef-
fectively, because any party in the dispute could block the MAP unilaterally.
Unfortunately, the Action 14 has not offered remedies for the deadlock
of MAP. Although mandatory arbitration is the suitable remedy for the MAP
deadlock, Action 14 has not proposed the minimum standard of mandatory
arbitration. At most, this Action encourages the inclusion of arbitration as an
optional provision in the multilateral instruments. As some jurisdictions
might exclude the arbitration clause in their bilateral and multilateral tax
treaties, mandatory binding arbitration should be included in all bilateral and
multilateral tax treaties.
It is important to note that mandatory binding arbitration should be sup-
ported by clear and predictable substantive rules, due process of law, and
impartial and competent arbitrators. In our opinion, each party may freely
appoint one arbitrator. If the two parties are unable to collaborate in choos-
ing the chief arbitrator, the arbitration body may appoint the chief arbitrator.
Q. The Limits of Action 15
The success of the BEPS project depends on a swift implementation of
the measures. According to the OECD, “Some actions of the BEPS project
have resulted in recommendations regarding domestic law provisions, as
well as . . . changes to the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention
and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. However, changes to the OECD Model
Tax Convention are not directly effective without amendments to bilateral
tax treaties.” It would be very time-consuming and uncertain to amend the
more than 3,000 bilateral treaties currently in existence on a treaty-by-treaty
basis.
The Action 15 report explores the technical feasibility of a multilateral
instrument to implement the BEPS treaty-related measures and amend bilat-
eral tax treaties. It concludes:
[A] multilateral instrument is desirable and feasible, and . . . ne-
gotiations for such an instrument should be convened quickly.
Based on this analysis, a mandate has been developed for an ad-
hoc group, open to the participation of all countries, to develop the
multilateral instrument and open it for signature in 2016. So far,
about 90 countries are participating in the work.
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The goal of Action 15 is to streamline the implementation of the tax treaty-
related BEPS measures by drafting a multilateral instrument. Although this
Action represents a significant step towards multilateralism, the proposed
multilateral instrument has not been provided for debate. To make the multi-
lateral instrument coherent, inclusive and feasible, the developing process
should be open and transparent. Namely, the negotiations should be really on
equal footing, the proposals should be published, all relevant stakeholders
should be heard, and public debate should be meaningful.
However, participation in developing the multilateral instrument is vol-
untary, and participating countries are not obligated to sign it. This liberal
approach intends to encourage more countries to participate in the develop-
ment process. But it is uncertain how many countries will sign it in the end.
If the participating countries are obligated to sign the multilateral instrument,
many countries will be not interested in participation. This dilemma reflects
inadequate multilateralism represented by the OECD. Therefore, we believe
that UN is the most qualified multilateral platform to develop a universally
binding instrument to address BEPS.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME: A MULTILATERAL
SOLUTION
It is time to re-evaluate the benefits principle. Most of the current issues
can be solved by taxing passive income primarily at source and active in-
come primarily at residence. For passive income, the number of source juris-
dictions is much smaller than residence jurisdictions. Because most
individuals are relatively risk averse, portfolio investment flows overwhelm-
ingly to a small number of jurisdictions: the United States, European Union,
and Japan. If these jurisdictions could impose a withholding tax on all out-
bound payments, most of the problem of taxing passive income could be
resolved. Crucially, money cannot stay in tax havens and earn decent rates
of return, so the cooperation of tax havens is not needed, unlike in the case
of the MAATM. This approach would address the Sam Wyly problem be-
cause all of the income of the trusts would be currently taxed where it is
invested.108
For active income, about 90% of large multinationals are headquartered
in G20 countries, and none of those countries have a corporate tax rate be-
low 20%. If the G20 countries taxed their MNEs based on where the head-
quarters are located on a current basis and restricted the ability to move the
headquarters, the problem of taxing active income would be largely resolved
108 While FATCA takes care of the Wyly problem to some extent, it can be avoided by
using banks that have no U.S. exposure. MAATM is unlikely to solve this issue because Wyly
and tax evaders like him could place the trusts in a non-cooperating jurisdiction.
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as well. This approach would address the Apple and Caterpillar problems
because their offshore income would be subject to current U.S. taxation.109
The precedent for this approach is the adoption of the CFC rules.110
Before 1961, no country taxed the foreign source income of subsidiaries of
its MNEs because residence countries believed they lacked both source and
residence jurisdiction over foreign source income of foreign corporations.
However, in 1961 the Kennedy Administration proposed taxing all income
of CFCs by using a deemed dividend mechanism that was copied from the
Foreign Person Holding Company (FPHC) rules.111
While this proposal was rejected, the resulting compromise (Subpart F)
aimed at taxing income of CFCs that was unlikely to be taxed by source
countries either because it was mobile and could be earned anywhere (pas-
sive income) or because it was structured to be earned in low-tax jurisdic-
tions (base company income). Initially, the adoption of Subpart F seemed to
have put U.S.-based MNEs at a competitive disadvantage because no other
country had such rules. But gradually the picture changed. The United States
was followed by Germany (1972), Canada (1975), Japan (1978), France
(1980), the United Kingdom (1984), New Zealand (1988), Australia (1990),
Sweden (1990), Norway (1992), Denmark (1995), Finland (1995), Indonesia
(1995), Portugal (1995), Spain (1995), Hungary (1997), Mexico (1997),
South Africa (1997), South Korea (1997), Argentina (1999), Brazil (2000),
Italy (2000), Estonia (2000), Israel (2003), Turkey (2006), and China (2008).
Many other countries, such as India, are considering adopting such rules. As
a result, most of our trading partners now have CFC rules.
Moreover, the later adopters improved the U.S. approach in two princi-
pal ways. First, they rejected the deemed dividend mechanism, which can
lead to many unforeseen complications, in favor of taxing the shareholders
on a pass-through basis. Second, they generally explicitly incorporate the
effective foreign tax rate into the determination whether a CFC will be sub-
ject to current tax. This approach is better than the U.S. rule that is based
solely on the type of income because, after 1980, it became quite easy to
earn active income that is not subject to tax.112
The result is that the CFCs of EU-based MNEs are generally subject to
tax at similar or higher rates than U.S.-based MNEs113 despite the non-taxa-
tion of dividends from active income under territoriality. This outcome is a
classic example of constructive unilateralism. The United States led and
109 Some of the BEPS action items (8–10) seek to address the types of profit shifting
engaged in by Apple and Caterpillar, but they are not very effective.
110 We do not think unilateral action is possible on the evasion front, but as explained
above coordinated withholding taxes by the United States and European Union should work.
111 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Deemed Dividend Problem, 4 J. TAXATION GLOBAL TRANS-
ACTIONS 33 (2004).
112 See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, supra note 2, at 1577. R
113 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest US
and EU Multinationals 5 (Law & Economics Working Paper 41, 2011).
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others followed, and the end result is that most MNEs are subject to similar
effective tax rates, with no competitive disadvantage or advantage.114 The
result is a world in which there is much less double non-taxation than in the
absence of CFC rules.
Unfortunately, in the United States, Subpart F has been critically under-
mined by the adoption of check-the-box elections and the CFC-to-CFC ex-
ception, resulting in $2 trillion of low-taxed accumulated earnings offshore
by U.S.-based MNEs.115 This accumulation cannot happen in other countries
with tougher CFC rules, and is a major part of the explanation why despite
rampant tax competition most OECD members did not see the sharp drops in
overall corporate tax revenues that are seen in developing countries.
The main argument in favor of territoriality (exempting dividends paid
by U.S. CFCs from tax upon receipt by their parents) is the lock-out prob-
lem. About $2 trillion in low-taxed foreign source income are in CFCs that
cannot repatriate the income because of the 35% tax on repatriations and the
absence of foreign tax credits.116 We know this is a real problem because of
the effectiveness of the 2004–05 amnesty and because of various attempts by
MNEs to avoid the rule (via inversions, “killer Bs,” and short-term loans).117
But it is less clear that the solution is a participation exemption. Why
not abolish deferral and let the dividends flow back tax-free? This is a good
opportunity for constructive unilateralism. No G20 country has a corporate
tax rate below 20%. If the United States reduced the corporate tax to, say,
28%, and, at the same time, abolished deferral, other G20 countries, such as
Germany or France, would likely follow suit.118 These countries need the
extra revenue more than the United States, and concerns about competitive-
ness would be alleviated by the United States making the first move, like
they were in the original CFC context.
Other G20 countries have more effective CFC rules than the United
States, and those CFC rules already act as a de facto worldwide system with
a minimum tax. If the foreign tax is below a set level (e.g., 25% in Germany
or 20% in Japan), the CFC rules kick in to tax the income. The result is that
there is much less lock out because most low-taxed foreign income is taxed
by the CFC rules. The change to a worldwide system would be much less
radical than usually envisaged. This is why for both the United Kingdom and
114 Id.
115 Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base, 81 TAX
NOTES 3 (2016).
116 Id.
117 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH
CONG., REPATRIATING OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR SELECT MULTINATIONALS
5 (Comm. Print 2011).
118 28% is the rate in which a revenue neutral corporate tax reform can be achieved if we
abolished the three major corporate tax expenditures (deferral, accelerated depreciation, and
the domestic manufacturing deduction). See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & MARK P. KEIGHTLEY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43060, TAX REFORM IN THE 144TH CONGRESS: AN OVERVIEW OF
PROPOSALS 3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43060.pdf.
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Japan, there was no significant increase in repatriations after they adopted
territoriality in 2009.119
But should the United States not adopt a minimum but lower tax on
foreign source income for competitiveness reasons? This is what both the
Obama and Congressman David Camp proposals envisage. Obama suggests
a 28% corporate tax on domestic profits and a 19% tax on foreign income,
while Camp proposed a 25% tax on domestic profits and a 12.5-15% tax on
foreign income.
The problem, of course, is that such a gap would still encourage U.S.-
based MNEs to shift profits overseas, with no repatriation tax to deter them.
The United States can always fall back to such a system if needed. But, for
now, we suggest taxing all income at the same rate, and if that rate has to be
lower, so be it. As long as it is above 20% we do not think we will be
outside G20 norms, and a rate in the 20% to 25% range will not put our
MNEs at a significant competitive disadvantage given the effective mini-
mum tax imposed by the CFC rules of our trading partners.
It is impossible to predict what will happen, but the history described
above suggests that there is a good chance that other G20 countries will
follow us if we abolish deferral at a lower rate.120 If that happens, all the
usual objections to worldwide taxation (competitiveness, inversions, and the
various neutralities) lose their force. We do not think there is a significant
risk involved in this move, and the potential upside is quite large.
CONCLUSION
The benefits principle should be reconsidered in light of the reality of
globalization. We should tax passive income primarily at source and active
income primarily at residence. This approach will enable the large econo-
mies to address both individual tax evasion and corporate tax avoidance.
These problems must be addressed if we are to continue to maintain and
expand the benefits of globalization. The U.S. public support of globaliza-
tion hinges on the existence of a social insurance safety net. If the rich and
large corporations are not perceived to pay their fair share, the public’s will-
ingness to pay tax to support this safety net is eroded. Once a culture of not
119 Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, Territoriality in Search of
Principles and Revenue: Camp and Enzi 141 TAX NOTES 173 (2013).
120 See the most recent proposal of the EU Commission to tax currently CFC profits that
are subject to an effective tax rate below 40% of the residence country rate if over 50% of the
CFC’s income is either passive or derived from sales to related parties. Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 14544/15, art. 9 (Dec. 2, 2015), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-14544-2015-INIT/en/pdf; see also European Commission, Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of
the internal market, COM (2016) 26 final; European Commission, Anti Tax Avoidance Pack-
age, COM (2016) 23 final. But see Christian Oliver & Jim Brunsden, US blasts Brussels over
tax probe bias, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c63db5c8-c6b1-11e5-
808f-8231cd71622e.html#axzz4CRV4Xfta. Hopefully, the next U.S. Administration will take
a more cooperative attitude.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\6-2\HLB203.txt unknown Seq: 54 29-NOV-16 12:09
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paying taxes is established it is very hard to change. We need to do some-
thing about both tax evasion and avoidance before it is too late.
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A GLOBAL TREATY OVERRIDE?
THE NEW OECD MULTILATERAL TAX




On June 7, 2017, seventy-six countries met in Paris for the official sign-
ing of a new multilateral tax instrument (MLI).1 The text and commentary
of the MLI were published in November 2016 by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD stated:
The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent BEPS will implement minimum standards to
counter treaty abuse and to improve dispute resolution mecha-
nisms while providing flexibility to accommodate specific tax
treaty policies. It will also allow governments to strengthen their
tax treaties with other tax treaty measures developed in the
OECD/G20 BEPS Project. . . .
The new instrument will transpose results from the OECD/G20
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS) into more than
2,000 tax treaties worldwide.2
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. We would like to
thank Kim Brooks, Nir Fishbien, Pasquale Pistone, Omri Marian, Gianluca Mazzoni, Steven
Ratner, Richard Reinhold, Fadi Shaheen, Victor Thuronyi, and participants in the October,
2017 MJIL conference on the MLI for their very helpful comments.
** Professor of Law, University of International Business & Economics, Beijing; SJD
candidate, the University of Michigan.
1. Ground-breaking multilateral BEPS convention signed at OECD will close loop-
holes in thousands of tax treaties worldwide, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD]
(June 7, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ground-breaking-multilateral-beps-convention-will-
close-tax-treaty-loopholes.htm; see OECD, SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE MULTILAT-
ERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-
signatories-and-parties.pdf (listing the countries that have signed the treaty, plus countries
that intend to sign soon). The signatories include the major OECD and EU members (except
for the U.S.), China and India, as well as many important treaty shopping jurisdictions (e.g.,
the Netherlands and Mauritius) and tax havens (e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong). As of Oc-
tober 2017, 71 jurisdictions have signed the MLI but only one (Austria) has ratified it; four
more ratifications are needed for the MLI to enter into force, which is expected to occur by
early 2018.
2. Countries adopt multilateral convention to close tax treaty loopholes and improve
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The OECD went on to explain that:
[t]he multilateral convention was developed over the past year,
via negotiations involving more than 100 jurisdictions including
OECD member countries, G20 countries and other developed
and developing countries, under a mandate delivered by G20 Fi-
nance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their February
2015 meeting . . . The OECD will be the depositary of the multi-
lateral instrument and will support governments in the process of
its signature, ratification and implementation.3
There is no question that this event represents a milestone in the evolution
of the international tax regime (ITR).4 But it also raises important ques-
tions about the function of tax treaties in the twenty-first century and
whether other steps can be taken to improve the tax treaty network be-
yond the MLI.
To appreciate the importance of the MLI, it is useful to take a step
back and consider its historical significance. Bilateral tax treaties were first
negotiated in the nineteenth century,5 but their importance grew after
World War I because of increased income tax rates and the risk of taxation
by both country of residence and country that sources the income.6 The
result was the publication of the first model bilateral tax treaty under the
auspices of the League of Nations in 1928,7 followed by the Mexico
(1943)8 and London (1946)9 models. The OECD took over from the
League after World War II and published its own bilateral model (based
on the London model) in 1963,10 while the UN published a bilateral model
based on the Mexico model in 1980.11 These models in turn inspired a
network of over three thousand bilateral tax treaties that form the bul-
3. Id.
4. See generally REUVEN AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TAX LAW (2015) (discussing the international tax regime). For the importance of the
MLI as a turning point in the evolution of the international tax regime, see A GLOBAL ANAL-
YSIS OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES (Eduardo Baistrocchi ed., 2017).
5. For the history of the pre-World War I bilateral tax treaties, see, e.g., Sunita
Jogarajan, Prelude to the International Tax Treaty Network: 1815–1914 Early Tax Treaties and
the Conditions for Action, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 679 (2011). The first tax treaty was
concluded between Prussia and Saxony in 1869. Id at 696.
6. Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Resi-
dence vs. Source, 5 Colum. J. Tax. L. 1, 13 (2013).
7. See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double
Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562M.178 1928 II (1928).
8. Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation
and Fiscal Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.2.M.2. 1945 II A (1945).
9. Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation
and Fiscal Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88. 1946 II A. (1946).
10. OECD, Draft double taxation convention on income and capital: report of the
O.E.C.D. Fiscal Committee (1963).
11. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CON-
VENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102,
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wark of the ITR.12 About eighty percent of the words of any two tax trea-
ties are identical and derive from the OECD or UN models (which are
themselves over eighty percent identical to one another).13
From the beginning, the League of Nations was interested in the possi-
bility of negotiating a multilateral tax treaty, but it concluded that the dif-
ferences among the tax laws of different states were too vast to allow for a
successful negotiation.14 Subsequent efforts to negotiate multilateral tax
treaties also failed.15 Most recently, the European Court of Justice refused
to apply its freedom of movement of capital jurisprudence to force a har-
monization of withholding tax rates among treaties within the EU.16
However, in the academic world as well as in practice, there has been
increasing recognition of the need for a multilateral tax treaty.17 There are
three reasons why a multilateral tax treaty makes more sense than a net-
work of bilateral tax treaties. First, the rise of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then the WTO after World War II, has
shown that multilateral treaties governing important areas of international
economic law are feasible if space is allowed for reservations (i.e., allowing
countries to opt out of specific provisions). Second, there has been increas-
U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980). United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries (United Nations, 1980).
12. REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 5 (2007).
13. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 99 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs, eds.,
2009); Elliott Ash and Omri Marian, The Making of International Tax Law: Empirical Evi-
dence from Natural Language Processing, NTA Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, November 9,
2017.
14. Eran Lempert, Crossing the Barrier: Towards a Multilateral Tax Treaty (2009) (un-
published J.S.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors).
15. Id. For an early appreciation of the need for a multilateral treaty, see Thomas S.
Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, 22 PROC. OF THE ANN.
CONF. ON TAX’N UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NAT’L TAX ASS’N, 192-199 (1929) (“Now, in
the long run, whatever solutions are adopted by different pairs of nations, it is probable that
Nation A in concluding a bi-lateral convention with Nation B will adopt some solution differ-
ent from that which it might adopt in a similar treaty with Nation X. And if this piece-meal
bargaining goes on for twenty years or more, as it is likely to go on, it may possibly result in a
tangle of conflicting solutions applicable to the nationals of different countries, which will be
highly complicated and highly mysterious, and about as bad as the situation that now exists.
In short, there is in my mind, looking to the ‘longer future, the strongest reason for the
adoption of one uniform solution, if we could get it, or the settlement of this problem by a
multilateral convention, in which a large group of nations would adopt the same solutions for
the detailed problems which have to be set.”).
16. Case C-376/03, D v. Inspecteur van Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. I-05821.
17. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, The Potential of Multilateral Tax Treaties, in TAX TREATIES:
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010); Jung-
hong Kim, A New Age of Multilateralism in International Taxation?, 21 SEOUL TAX L. REV.
227 (2015); Richard L. Reinhold, Some Things That Multilateral Tax Treaties Might Usefully
Do, 57 TAX LAW. 661 (2004); Thomas Rixen, Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political
Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation, 16 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 589 (2010);
Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1641 (2001).
158 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:155
ing convergence in the language of the various tax treaties; in particular,
the OECD and UN models have become increasingly similar over time.18
Third, with globalization, tax competition treaty shopping (using treaties
to obtain advantages for non-treaty country residents)19 and “triangular
situations” (problems arising from treaty residents doing business in third
countries in ways that affect the treaty but are not covered by it) have
become far more common.20
The main obstacle to a multilateral tax treaty has always been that
investment flows vary by each pair of countries; therefore, appropriate
withholding tax rates vary as well.21 That is the main reason for the re-
maining differences between the OECD and UN models, because flows
between developed countries are more reciprocal than flows between de-
veloped and developing countries. But even that is changing, as more de-
veloping countries become capital exporters as well as importers.22 In
addition, it has for some time been recognized that it may be possible to
negotiate a multilateral treaty but leave the withholding tax rates to be
settled by bilateral negotiation, as the UN model does.23
The new OECD MLI represents the culmination of this line of think-
ing. It is not a full-fledged multilateral tax convention covering all the ar-
eas that are usually covered by bilateral tax treaties. Instead, it is a global
consensual treaty override designed to apply the results of Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) simultaneously to all the tax treaties where the
countries involved agree. The MLI is implemented by countries signing
and ratifying it according to their usual constitutional norms and then de-
positing the ratification with the OECD.24 Upon ratification, the provi-
sions of the MLI apply to modify the relevant provisions of the bilateral
treaties of each depositing country with other depositing countries that
18. REUVEN SHLOMO AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION LAW 150 (2011).
19. Reuven Avi-Yonah & C. H. Panayi, Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the
European Union, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 21
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010).
20. EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL INCOME TAX
TREATIES IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS (2014).
21. Withholding Tax Rates 2017, DELOITTE (Mar. 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-withholding-tax-rates.pdf
22. For an overview of the general trends of participation of developing countries in
world trade, see Comm. on Trade and Dev., Participation of developing countries in World
Trade: Overview of major trends and underlying factors, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/15
(Aug. 16, 1996).
23. See Lempert, supra note 14.
24. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Multilateral Convention to Imple-
ment Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, art. 27 (June 7, 2017), http://www.oecd
.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-pre-
vent-BEPS.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2017 MLI]; OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multi-
lateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, ¶ 263, https://
www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf [hereinafter OECD MLI Explanatory
Statement].
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they both designate as “covered tax agreements,” unless there is a reserva-
tion (which is not allowed in some cases involving minimum BEPS
standards).25
One of those minimum standards that has been agreed to by all sev-
enty-one signatories of the MLI is the “primary purpose test” (PPT),
which states:
A [treaty] benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be
granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasona-
ble to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circum-
stances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly
or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting
that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of Covered Tax
Agreement.26
The PPT, which was adopted over strenuous opposition from the United
States, may influence treaty interpretation beyond the signatories of the
MLI. In particular, the reference to the “object and purpose” of the tax
treaty should be interpreted in light of the new preamble to the OECD
model, which clarifies that the object and purpose of tax treaties is to pre-
vent both double taxation and double non-taxation.27 This adoption of the
“single tax principle” can have wide-ranging ramifications for the interpre-
tation of tax treaties, and may even impact the United States as a non-
signatory because the prevention of double non-taxation is also incorpo-
rated into the 2016 U.S. model.28
In addition, the new OECD MLI has a wide-ranging dispute resolu-
tion mechanism including mandatory arbitration.29 Mandatory arbitration
has recently been introduced into the OECD and U.S. models,30 but it is
still lacking in the UN model and most actual treaties. The effect of includ-
ing it in the MLI may be to force binding arbitration on many existing
treaties, which is likely to prove controversial.31
25. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 280.
26. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
27. OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances,
Action 6 – 2015 Final Report 92 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241695-en
(“(State A) and (State B) . . . intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of
double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without creating opportunities
for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance”).
28. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Full Circle: The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and the New
US Model, 1 GLOBAL TAXATION 12 (2016).
29. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts. 18–26.
30. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art.
25, ¶ 6–10, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-
US%20Model-2016.pdf; OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 25
(2008), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/42219418.pdf.
31. Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 703 (2008).
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This article will proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main
provisions of the MLI. Section 3 discusses the purpose of tax treaties in the
twenty-first century, because it can be argued that they are less necessary
under conditions of tax competition. Section 4 raises the question whether
tax treaties can be improved short of a full-fledged multilateral tax treaty
by inserting a most favored nation (MFN) provision similar to those found
in bilateral investment treaties. Such an MFN provision operates over time
to create a de facto multilateral treaty without the negotiation of one. Sec-
tion 5 concludes this article.
2. THE NEW OECD MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT (NEW MLI)
2.1 The Mission of the MLI
The mission of the MLI is described in the preamble as follows:
[T]o ensure swift, co-ordinated and consistent implementation of
the treaty-related BEPS measures in a multilateral context . . . to
ensure that existing agreements for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion on income are interpreted to eliminate double taxation with
respect to the taxes covered by those agreements without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrange-
ments aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in those agreements for
the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions) . . . to imple-
ment agreed changes in a synchronised and efficient manner
across the network of existing agreements for the avoidance of
double taxation on income without the need to bilaterally renego-
tiate each such agreement.32
In short, the overall mission or purpose of the MLI is to implement tax-
treaty-related BEPS measures in a swift, coordinated, and consistent man-
ner across the network of existing tax treaties (Covered Tax Agreements)
in a multilateral context without bilateral renegotiation of each agreement.
Although tax treaties have played an important role in eliminating
double taxation and facilitating globalization of liberal investment and
trade in past decades, the loopholes and mismatches in existing treaties are
one of the root causes of widespread unregulated BEPS opportunism.33
As a comprehensive response, BEPS Actions 2, 6, 7 and 14 have devel-
oped a series of treaty-related BEPS measures. Action 2 report aims at
neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements.34 Action 6 re-
port aims at preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances.35 Action 7 report aims at preventing the artificial avoid-
32. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
33. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 13 (July 19, 2013), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en.
34. See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 -
2015 Final Report (Oct.5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241138-en.
35. See OECD, supra note 27.
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ance of Permanent Establishment (PE) (physical presence) status.36 Ac-
tion 14 report aims at making dispute resolution mechanisms more
effective.37
Beyond reflecting the BEPS measures in articles 3 through 26, the
MLI further reinforces the single tax principle by “recognizing the impor-
tance of ensuring that profits are taxed where substantive economic activi-
ties generating the profits are carried out and where value is created,” and
clarifying the position to eliminate both double taxation and non-taxation
or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance.38
Multilateral problems demand multilateral solutions. Implementation
of the BEPS Package will demand updates to model tax conventions, in-
cluding the OECD Model Tax Convention and the UN Model Tax Con-
vention, as well as the bilateral tax treaties that follow those model
conventions.39 Uncoordinated bilateral updates to the treaty network
would be burdensome and time-consuming and would frustrate the imple-
mentation of BEPS measures by creating new BEPS opportunities.
To avoid uncoordinated and inconsistent unilateralism or bilateralism,
pursuant to Action 15 Report, “Developing a Multilateral Instrument to
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,” the MLI is intended to effectively and effi-
ciently modify existing agreements in a multilateral context by creating
and maintaining an effective, transparent, and reliable mechanism assisted
by the Depositary, the Secretary General of OECD.40 The MLI is not an
amending protocol to a single existing treaty, and would not directly
change the text of existing treaties.41 Instead, the MLI will be applied
alongside existing tax treaties, serving as the compass to empower and en-
able the modification, interpretation, and application of the Covered Tax
Agreements for the purpose of effective implementation of the treaty-re-
lated BEPS measures and the single tax principle.
The MLI would strengthen global partnerships and facilitate the
smooth modification of the Covered Tax Agreements.42 All Parties would
benefit from active participation either by developing consolidated ver-
sions of their Covered Tax Agreements as modified by the MLI, or by
agreeing subsequently to different but functionally equivalent modifica-
36. See OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status,
Action 7 - 2015 Final Report (Oct. 5, 2015) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241220-en.
37. See OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 -
2015 Final Report (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241633-en.
38. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
39. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 4.
40. See OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,
Action 15 -2015 Final Report, at 18, ¶ 11 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892642
41688-en.
41. See OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24 ¶ 15.
42. Countries adopt multilateral convention to close tax treaty loopholes and improve
functioning of international tax system, OECD (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/coun-
tries-adopt-multilateral-convention-to-close-tax-treaty-loopholes-and-improve-functioning-
of-international-tax-system.htm.
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tions to their Covered Tax Agreements.43 It is not wise for any Party to be
marginalized and isolated by the far-reaching reform of international tax
regime led by the MLI and the BEPS project as a whole.
The MLI would ensure the coherent and consistent interpretation of
the numerous Covered Tax Agreements. Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties requires that a treaty “be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in
context and in light of its object and purpose.”44 Thus, the purpose of the
MLI and the Covered Tax Agreement should be taken into account for
the purpose of precisely understanding “the context” in question. To clar-
ify the intent of the Parties to ensure that Covered Tax Agreements be
interpreted in line with the mission of the MLI especially in controversial
circumstances, article 6(1) requires the Covered Tax Agreements to be
modified to include the penultimate paragraph of the preamble text of the
MLI.45
In addition to benefiting governments by closing the BEPS loopholes,
the MLI is also intended to benefit MNEs by improving the transparency
and predictability of the international tax regime and effectively minimiz-
ing and/or resolving disputes over the application of Covered Tax
Agreements.46
2.2 The Principled Flexibilities in the MLI
The MLI is both principled and flexible in response to the idealism
and pragmatism of the BEPS package. The treaty-related minimum stan-
dards, including the prevention of treaty abuse under Action 6 and the
improvement of dispute resolution under Action 14, must be implemented
by and through the operation of the MLI in relation to the Covered Tax
Agreements.47 However, the MLI is principled not only because of its
dedication to effective implementation of the minimum standards of
BEPS measures, but also because of firm adherence to the single tax prin-
ciple and multilateralism.48
To some extent, it is difficult or even impossible to develop a “one-
size-fits-all” BEPS solution.49 Recognizing that not all the agreed BEPS
43. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 13.
44. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
45. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6.
46. Angel Gurrı´a, Secretary-General, OECD, Remarks at Adoption Ceremony of the
BEPS Treaty (Nov. 24, 2016), (transcript available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/remarks-
at-adoption-ceremony-of-the-beps-treaty.htm).
47. OECD, Background Brief: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, ¶ 5 (Jan. 2017), https://
www.oecd.org/ctp/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf.
48. For a brief discussion of the complexities of multilateralism in the context of
BEPS, see CHRISTIANA HJI PANAYI, ADVANCED ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
TAX LAW 153–57 (2015).
49. MICHAEL LANG ET AL., BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): THE PRO-
POSALS TO REVISE THE OECD MODEL CONVENTION 212 (2016).
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measures are minimum standards or hard rules, and given that even the
minimum standards can  be achieved in multiple different ways, the MLI
has to be flexible and moderate to enable the Parties to substantially and
creatively meet the minimum standards and seek best practices pursuant
to the purpose and object of the BEPS project. The Parties enjoy a variety
of solutions to implement the MLI by and through free choice to opt in
and/or opt out, win-win mutual agreements based on compromise, and in-
vention of more effective methodology and tools in line with the mission
and purpose of the MLI and the BEPS package.50
First, the MLI only applies to the Covered Tax Agreements that are
specifically listed by the Contracting Jurisdictions to those Agreements,51
although the MLI is intended to cover all existing tax treaties.52 A Party
may choose to exclude a specific agreement from the scope of Covered
Tax Agreements if such agreement “has been recently renegotiated to im-
plement the outcomes of the BEPS Project, or is currently under renegoti-
ation with the intent of implementing those outcomes in the renegotiated
agreement.”53
Second, the Parties may use a reservation to opt out of the entirety or
parts of substantial provisions not reflecting the minimum standard in the
MLI.54 The reserved provision will not apply as between the reserving
Party and all other Parties to the MLI, and the reserving Party is not obli-
gated to modify the Covered Tax Agreements as foreseen by the reserved
provision of the MLI.55
Third, the Parties may use a reservation to opt out of the entirety or
parts of provisions to be applied to “a subset of Covered Tax Agreements
in order to preserve existing provisions that have specific, objectively de-
fined characteristics.56 “[S]uch reservations will apply as between the re-
serving Party and all Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax
Agreements covered by such reservations.”57
Fourth, multiple alternatives or optional provisions addressing a par-
ticular BEPS issue offered in the MLI will apply only if all Contracting
Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement affirmatively and expressly
choose to apply them.58 Parties may also feel free to supplement the main
provision of the MLI with an additional provision in the Covered Tax
Agreement.59
50. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 13–14.
51. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 1–2.
52. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 26.





58. E.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 2424, art. 7(7); OECD MLI Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 24, ¶ 14.
59. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 14.
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Fifth, the MLI provides great flexibility on the provisions relating to a
BEPS minimum standard. Where a minimum standard could be satisfied
in multiple alternative ways, the Contracting Jurisdictions may adopt their
own favorite approaches or solutions.60 In case of conflicts or disputes
arising from different approaches between contracting jurisdictions, the
conflicts are expected to be settled amicably by a mutually satisfactory
solution consistent with the minimum standard.61 If a Party’s Covered Tax
Agreements have already satisfied a specific minimum standard, this Party
may opt out of the provision reflecting this minimum standard.62 To en-
courage best efforts and the honest implementation of minimum stan-
dards, the effectiveness and adequacy of certain Covered Tax Agreement
in satisfying the minimum standard would be tested by the Inclusive
Framework on BEPS.63
Sixth, although Part VI provides for mandatory and binding arbitra-
tion,64 Parties enjoy great autonomy and flexibility on the choice of arbi-
tration rules. Part VI applies only between Parties that expressly choose to
apply it with respect to their Covered Tax Agreements.65 The Parties that
choose to apply Part VI may also formulate their own reservations with
respect to the scope of cases eligible for arbitration subject to acceptance
by the other Parties, despite the defined reservations included in Part
VI.66
Seventh, the MLI encourages the Parties to choose recommended op-
tional provisions.67 Although many optional provisions are not required in
order to meet the minimum standards, they are important “soft law” rules.
Thus, it is wise for the Parties to introduce these best practices and policy
recommendations into the Covered Tax Agreements. For instance, article
6 encourages Parties to include the following optional preamble language
in their Covered Tax Agreements, “[d]esiring to further develop their eco-
nomic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax matters.”68 If
all Parties voluntarily pledge allegiance to the mission of the MLI, the
solidarity of global partnership is expected to be further strengthened by
and through more flexible and practical dialogue, negotiation, exchange




63. OECD and G20 countries promised to work together to design and propose a
more inclusive framework in early 2016 to support and monitor the implementation of the
BEPS package. See OECD, Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project, ¶ 11 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf.
64. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19.
65. Id., art. 18.
66. Id., art. 28.
67. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble.
68. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6(3).
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2.3 The Macro Structure of the MLI
The MLI of 39 articles could be perceived as a dragon, with the pre-
amble as its eyes, Part I as its head, Parts II through VI as its body, and
Part VII as its tail. The core value of a single tax principle and almost all
treaty-related BEPS measures agreed to in the BEPS Package have been
fully reflected in the MLI.69
Part I is intended to clarify the scope of the MLI and interpretation of
terms.70 Under Article 1, the MLI modifies all Covered Tax Agreements
as defined in article 2 (1)(a).71 Article 2 interprets four terms and provides
the general rules of interpretation of other undefined terms used in the
MLI.72
Part II addresses the measures on hybrid mismatches covered by the
Action 2 Report.73 Article 3 addresses treaty provision on transparent en-
tities.74 In addition to addressing dual-resident entities, article 4 addresses
the tie-breaker rule for determining the treaty residence of dual-resident
persons other than individuals covered by the Action 6 Report.75 Article 5
addresses the exemption method and the credit method.76
Part III addresses treaty abuse covered by the Action 6 Report.77 The
Preamble and article 6 of the MLI clarify that tax treaties are not intended
to be used to generate double non-taxation.78 Article 7(1) and (4) address
the rules aimed at arrangements, one of the principal purposes of which is
to obtain treaty benefits.79 Article 7(8) through (13) focus on the LOB
rule.80 Article 8 focuses on dividend transfer transactions.81 Article 9 fo-
cuses on transactions that circumvent the application of article 13(4).82 Ar-
ticle 10 focuses on the anti-abuse rule for PEs situated in third States.83
Article 11 focuses on application of tax treaties to restrict a Contracting
State’s right to tax its own residents.84
Part IV is intended to amend existing tax treaties to counter the artifi-
cial avoidance of PE status covered by the Action 7 Report.85 Articles 12
69. See id., Annex.
70. Id. arts. 1 – 2.
71. Id., art. 1.
72. Id., art. 2.
73. Id., arts. 3 – 5; OECD supra note 34.
74. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3.
75. Id. art. 4.
76. Id. art. 5.
77. Id., arts 6 – 11; OECD, supra note 27.
78. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, preamble, art. 6.
79. Id., arts. 7(1), 7(4).
80. Id., arts. 7(8) – 7(13).
81. Id., art. 8.
82. Id. art 9.
83. Id., art. 10.
84. Id., art. 11.
85. Id., arts. 12-16; OECD, supra note 36.
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addresses commissionnaire arrangements and similar strategies.86 Article
13 addresses specific activity exemptions.87 Article 14 addresses splitting-
up of contracts.88 Article 15 defines the term “a person closely related to
an enterprise” frequently used in Part IV.89
Part V and Part VI reflect the Action 14 Report on making dispute
resolution mechanisms more effective.90 Part V focuses on improving dis-
pute resolution (article 16 and article 17) by clarifying the elements of a
minimum standard to ensure the timely, effective and efficient resolution
of treaty-related disputes and best practices.91
Part VI (article 18 through article 26) represents a set of cohesive pro-
visions on mandatory binding arbitration of mutual agreement procedure
(MAP) cases, in which the competent authorities are unable to reach
timely agreement.92 It contains both substantive content and modalities of
its technical application to Covered Tax Agreements. Rules for compati-
bility with existing provisions are consolidated in article 26, rather than
being scattered in each article.93
Part VII addresses the procedural issues from article 27 through arti-
cle 39, including signature and ratification, acceptance or approval, reser-
vations, notifications, subsequent modifications of covered tax
agreements, conference of the parties, interpretation and implementation,
amendment, entry into force, entry into effect, entry into effect of part VI,
withdrawal, relation with protocols, and depositary.94
To clarify the approach taken in the MLI, the types of provisions of
Covered Tax Agreements intended to be covered and the detailed ways
for the MLI to affect Covered Tax Agreements, an “explanatory state-
ment” was adopted on November 24, 2016.95 It reflects the consensus of
the negotiators with respect to the MLI. It is intended to clarify the opera-
tion of the MLI to modify Covered Tax Agreements, but not to interpret
the underlying BEPS measures, except with respect to Part VI.96
86. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12.
87. Id., art. 13.
88. Id., art. 14.
89. Id., art. 15.
90. See OECD, supra note 37, nd art. 14.
91. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts. 16 – 17.
92. Id. arts. 18 – 26.
93. Id. art. 26.
94. Id. arts. 27 – 39.
95. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 12.
96. Id.
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2.4 The Micro Structure of Each Substantive Provision of
Part II, III, IV & V
Almost every substantive provision in Part II, III, IV and V (i.e., all
except Part VI) contains a BEPS measure clause, a compatibility clause, a
reservation clause and a notification clause.97
2.4.1 BEPS Measures Clause
As BEPS measures are the backbone of the MLI, it is necessary for
articles 3 through 17 to duplicate the language of the provisions of the
OECD Model Tax Convention developed during the course of the BEPS
Project, with minor technical modifications.98 For instance, “Covered Tax
Agreement” and “Contracting Jurisdiction” replaced “Convention” and
“Contracting State” used in the OECD Model Tax Convention and the
UN Model Tax Convention, respectively.99 References to specific articles
and paragraphs in provisions of existing tax agreements are also replaced
with descriptions of those provisions for the purpose of precisely identify-
ing specific provisions in Covered Tax Agreements.100
2.4.2 Compatibility Clauses
The provisions of the MLI may overlap or conflict with provisions of
Covered Tax Agreements on the same tax matters.101 To clarify the rela-
tionship between the provisions of the MLI and Covered Tax Agreements,
there are four major types of compatibility clauses, whose uses depend on
policy considerations and factual circumstances.102 First, a specified MLI
provision applies only “in place of” an existing provision, and does not
apply where such existing provision does not exist.103 Second, a specified
MLI provision “applies to” or “modifies” an existing provision by chang-
ing the application of the existing provision without replacing it.104 Third,
a specified MLI provision applies “in the absence of” an existing provi-
sion.105 Fourth, a specified MLI provision applies “in place of or in the
absence of” an existing provision, regardless of whether such existing pro-
vision exists and/or whether such existing provision has been notified to
the Depositary.106 If an incompatible or conflicting provision exists, the
provision of the MLI shall prevail.107 In the absence of such existing provi-
97. Id., ¶ 15. See, e.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3 (providing four
paragraphs that respectively represent each kind of clause).





103. See, e.g., OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(7).
104. See, e.g., id., art. 7(5).
105. See, e.g., id., art. 16(4)(b)(i).
106. See, e.g., id., art. 3(4).
107. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15.
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sion, the provision of the MLI shall be deemed to be automatically added
to the Covered Tax Agreement.108
2.4.3 Reservation Clauses
Reasonable reservations are necessary to respect the Parties’ auton-
omy and to keep the elasticity of the MLI, while unregulated reservations
would make chaos.109 To ensure its harmonious application, the MLI con-
tains reservation clauses to define and regulate the reservations.110 Parties
may opt out of applying certain provisions to their Covered Tax Agree-
ments within a closed list of permitted reservations specified in the reser-
vation clauses.111 To ensure transparency, a reserving Party is required to
provide a list of the existing provisions within the scope of that reserva-
tion.112 The reservation will apply as between the reserving Party and all
other Parties to the MLI.113
2.4.4 Notification Clauses
To safeguard clarity, transparency, certainty, and predictability of its
application, the MLI requires Parties to notify the Depositary of their
choices and/or significant information regarding the Covered Tax Agree-
ments.114 First, Parties should report their choices of optional provisions
to the Depositary, “and describe the consequences of a mismatch between
the Contracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement.”115 Second,
Parties should notify the Depositary of specific types of existing provisions
within the scope of compatibility clauses that are superseded or modified
by the MLI.116 Parties are expected to identify, notify, and disclose all
provisions within the objective scope of the compatibility clause.117 In case
of inadvertent omission of existing provisions, additional notifications are
expected to be forthcoming.118 If the contracting jurisdictions disagree on
whether existing provisions are within the scope of a compatibility clause,
such disputes should be settled either through the mutual agreement pro-
cedure, or a Conference of the Parties.119
108. Id.
109. Id., ¶ 14.
110. Id.
111. See OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28.
112. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 271.
113. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(3).
114. Id., art. 29.
115. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15; See e.g. OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(10).
116. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15; See e.g. OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(4).
117. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 15.
118. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 29(6); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 18.
119. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 18.
Spring 2018] A Global Treaty Override? 169
2.5 Interpretation of Terms
2.5.1 Covered Tax Agreement
Article 2(1)(a) of the MLI defines the term “Covered Tax Agree-
ment” as “an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income . . .  in force between two or more Parties[ ] and/or ju-
risdictions or territories . . . for whose international relations a Party is
responsible, and with respect to which each such Party has made a notifi-
cation to the Depositary listing the agreement as well as any amending or
accompanying instruments thereto . . . as an agreement which it wishes to
be covered by this Convention.”120
While agreements simultaneously covering capital taxes, taxes on cap-
ital gains, and income taxes are also Covered Tax Agreements, agreements
applying solely to shipping and air transport or social security are not cov-
ered by the MLI.121
Under article 2 (1)(a)(i) of the MLI, Covered Tax Agreements are
supposed to be in force between two or more Parties and/or jurisdictions
or territories.122 If an agreement has been signed but has not yet entered
into force, a Party may include such agreement in the list of Covered Tax
Agreements, and must notify the Depositary of the date of entry into force
of that agreement.123 Such an inclusive and enabling approach to interpre-
tation would improve the transparency of the potential Covered Tax
Agreements.
2.5.2 Party
Article 2(1)(b) defines the term “Party” used throughout the MLI as a
State for which the MLI is in force, or a jurisdiction which has signed the
MLI and for which the MLI is in force.124 Therefore, Parties can be either
States or Non-State jurisdictions.125
2.5.3 Contracting Jurisdiction
The term “Contracting Jurisdiction” refers to a party to a Covered Tax
Agreement, including States, jurisdictions, or territories.126 Thus, “Con-
tracting Jurisdiction” is broader than “Contracting State.” While “Con-
tracting Party” exclusively refers to a Party to the MLI, “Contracting
Jurisdiction” exclusively refers to a Party to the Covered Tax
Agreements.127
120. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a).
121. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 25.
122. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a).
123. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 32.
124. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(b).
125. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 35.
126. Id.
127. Id., ¶¶ 34-35.
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The MLI may cover tax agreements entered into by a State Party on
behalf of a non-State jurisdiction or territory for whose international rela-
tions it is responsible.128 In such cases, the State Party should include
those tax agreements in its list of tax agreements, and the list of reserva-
tions and notifications regarding that jurisdiction or territory may differ
from the State Party’s own list.129
2.5.4 Signatory
The term “Signatory” exclusively used in Part VII, refers to a State or
jurisdiction that has signed the MLI but for which the MLI is not yet in
force.130
2.5.5 Interpretation of Other Undefined Terms
Article 2(2) provides a general rule of interpretation for undefined
terms used in the MLI.131 Unless the context requires otherwise, an unde-
fined term “has the meaning that it has under the relevant Covered Tax
Agreement at the time the Convention is being applied.”132 As noted
above, the purpose of the MLI and of the Covered Tax Agreement should
be taken into account for the purpose of understanding “the context” re-
quired by article 2(2).133
2.6 Hybrid Mismatches
2.6.1 Transparent Entities
Article 3 of the MLI is intended to address the application of tax trea-
ties to the income earned through transparent entities, including partner-
ships and trusts, and to ensure that treaty benefits are granted in
appropriate cases but not granted where neither Contracting State treats
the income of an entity as the income of one of its residents.134
Based on article 1(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention of 2014
produced by the Action 2 Report, Article 3(1) restates that income de-
rived by or through an entity or arrangement treated as fiscally transpar-
ent under the tax law of either Contracting Jurisdiction, shall be
considered to be income of a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction, but
only to the extent that the income is treated for purposes of taxation by
that Contracting Jurisdiction as the income of its resident.135
To modify the application of the provisions related to methods for the
elimination of double taxation, article 3(2) clarifies that the Provisions of a
128. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(a)(i)(B).
129. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 27 – 28.
130. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 2(1)(d).
131. Id. art. 2(2).
132. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 37.
133. Id.
134. Id., ¶¶ 39-40.
135. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3(1).
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Covered Tax Agreement that require Contracting Jurisdiction X to ex-
empt from income tax or provide a deduction or credit equal to the in-
come tax paid with respect to income derived by its resident which may be
taxed in Contracting Jurisdiction Y according to the Covered Tax Agree-
ment, shall not apply to the extent that such provisions allow taxation by
Jurisdiction Y solely because the income is also income derived by its
resident.136
Article 3(3) addresses the link between article 3 and the saving clause
in article 11 by adding an additional sentence to the end of paragraph 1:
“In no case shall the provisions of this paragraph be construed to affect a
Contracting Jurisdiction’s right to tax the residents of that Contracting Ju-
risdiction.”137 It shall apply with respect to any Covered Tax Agreement
for which one or more Parties has made reservation described in Article
11(3)(a).138
Under the compatibility clause in article 3(4), article 3(1) will apply
instead of or in the absence of existing provisions of the same type,
whether such provisions are framed either through a general rule, or by
identifying in detail the treatment of specific fact patterns or specific types
of entities or arrangements.139
Given that “a provision on fiscally transparent entities is not required
in order to meet a minimum standard,”140 the reservation clause in article
3(5) permits Parties to opt out of the entirety or part of Article 3.141 Par-
ties may opt out of article 3(1) while retaining existing provisions denying
benefits in the case of transparent entities established in third jurisdictions
and/or identifying in detail the treatment of specific fact patterns and types
of entities or arrangements.142 Parties may opt out of article 3(2).143 Par-
ties may reserve the right for article 3(1) to replace existing detailed provi-
sions, while keeping existing shorter provisions.144
To ensure clarity, article 3(6) provides the notification requirements
for the Parties.145
136. Id., art. 3(2).
137. Id., art. 3(3).
138. Id.
139. Id., art. 3(4).
140. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 46.
141. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 3(5)(a).
142. Id., art. 3(5).
143. Id., art. 3(5)(f).
144. Id., art. 3(5)(g).
145. Id., art. 3(6).
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2.6.2 Dual Resident Entities
Based on article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention of 2014,146
Article 4(1) of the MLI is designed to modify the rules for determining the
treaty residence of dual-resident entities.147
Under article 4(1):
where by reason of the [existing] provisions . . . a person is a resi-
dent of more than one Contracting Jurisdiction, the competent au-
thorities . . . shall endeavour to determine by mutual agreement
the Contracting Jurisdiction of which such person shall be deemed
to be a resident . . .  having regard to its place of effective manage-
ment, the place where it is incorporated or otherwise constituted,
and any other relevant factors.148
“In the absence of such agreement, the entity shall not be entitled to any
relief or exemption . . . as may be agreed upon by the competent authori-
ties.”149 Since the failure to grant such benefits cannot be viewed as viola-
tion of the Covered Tax Agreement, the cases in which benefits are denied
due to an agreement failure would not be eligible for arbitration under
Part VI.150
Under the compatibility clause in article 4(2), article 4(1) shall apply
in place of or in the absence of all types of tie-breaker rules on the resi-
dence of entities, but it would not replace existing provisions “specifically
addressing the residence of companies participating in dual-listed com-
pany arrangements”151 across several jurisdictions.
Recognizing that provisions addressing dual-resident entities are not
required to meet the minimum standard,152 the reserving clause in article
4(3) permits Parties to opt out of the entirety of article 4 in different
ways.153 For instance, a Party may opt out of applying it to existing agree-
ments that contain provisions with specific, objectively defined character-
istics, by requiring the competent authorities to endeavor to reach tie-
breaker agreement, setting out the treatment of an entity in case of agree-
ment failure or simply denying treaty benefits without such
requirement.154
To ensure clarity, article 4(4) provides the notification requirements
for the Parties.155 In general, each Party should “notify the Depositary of
146. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 49.
147. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(1).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 58.
151. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(2).
152. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 54.
153. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 4(3).
154. Id., arts. 4(3)(b)-(d).
155. Id. art. 4(4).
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[the existing] provision . . .  not subject to a reservation”.156 Such a provi-
sion would be replaced by article 4(1) where all parties to the Covered Tax
Agreement have notified accordingly.157 “In other cases, [article 4(1)]
would apply to the Covered Tax Agreement, [but would] supersede the
[existing] provisions only to the extent that those provisions are incompati-
ble with article 4(1).”158
2.6.3 Application of Methods for Elimination of Double Taxation
As recommended by the Action 2 Report,159 article 5 offers three op-
tions for Parties to address problems arising from the inclusion of the ex-
emption method in treaties with respect to items of income not taxed in
the jurisdiction of source.160 Article 5(1) permits a Party to choose one or
none of the options.161 Recognizing that asymmetrical application is nor-
mal in provisions on elimination of double taxation, the option chosen by
each Jurisdiction shall apply with respect to its own residents, where Con-
tracting Jurisdictions make different choices.162
Under Option A, existing provisions
[t]hat would otherwise exempt income derived or capital owned
by a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] from tax in its juris-
diction for the purpose of eliminating double taxation shall not
apply where Contracting Jurisdiction Y applies existing provisions
to exempt such income or capital from tax or to limit the rate . . .
In the latter case . . . [Jurisdiction X] shall allow as a deduction
from the tax on the income or capital of that resident an amount
equal to the tax paid in [Jurisdiction Y].163
Under Option B, existing provisions
[t]hat would otherwise exempt income derived by a resident of
Contracting [Jurisdiction X] from tax in its jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of eliminating double taxation, because such income is
treated as a dividend by [Jurisdiction X], shall not apply where
such income gives rise to a deduction for the purpose of determin-
ing the taxable profits of a resident of [Contracting Jurisdiction Y]
under the laws of [Jurisdiction Y]. In such case, [Jurisdiction X]




159. OECD, supra note 34, ¶¶ 442-444.
160. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5.
161. Id., art. 5(1).
162. Id., art. 5(1).
163. Id.
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dent an amount equal to the income tax paid in [Jurisdiction
Y].164
Under Option C,
[w]here a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] derives income
or owns capital which may be taxed in Contracting [Jurisdiction
Y] in  accordance with the [existing] provisions . . .“ , [Jurisdiction
X] shall allow, as a deduction from the tax on the income [or capi-
tal] of that resident, an amount equal to the income tax [or capital
tax] paid in [Jurisdiction Y]. . . Such deduction shall not exceed
that part of the income tax or capital tax, as computed before the
deduction is given, which is attributable to the income or the capi-
tal which may be taxed in [Jurisdiction Y]. Where in accordance
with any [existing] provision, income derived or capital owned by
a resident of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] is exempt from tax in
[its] jurisdiction, [Jurisdiction X] may nevertheless, in calculating
the amount of tax on the remaining income or capital of such resi-
dent, take into account the exempted income or capital.165
To address the concerns that accepting asymmetrical application un-
conditionally might disrupt the balance of certain bilateral tax treaties
“where the provision on the elimination of double taxation was the subject
of bilateral compromise”,166 article 5(8) allows a Party that chooses none
of the Options to “reserve the right for the entirety of [article 5] not to
apply with respect to . . .  [its Covered Tax Agreements].167 Given that
“some Parties . . . comfortable with the asymmetrical application of Op-
tion A or B . . . may prefer to address more significant changes . . . through
bilateral negotiation”,168 article 5(9) permits a Party not choosing Option
C, to permit the other Contracting Jurisdiction to not apply Option C.169
Under the notification clause in article 5(10), “each Party . . .  [choos-
ing] to apply an Option . . . shall notify the Depositary of its choice of
Option”.170 To ensure clarity, “an Option shall apply with respect to a
provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only . . . [if the choosing Party]
made such a notification . . . .171
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 5(6)(b).
166. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 72.
167. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(8).
168. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 73.
169. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 5(9).
170. Id., art 5(10).
171. Id.
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2.7 Treaty Abuse
2.7.1 Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement
As the minimum standard for protection against the abuse of tax trea-
ties under Action 6 of BEPS project,172 article 6(1) requires a Covered
Tax Agreement to incorporate the following preamble language:
[I]ntending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes
covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-
taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (in-
cluding through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining
reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of re-
sidents of third jurisdictions).173
The compatibility clause in article 6(2) describes the interaction be-
tween article 6(1) and the preamble language of Covered Tax
Agreements.174
Article 6(3) encourages Parties to include the full preamble language
produced in the Action 6 Report by adding the other part of the preamble
of the OECD Model Tax Convention: “[d]esiring to further develop their
economic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax mat-
ters.”175 Since such an inclusion is not required to meet a minimum stan-
dard, article 6(3) shall modify a Covered Tax Agreement only where all
Contracting Jurisdictions choose to apply it.176
Article 6(4) permits a Party to opt out of applying article 6(1) only
with respect to Covered Tax Agreements already satisfying the minimum
standard.177 Parties may preserve preamble language in their Covered Tax
Agreements that “already . . .  [refer to the intent] to eliminate double
taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxa-
tion, whether that language is limited to cases of tax evasion or avoidance
. . . ”.178
2.7.2 Prevention of Treaty Abuse
To address situations of treaty abuse, the Action 6 Report requests
that countries implement (i) a principal purpose test (PPT) only; (ii) a PPT
and either a simplified or detailed LOB provision; or (iii) a detailed LOB
provision, supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit ar-
rangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.179 Based on Article X
172. OECD, supra note 29 ¶ 72.
173. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 6(1).
174. Id., art. 6(2).
175. Id., art. 6(3).
176. Id., art. 6(6).
177. Id., art. 6(4).
178. Id.
179. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 22.
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(Entitlement to Benefits) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, a result of
the Action 6 Report, article 7 is the lengthiest article in the MLI.
Given that a PPT alone is the only approach that can satisfy the mini-
mum standard, article 7(1) presents the PPT as the default option.180 A
treaty benefit
shall not be granted in respect to an item of income or capital if it
is  reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly
or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting
that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered
Tax Agreement.181
Although the PPT is intended to identify the purpose behind the arrange-
ment or transaction, this test is objective, rather than subjective, in terms
of practical operation.
Under the compatibility clause in article 7(2), article 7(1)
shall apply in place of or in the absence of provisions of a Covered
Tax Agreement that deny all or part of the benefits that would
otherwise be provided where the principal purpose or one of the
principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction, or of any
person concerned with an arrangement or transaction, was to ob-
tain those benefits.182
Although article 7(1) is intended to replace narrower PPT provisions with
a broader provision, it would not restrict the scope or application of vari-
ous types of anti-abuse rules besides a PPT in existing agreements.183
Given that the competent authorities need necessary discretion to
grant benefits to qualified taxpayers in certain circumstances, Article 7(3)
permits non-reserving Parties under Article 7(15)(a) to add Article 7(4) in
Covered Tax Agreements.184 Where a treaty benefit:
[I]s denied to a person under provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement . . . , the competent authority of Contracting [Jurisdic-
tion X] that would otherwise have granted this benefit shall never-
theless treat that person as being entitled to this benefit, or to
different benefits with respect to a specific item of income or capi-
tal, if such competent authority, upon request from that person
and after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances,
determines that the benefits would have been granted to that per-
180. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 90.
181. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
182. Id., art. 7(2).
183. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 95.
184. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24,, art. 7(3).
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son in the absence of the transaction or arrangement. The compe-
tent authority. . . requested by a resident of Contracting
[Jurisdiction Y] shall consult with the competent authority of [Ju-
risdiction Y] before rejecting the request.185
Article 7(4) is an optional provision, and shall apply to a Covered Tax
Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply
it.186
The compatibility clause in article 7(5) clarifies that article 7(4) shall
apply to a PPT of a Covered Tax Agreement.187 As a result, article 7(1)
and article 7(4) may apply together in practice.188
Article 7(6) permits Parties to supplement the PPT by choosing to
apply a simplified LOB provision, which is optional, and applies with re-
spect to a Covered Tax Agreement only “where all Contracting Jurisdic-
tions have chosen to apply it”.189 Where Parties disagree on its
application, the PPT alone applies symmetrically by default.190 However,
it is problematic where one Party chooses the simplified LOB provision
and opts out of article 7 entirely, while another contracting Party chooses
not to apply the simplified LOB provision. To avoid such deadlock in the
bilateral relationship, the simplified LOB provision shall apply when some
but not all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply it, provided that
there is agreement under article 7(7)(a) or (b).191 There are two possible
outcomes. First, “all Contracting Jurisdictions choosing to apply the PPT
alone may agree that the simplified LOB Provision applies symmetri-
cally.192 Second, all Contracting Jurisdictions choosing to apply the PPT
alone may affirmatively permit asymmetrical application of the simplified
LOB Provision.193 Consequently, the Contracting Jurisdictions choosing
to apply the simplified LOB Provision would apply both the PPT and the
simplified LOB Provision, while the other Contracting Jurisdictions would
apply the PPT alone.194
Articles 7(8) through 7(13) contain a simplified LOB provision.195
“Except as otherwise provided in the Simplified LOB Provision, a resident
of a Contracting Jurisdiction shall not be entitled to a benefit that would
otherwise be accorded by the Covered Tax Agreement”, unless such resi-
185. Id.
186. Id., art. 17(b); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 98.
187. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24,, art. 7(5).
188. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 99.
189. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(6).
190. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 101.
191. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(7).
192. Id., art. 7(7)(a).
193. Id., art. 7(7)(b).
194. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 102.
195. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, arts., 7(8) – (13).
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dent is a “qualified person” at the time that the benefit would be
accorded.196
Article 7(9) lists five categories of “qualified persons” as follows:
a) an individual; b) a Contracting Jurisdiction, or a political subdi-
vision or local authority thereof, or an agency or instrumentality
of any such Contracting Jurisdiction, political subdivision or local
authority; c) a company or other entity, if the principal class of its
shares is regularly traded on one or more recognized stock ex-
changes; d) a person, other than an individual, that  i) is a non-
profit organization of a type agreed to by the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions through an exchange of diplomatic notes or ii) is an entity or
arrangement established in that Contracting Jurisdiction, treated
as a separate person under its domestic taxation laws, and is: A)
established and operated exclusively or almost exclusively to ad-
minister or provide retirement benefits and ancillary or incidental
benefits to individuals and regulated as such by that Contracting
Jurisdiction or one of its political subdivisions or local authorities;
or B) established and operated exclusively or almost exclusively
to invest funds for the benefit of entities or arrangements referred
to in Subdivision A); e) a person other than an individual, if, on at
least half the days of a twelve-month period that includes the time
when the benefit would otherwise be accorded, persons who are
residents of that Contracting Jurisdiction and that are entitled to
benefits of the Covered Tax Agreement under subparagraphs a)
to d) own, directly or indirectly, at least fifty percent of the shares
of the person.197
Under article 7(10),
[A] resident of Contracting Jurisdiction X will be entitled to bene-
fits with respect to an item of income derived from Contracting
Jurisdiction Y, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified
person, if the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a busi-
ness in [Jurisdiction X] and the income derived from [Jurisdiction
Y] emanates from, or is incidental to, that business.198
[I]f a resident of [Jurisdiction X] derives income from business ac-
tivity conducted by that resident in [Jurisdiction Y], or arising in
[Jurisdiction Y] from a connected person, the [qualification] con-
ditions . . . for the benefits shall be considered to be satisfied with
respect to such income only if the business activity carried on by
the resident in [Jurisdiction X] to which the income is related is
substantial in relation to the same activity or a complementary
196. Id., art. 7(8).
197. Id., art. 7(9).
198. Id., art. 7(10).
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business activity carried on by the resident or such connected per-
son in [Jurisdiction Y].199
Under article 7(11),
A resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment that is not a qualified person shall also be entitled to a bene-
fit that would otherwise be accorded by the Covered Tax
Agreement with respect to an item of income if, on at least half of
the days of any twelve-month period that includes the time when
the benefit would otherwise be accorded, persons that are
equivalent beneficiaries own, directly or indirectly, at least sev-
enty-five percent of the beneficial interests of the resident.200
Under article 7(12),
[I]f a resident of [Contracting Jurisdiction X] . . . is neither a quali-
fied person . . . nor entitled to benefits under [article 7(10) or
(11)], the competent authority of [Contracting Jurisdiction Y] may
nevertheless grant the benefits . . . or benefits with respect to a
specific item of income, taking into account the object and pur-
pose of the Covered Tax Agreement, but only if [the] resident
demonstrates to the satisfaction of [the] competent authority that
neither its establishment, acquisition, maintenance, nor the con-
duct of its operations, had [the acquisition of treaty benefits] as
one of its principal purposes. . .. Before either granting or denying
a request made . . .  by a resident of [Jurisdiction X], the compe-
tent authority of [Jurisdiction Y] . . . shall consult with its counter-
part in [Jurisdiction X].201
Article 7(13) defines five terms for the purposes of the Simplified
LOB Provision, including “recognized stock exchange,” “principal class of
shares,” “equivalent beneficiary,” “shares” and “connected persons.”202
Unlike the Simplified LOB Provision, article 7 does not include a de-
tailed LOB provision, which necessitates substantial bilateral customiza-
tion.203 Parties preferring a detailed LOB provision may either opt out of
the PPT and agree to endeavor to reach a bilateral agreement that satisfies
the minimum standard204 or accept the PPT in article 7(1) as an interim
measure and express such intent in their notification to the Depositary.205
The compatibility clause in article 7(14) clarifies that the simplified
LOB Provision is intended to apply in place of or in the absence of ex-
199. Id. art. 7(10)(b).
200. Id., art. 7(11).
201. Id., art. 7(10).
202. Id., art. 7(13).
203. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 90.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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isting LOB provisions, but not to restrict the scope or application of other
types of anti-abuse rules in Covered Tax Agreements.206
Under the reservation clause in article 7(15), Parties intending to sat-
isfy the minimum standard by adopting a combination of a detailed LOB
provision and either rules to address conduit financing structures or a PPT,
may opt out of article 7(1) but should “endeavor to reach a mutually satis-
factory solution [satisfying the minimum standard”.207 Parties may opt out
of either articles 7(1) and 7(4) with respect to Covered Tax Agreements
already containing a PPT, or the simplified LOB Provision with respect to
their Covered Tax Agreements already containing a LOB provision de-
scribed in article 7(14).208
Under article 7(16), “except where the Simplified LOB Provision ap-
plies [under Article 7(7)], a Party [choosing under article 7(6)] to apply the
Simplified LOB Provision may reserve the right to have the entirety of
[article 7] not apply with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements . . . [and]
the Contracting Jurisdictions shall endeavor to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory solution [meeting] the minimum standard.”209
Article 7(17) describes very detailed notification requirements to en-
sure clarity as to the application of article 7.210
2.7.3 Dividend Transfer Transactions
Based on article 10(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention revised by
the Action 6 Report,211 article 8(1) introduced a minimum shareholding
period for a company to be entitled to exemption or a reduced rate on
dividends from a subsidiary.212
Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement [exempting from tax] div-
idends paid by a company which is a resident” of Contracting Ju-
risdiction X or limiting the tax rate on dividends “provided that
the beneficial owner or the recipient . . . is a resident of [Con-
tracting Jurisdiction Y] and . . . owns, holds, or controls more than
a certain amount of the capital, shares, stock, voting power, voting
rights, or similar ownership interests of the company paying the
dividends, shall apply only if the ownership conditions described
in those provisions are met throughout a 365-day period that in-
cludes the day of the payment of the dividends.”213
206. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 7(14).
207. Id., art. 7(15)(a).
208. Id., art. 7(15)(b) and (c).
209. Id., art. 7(16).
210. Id., art. 7(17).
211. See OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 36.
212. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(1).
213. Id.
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However, article 8(1) is not intended to modify conditions or elements of
Covered Tax Agreement, including tax rates, ownership thresholds and
forms of ownership.214
The compatibility clause in article 8(2) clarifies that the 365-day mini-
mum shareholding period “shall apply in place of or in the absence of a
minimum holding period in [existing] provisions” . . . .215
Given that a provision addressing dividend transfer transactions is not
required in order to meet a minimum standard, the reservation clause in
Article 8(3) allows Parties to opt out of Article 8 entirely, either uncondi-
tionally or conditionally to the extent that the existing provisions already
include a minimum holding period, regardless of whether it is shorter or
longer than a 365-day period.216
To ensure clarity, the notification clause in Article 8(4) sets out notifi-
cation requirements and clarifies that Article 8(1) “shall apply with respect
to an [existing] provision only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have
made such a notification with respect to the that provision”.217
2.7.4 Capital Gains from Alienation of Shares or Interests of Entities
Deriving Their Value Principally from Immovable Property
Based on Article 13(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention as re-
vised by the Action 6 Report and Article 13(4) of the UN Model Tax Con-
vention,218 Article 9(1) addresses situations in which assets are
contributed to an entity shortly before the sale of shares or comparable
interests in that entity in order to dilute the proportion of the value of the
entity that is derived from immovable property.219
Under Article 9(1):
Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement providing that gains de-
rived by a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction from the aliena-
tion of shares or other rights of participation in an entity may be
taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction provided that these
shares or rights derived more than a certain part of their value
from immovable property (real property) situated in that other
Contracting Jurisdiction (or provided that more than a certain
part of the property of the entity consists of such immovable prop-
erty (real property)): a) shall apply if the relevant value threshold
is met at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation;
and b) shall apply to shares or comparable interests, such as inter-
ests in a partnership or trust (to the extent that such shares or
214. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 122.
215. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 8(2).
216. Id. art. 8(3).
217. Id. art. 8(4).
218. See OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 44.
219. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(1).
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interests are not already covered) in addition to any shares or
rights already covered by the provisions.”220
Given that article 9(1) is intended to “introduce a testing period and to
[expand the scope of covered interests], the threshold provided in existing
provisions would be preserved”.221 The exceptional rule on the application
of the existing provisions would continue to apply.222 For example, “some
Covered Tax Agreements may exclude gains derived from the alienation
of shares of listed companies. . .”.223
The compatibility clause in article 9 (2) clarifies that the 365-day test-
ing period “shall apply in place of or in the absence of a time period for
determining whether the relevant value threshold in [existing] provisions
was met”.224
Under article 9(3), parties may apply optional article 9(4), based on
article 13(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention,225 “to their Covered
Tax Agreements, rather than incorporating a testing period and expanding
interest covered by existing capital gains provisions”.226
[F]or purposes of a Covered Tax Agreement, gains derived by a
resident of Contracting Jurisdiction [X] from the alienation of
shares or comparable interests, such as interests in a partnership
or trust, may be taxed in Contracting [Jurisdiction Y] if, at any
time during the 365 days preceding the alienation, these shares or
comparable interests derived more than fifty percent of their
value directly or indirectly from immovable property (real prop-
erty) situated in [Jurisdiction Y].227
The compatibility clause in article 9(5) clarifies that article 9(4) “shall
apply in place of or in the absence of [existing]provisions of Covered Tax
Agreements . . . [addressing capital gains] from the alienation of shares or
[interests in entities] . . .  [deriving their value principally] from immovable
property”.228
“Given that a provision addressing capital gains from alienation of
shares or interests in entities deriving their value principally from immova-
ble property is not required in order to meet the minimum standard,”229
the reservation clause in article 9(6) allows Parties to opt out of either
220. Id.
221. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 131.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(2).
225. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 133.
226. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(3).
227. Id. art. 9(4).
228. Id. art. 9(5).
229. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 136.
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article 9(1) entirely, or opt out of article 9(1)(a) and  (b) separately.230”
Parties may also opt out of [article 9(4)] with respect to their Covered Tax
Agreements that already contain a provision described in article [9(5)]
. . .”.231
The reservation clause in article 9(7) clarifies that article 9(1) “shall
apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where
all Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to that
provision”.232
Under article 9(8), article 9(4) “shall apply to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have [chosen to apply it and
notified the Depositary of its choice]”.233 In such a case, article 9(1) would
not apply.234
2.7.5 Anti-abuse Rule for PEs Situated in Third Jurisdictions
Articles 10(1) through (3) are based on the text of the OECD Model
Tax Convention produced in the Action 6 Report.235 Under Article 10(1),
[W]here an enterprise of Contracting [Jurisdiction X] derives in-
come from Contracting [Jurisdiction Y] and [Jurisdiction X] treats
such income as attributable to a PE of the enterprise situated in a
third [jurisdiction Z], and the profits attributable to that PE are
exempt from tax in [Jurisdiction X], the [treaty] benefits shall not
apply to any item of income on which the tax in [jurisdiction Z] is
less than sixty percent of the tax that would be imposed in [Juris-
diction X] on that item of income if that PE were situated in [Ju-
risdiction X].236 In such a case, any income to which the
provisions of [article 10(1)] apply shall remain taxable according
to the domestic law of [Jurisdiction Y], notwithstanding any other
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.237
However, under article 10(2), article 10(1)
[S]hall not apply if the income [of Jurisdiction Y is] derived in
connection with or is incidental to the active conduct of a business
carried on through the PE (other than the business of making,
managing, or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own
account, unless these activities are banking, insurance, or securi-
230. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 9(6).
231. Id., art. 9(6)(f).
232. Id., art. 9(7).
233. Id., art. 9(8).
234. Id., art. 9(6).
235. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 52.
236. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 10(1).
237. Id.
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ties activities carried on by a bank, insurance enterprise or regis-
tered securities dealer, respectively).238
Article 10(3) empowers the competent authorities to grant treaty ben-
efits in certain justified circumstances.239 “If benefit[s] . . . are denied pur-
suant to [article 10(1)] with respect to an item of income derived by a
resident of [Jurisdiction X], the competent authority of [Jurisdiction Y]
may, nevertheless, grant these benefits with respect to that item of income,
if . . . [the] authority determines that granting such benefits is justified in
light of the reasons [the] resident did not satisfy the requirements of [arti-
cle 10(1) and (2)]”.240 “The competent authority . . . shall consult with [its
counterpart in Jurisdiction X] before either granting or denying the
request”.241
The compatibility clause in article 10(4) clarifies that articles 10(1)
through (3) shall apply in place of or in the absence of a provision address-
ing PEs situated in third jurisdictions.242
“Given that a provision addressing [PE]s situated in third jurisdictions
is not required in order to meet the minimum standard,”243 the reserva-
tion clause in Article 10(5) permits a Party to opt out of article 10 in three
different ways.244
The notification clause in article 10(6) requires the non-reserving Par-
ties to notify the Depositary.245 “Where all Contracting Jurisdictions have
[notified] with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement, that
provision shall be replaced by [articles 10(1) through (3)]”.246 Articles
10(1) through (3) shall supersede the existing provisions only to the extent
of incompatibility.247
2.7.6 Application of Tax Agreements to Restrict a Party’s Right to
Tax Its Own Residents
Based on article 1(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention as set out
in the Action 6 Report,248 the saving clause in article 11(1) is intended to
preserve the right of a Contracting Jurisdiction to tax its own residents.249
Under article 11(1), a Covered Tax Agreement shall not affect the
taxation by a Contracting Jurisdiction of its residents, except with respect
238. Id., art. 10(2).
239. Id., art. 10(3).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id., art. 10(4).
243. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note24, ¶ 145.
244. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24 art. 10(5).
245. Id., art. 10(6).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. OECD, supra note 27, ¶ 63.
249. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 11(1).
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to the following ten categories of treaty benefits: i) business profits of a PE
or  profits of an associated enterprise; ii) government service; iii) qualified
student, business apprentice or trainee, teacher, professor, lecturer, in-
structor, researcher or research scholar; iv) credit method and exemption
method); v) non-discrimination; vi) mutual agreement procedure; vii)
members of diplomatic missions, government missions, or consular posts;
viii) pensions or other payments made under social security legislation; ix)
pensions and similar payments, annuities, alimony payments, or other
maintenance payments; or x) other provisions that expressly limit taxation
rights of the residence jurisdiction or allow taxation rights exclusively to
the source jurisdiction.250
The compatibility clause in article 11(2) clarifies that article 11(1) re-
places existing provisions “stating that the Covered Tax Agreements
would not affect the taxation by a Contracting Jurisdiction of its re-
sidents,” or is added where such provisions do not exist.251
“Given that a saving clause is not required  to meet the minimum stan-
dard,”252 and recognizing that some Parties may prefer a more targeted
solution,253 article 11(3)(a) allows Parties to opt out of article 11 en-
tirely.254 In such a case, article 3(3) applies to introduce a saving clause
that relates solely to the provision in article 3(1).255 Recognizing that an
existing saving clause provision is usually customized based on the content
of such Agreements, article 11(3)(b) allows the Parties to opt out of article
11 entirely with respect to Covered Tax Agreements already containing a
saving clause.256
The notification clause in article 11(4) clarifies that an existing provi-
sion of a Covered Tax Agreement would be replaced by the provisions of
article 11(1), “where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notifi-
cation with respect to the [existing provision]”.257 In other cases, article
11(1) would supersede the existing provisions only to the extent of
incompatibility.258
2.8 Avoidance of PE Status
2.8.1 Artificial Avoidance of PE Status Through Commissionnaire
Arrangements and Similar Strategies
Article 12(1) of the new MLI, based on article 5(5) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention produced in the Action 7 Report,259 states that:
250. Id.
251. Id., art. 11(2).
252. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 153.
253. Id.
254. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 11(3)(a).
255. Id., art. 3(3).
256. Id., art. 11(3)(b).
257. Id., art. 11(4).
258. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 155 .
259. OECD, supra note 36, at 16.
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[W]here a person is acting in a Contracting Jurisdiction . . . on
behalf of an enterprise and, in doing so, habitually concludes con-
tracts, or habitually plays the principal role leading to the conclu-
sion of contracts that are routinely concluded without material
modification by the enterprise, and these contracts are: a) in the
name of the enterprise; or b) for the transfer of the ownership of,
or for the granting of the right to use, property owned by that
enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use; or c) for the
provision of services by that enterprise, that enterprise shall be
deemed to have a permanent establishment in that Contracting
Jurisdiction in respect of any activities which that person under-
takes for the enterprise unless these activities, if they were exer-
cised by the enterprise through a fixed place of business of that
enterprise situated in that Contracting Jurisdiction, would not
cause that fixed place of business to be deemed to constitute a
permanent establishment under the definition of permanent es-
tablishment included in the Covered Tax Agreement.260
Based on article 5(6)(a) of the OECD Model Tax Convention produced in
the Action 7 Report,261 article 12(2) clarifies that article 12(1) “shall not
apply where the person acting in Contracting [Jurisdiction X] on behalf of
[an enterprise of Contracting Jurisdiction Y carries on business in Jurisdic-
tion X as] an independent agent and acts for the enterprise in the ordinary
course of that business”.262 “Where, however, a person acts exclusively or
almost exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is
closely related, that person shall not be considered to be an independent
agent [  ]with respect to any such enterprise.”263
The compatibility clause in article 12(3) describes the interaction be-
tween article 12(1) and (2) and various existing provisions.264 Article 12(1)
“would [replace existing provisions] describing the conditions under which
an enterprise shall be deemed to [have a] PE in a Contracting Jurisdiction
in respect of an activity which a person other than an [independent] agent
undertakes for the enterprise, but only to the extent that such provisions
address the situation in which [the] person has, and habitually exercises,
[authority] in that Contracting Jurisdiction to conclude contracts in the
name of the enterprise”.265 However, article 12(1) would not apply to a
provision providing that an enterprise can be deemed to have a PE for a
reason other than an authority to conclude contracts that are binding on
another enterprise.266 Article 12(2) would replace existing provisions pro-
viding “that an enterprise shall not be deemed to have a PE in a Con-
260. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(1).
261. OECD, supra note 36, at 7.
262. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(2).
263. Id., art. 12(2).
264. Id. art. 12(3).
265. Id., art. 12(3)(a).
266. Id.
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tracting Jurisdiction in respect of an activity which an agent of an
independent status undertakes for the enterprise”.267
Given that provisions addressing the issues of article 12 are not re-
quired to meet the minimum standard,268 article 12(4) allows a Party to
opt out of article 12 entirely.269
The notification clauses in article 12(5) and (6) clarify that article
12(1) or (2) would apply with respect to an existing provision only where
all Contracting Jurisdictions to such Agreement have made such a
notification.270
2.8.2 Artificial Avoidance of PE Status Through the
Specific Activity Exemptions
Article 13 is intended to reflect the changes brought by the Action 7
Report to the wording of article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention
of 2014, so as to address situations in which the specific activity exemp-
tions give rise to BEPS concerns.271 Article 13(1) permits a Party to
choose to apply Option A or Option B or to apply neither Option.272
To address concerns of artificial avoidance of PE status through the
specific activity exemptions, Option A explicitly states:
[T]hat the activities listed therein will be deemed not to constitute
a PE only if they are of a preparatory or auxiliary character, in-
cluding: a) the activities specifically listed in [existing provisions]
as activities deemed not to constitute a PE, whether or not that
exception from PE status is contingent on the activity being of a
preparatory or auxiliary character; b) the maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in subparagraph a); c) the
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combina-
tion of activities mentioned in subparagraphs a) and b).273
Option B is designed as an alternative provision to address inappro-
priate use of the specific activity exemptions through anti-fragmentation
rules.274 The term “PE” shall be deemed not to include:
a) the activities specifically listed in the [existing provisions] as
activities deemed not to constitute a PE, whether or not that ex-
ception from PE status is contingent on the activity being of a
preparatory or auxiliary character, except to the extent that the
267. Id., art. 12(3)(b).
268. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 165.
269. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 12(4).
270. Id., art. 12(5) – (6).
271. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 168.
272. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(1).
273. Id., art. 13(2).
274. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 169.
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relevant [existing] provisions provides explicitly that a specific ac-
tivity shall be deemed not to constitute a PE provided that the
activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character; b) the mainte-
nance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carry-
ing on, for the enterprise, any activity not described in
subparagraph a), provided that this activity is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character; c) the maintenance of a fixed place of business
solely for any combination of activities mentioned in subpara-
graphs a) and b), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a prepara-
tory or auxiliary character.275
The application of Option A will permit Parties to preserve the excep-
tions for activities described in existing provisions, but will require that
those activities must be preparatory or auxiliary.276 In contrast, the appli-
cation of Option B will permit Parties to preserve the exceptions for activi-
ties described in existing provisions, but “will require that those exceptions
will apply irrespective of whether the activity is of a preparatory or auxil-
iary character‘.277
To address the fragmentation of activities between closely related par-
ties and avoid the abuse of the exceptional rules on the definition of PE,
article 13(4) clarifies that a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement
[T]hat lists specific activities deemed not to constitute a PE shall
not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by
an enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise
carries on business activities at the same place or at another place
in the same Contracting Jurisdiction and: a) that place or other
place constitutes a PE for the enterprise or the closely related en-
terprise under the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement defin-
ing a PE; or b) the overall activity resulting from the combination
of the activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same
place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at
the two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character, pro-
vided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises
at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related
enterprises at the two places, constitute complementary functions
that are part of a cohesive business operation.278
The compatibility clause in article 13(5) (a)clarifies that Option A or
Option B “shall apply in place of the relevant parts of [existing] provisions
[listing] specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a PE even if
275. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(3).
276. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 171.
277. Id., ¶ 173.
278. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 13(4).
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the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business”.279 Further,
Article 13(5)(b) “shall apply to existing provisions [listing] specific activi-
ties that are deemed not to constitute a PE even if the activity is carried on
through a fixed place of business”.280 Such existing provisions would in-
clude those modeled after article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion of 2014 or article 5(4) of the UN Model Tax Convention of 2011  and
bilaterally negotiated provisions of the same type.281
“Given that provisions addressing artificial avoidance of PE status
through the specific activity exemptions [ ] are not required to meet the
minimum standard”,282 article 13(6) permits a Party to opt out of either
article 13 entirely, or Option A with respect to existing provisions already
explicitly stating “that [listed] activities shall be deemed not to constitute a
PE only if [the activities is] preparatory or auxiliary”, or Article 13(4).283
The notification clause in article 13(7) requires Parties choosing “to
apply an Option [to] notify the Depositary of its choice of Option”.284
“An Option shall apply [  ] to a provision [  ] only where all Contracting
Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a
notification . . .”.285
Article 13(8) requires Parties not opting out of applying article 13(4)
(or the entirety of Article 13) to notify the Depositary of each of its Cov-
ered Tax Agreements that includes specific activity exemptions.286 Article
13(4) “shall apply to [an existing] provision only where all Contracting
Jurisdictions have made [such] a notification . . .”287
2.8.3 Splitting-up of Contracts
Article 14 is designed to address abusive splitting-up of contracts as a
potential strategy for the artificial avoidance of PE status, as a response to
the Action 7 Report.288
Under article 14(1), “for the sole purpose of determining whether the
period (or periods) referred to in an [existing] provision that stipulates a
period (or periods) of time after which specific projects or activities shall
constitute a PE has been exceeded”:
a) where an enterprise E of Contracting Jurisdiction X carries
on activities in Contracting Jurisdiction Y at a place that con-
stitutes a building site, construction project, installation pro-
279. Id. art. 13(5).
280. Id., art. 13(5)(a).
281. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 178.
282. Id., ¶ 179.
283. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. (6).
284. Id., art. 13(7).
285. Id.
286. Id., art. 13(8).
287. Id.
288. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 182.
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ject or other specific project identified in the relevant existing
provision, or carries on supervisory or consultancy activities
in connection with such a place, in the case of an existing pro-
vision referring to such activities, and these activities are car-
ried on during one or more periods of time that, in the
aggregate, exceed 30 days without exceeding the period or pe-
riods referred to in the relevant existing provision;
b) where connected activities are carried on in Jurisdiction Y at
(or in connection with) the same building site, construction or
installation project, or other place identified in the relevant
existing provision during different periods of time, each ex-
ceeding 30 days, by one or more enterprises closely related to
enterprise E, these different periods of time shall be added to
the aggregate period of time during which enterprise E has
carried on activities at that building site, construction or in-
stallation project or other place identified in the relevant ex-
isting provision.289
The compatibility clause in article 14(2) clarifies that article 14(1) “shall
apply in place of or in the absence of [existing] provisions to the extent
that such provisions address the division of contracts into multiple parts to
avoid the application of a time period or periods” that determine whether
a PE exists for specific projects or activities.290 Although anti-splitting
rules in many treaties apply to a wide range of activities, article 14(2) is
only intended to replace existing rules to the extent that they relate to the
activities described in article 14(1), and leaves those rules intact with re-
spect to activities not within the scope of article 14(1).291
Given that anti-splitting provisions are not required in order to meet
the minimum standard,292 the reservation clause in article 14(3) permits a
Party to opt out of the entirety of Article 14.293 Recognizing that the anti-
contract-splitting rules addressing the exploration for or exploitation of
natural resources are generally carefully negotiated,294 a Party may opt
out of the entirety of article 14 “with respect to [existing] provisions relat-
ing to the exploration for or exploitation of natural resources”.295
The notification clause in article 14(4) clarifies that article 14(1) shall
replace anti-splitting provisions to the extent provided in article 14(2)
where all Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax Agreement have
notified accordingly.296 “In other cases, [article 14(1)] shall apply to [the
289. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 14(1).
290. Id., art. 14(2).
291. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 185.
292. Id.
293. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 14(3)(a).
294. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 186.
295. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note24, art. 14(3)(b).
296. Id., art. 14(4).
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Covered Tax Agreement, but will] supersede the existing provisions only
to the extent of incompatibility . . .”297
2.8.4 Definition of a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise
Based on article 5(6)(b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention,298 arti-
cle 15(1) describes the conditions under which a person will be considered
“closely related” to an enterprise for the purposes of articles 12, 13 and
14.299
A person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all the
relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or
both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises.
[Specifically], a person shall be considered to be closely related to
an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than fifty
percent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a
company, more than fifty percent of the aggregate vote and value
of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the
company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly
more than fifty percent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of
a company, more than fifty percent of the aggregate vote and
value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest
in the company) in the person and the enterprise.300
Since article 15(1) is essential to understand the term “closely related
to an enterprise” used in the MLI, Parties can opt out of Article 15 only if
they have made the reservations described in Article 12(4), Article
13(6)(a) or (c), and Article 14(3)(a).301
2.9 Improving Dispute Resolution
Given that the minimum standard for improving dispute resolution
declared in the Action 14 Report can be complemented by a set of best
practices, Part V of the MLI is designed to provide ways to incorporate
some of those best practices into Covered Tax Agreements.302
2.9.1 Mutual Agreement Procedure
To provide for taxpayer’s rights in the context of international tax law,
articles 16(1) through (3) are intended to effectively incorporate articles
25(1) through (3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention into Covered Tax
Agreements and to set out the requirements for the mutual agreement
procedure (MAP).303
297. Id.
298. OECD, supra note 36, at 16 –17.
299. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 15(1).
300. Id.
301. Id., art. 15(2).
302. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 191.
303. Id., ¶ 191.
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Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting Jurisdictions result or will result for that person in
taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement, that person may present the case to the competent
authority of either Contracting Jurisdiction within three years of
the first notification of the [aforesaid action] . . . . The competent
authority shall endeavor, . . . to resolve the case by mutual agree-
ment with its counterpart in the other Contracting Jurisdiction,
with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accor-
dance with the Convention. Any agreement reached shall be im-
plemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of
the Contracting Jurisdictions. The competent authorities shall en-
deavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts
arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention
. . . .304
The compatibility clause in Article 16(4) permits Parties to retain ex-
isting provisions relating to dispute resolution to the extent that those pro-
visions are consistent in content with the provisions of article 16(1)
through (3), and subject to any reservations provided in article 16(5).305
The reserving clause in article 16(5) permits Parties to implement ele-
ment 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard through administrative mea-
sures, as provided under elements 3.1 and 3.3 of the Action 14 minimum
standard.306
A Party may opt out of applying the first sentence of article 16(1)
[On the basis that it intends to meet the minimum standard [under
the BEPS Package by ensuring] that under each of its Covered
Tax Agreements, . . . the taxpayer may present its case to the com-
petent authority of the Contracting Jurisdiction of which it is a
resident . . . or a national and that [such] competent authority will
implement a bilateral notification or consultation process with [its
counterpart] in the other Contracting Jurisdiction for [the MAP]
cases in which [such] competent authority [does not consider the
taxpayer’s objection to be justified].307
A Party may opt out of applying the three-year period requirement of
article 16(1) on the basis that it intends to meet the minimum standard by
ensuring that, “where its tax treaty does not contain a provision stipulating
the time period for the taxpayer to present the [MAP] case”, the taxpayer
is allowed to present the MAP case within a period of at least three
years.308 “It is anticipated, therefore, that this reservation would only be
304. Id., art. 16(3).
305. Id., art. 16(4).
306. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 199.
307. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(a).
308. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(b).
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made by a Contracting Jurisdiction if its domestic regulations apply auto-
matically and are more favorable in their effects to the taxpayer, either
because they allow a longer time for presenting objections or because they
do not set any time limits for such purpose.”309
A Party may also reserve on the application of the second sentence of
article 16(2) only on the basis that either (i) all MAP agreements “shall be
implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the
Contracting Jurisdictions”310; or (ii) it intends to meet the minimum stan-
dard by accepting, in its bilateral treaty negotiations, alternative treaty
provisions that limit the time during which a Contracting Jurisdiction may
make an adjustment pursuant to provisions modeled after article 9(1) or
article 7(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, in order to avoid late
adjustments with respect to which MAP relief will not be available.311
Article 16(6) requires a number of notifications to ensure clarity as to
how Covered Tax Agreements will be modified by article 16.312
2.9.2 Corresponding Adjustments
Given that the Action 14 Report noted that it would be more efficient
if jurisdictions had the possibility to unilaterally provide for corresponding
adjustments in cases in which they find the objection of the taxpayer to be
justified.313 Recognizing that Best Practice No. 1 contained in the Action
14 Report states that jurisdictions should include article 9(2) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention in their tax treaties,314 article 17 is intended to
provide a mechanism for Parties to implement this Best Practice.315
Article 17(1) requires corresponding adjustments.316 “Where a
Contracting Jurisdiction [X] includes in the profits of an enter-
prise of [its] Jurisdiction —and taxes accordingly— profits on
which an enterprise of [ ] Contracting Jurisdiction [Y] has been
charged to tax  in Jurisdiction [Y], and the profits so included are
profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of Jurisdiction
[X] (if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been
those which would have been made between independent enter-
prises), then [Jurisdiction Y] shall make an appropriate adjust-
ment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement and the competent au-
309. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 201.
310. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(4)(b).
311. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 16(5)(c).
312. Id., art. 16(6).
313. OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, supra note 37, ¶
43.
314. Id.
315. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 209.
316. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 17(1).
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thorities of [Jurisdictions X and Y] shall if necessary consult each
other.”317
The compatibility clause in article 17 (2) provides that article 17(1)
“shall apply in the place of or in the absence of a provision that requires a
Contracting Jurisdiction to make an appropriate adjustment. . . where the
other Contracting Jurisdiction [makes an adjustment that reflects the
arm’s length profits of an enterprise] . . .”.318 Some existing provisions are
modeled after article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention or the UN
Model Tax Convention. If certain existing provisions only permit, but do
not require, a Contracting Jurisdiction to make a corresponding adjust-
ment, such provisions would be outside the scope of article 17(2) and
would continue to apply except in the case of incompatibility.319 If such
provisions would permit a Contracting Jurisdiction to choose not to make
an appropriate adjustment even when the adjustment made by the other
Contracting Jurisdiction was justified, the provisions would be superseded
by article 17(1).
“Given that the inclusion of article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention in tax treaties is a best practice . . . , not the minimum standard,
[and recognizing that] element 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard
requires that jurisdictions provide access to the MAP in transfer pricing
cases and implement the resulting mutual agreements regardless of
whether the tax treaty contains a provision modeled after article 9(2) of
the OECD Model Tax Convention,”320 the conditional reservation clauses
in Article 17(3) permit a Party to reserve the right for article 17 not to
apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that already contain a provision of
the same type.321 “A Party may also opt out of article 17 “on the basis that
in the absence of a provision referred to in [article 17(2)], it shall make the
appropriate adjustment referred to in [article 17(1)], or its competent au-
thority shall endeavor to resolve the case under the [existing] provisions
[relating to MAP].”322 A reserving Party under article 16(5)(c)(ii) may opt
out of article 17 “on the basis that in its bilateral treaty negotiations it shall
accept a treaty provision of the type contained in [article 17(1)], provided
that the Contracting Jurisdictions were able to reach agreement on that
provision and on the provisions described in [article 16(5)(c)(ii)].323
The notification clause in article 17(4) requires Parties to notify the
Depositary of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements contains an
existing requirement to make a corresponding adjustment.324 The provi-
sions of article 17(1) will replace such provisions where all Contracting
317. Id.
318. Id., art. 17(2).
319. But c.f. Id.
320. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 212.
321. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 17(3)(a).
322. Id., art. 17(3)(b).
323. Id., art. 17(3)(c).
324. Id., art. 17(4).
Spring 2018] A Global Treaty Override? 195
Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement have made such a notifica-
tion.325 In other cases, article 17(1) will supersede existing provisions only
in the case of incompatibility.326
2.10 Arbitration
2.10.1 Choice to Apply Part VI
Article 18 encourages Parties to choose to apply Part VI of the MLI
with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements.327 However, Part VI is in-
tended to apply only between Parties that explicitly choose to apply it by
notifying the Depositary of such choice.328 “A Party is permitted to for-
mulate reservations with respect to the scope of cases eligible for
arbitration”.329
2.10.2 Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Article 19 (1) contains the core arbitration provision.330 “Where the
competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement on a case pursu-
ant to the MAP under the Covered Tax Agreement . . . within a period of
two years . . .  any unresolved issues arising from the case shall, at the
request of the person presenting the case, be submitted to arbitration in
the manner described in [Part VI].”331 However, prior to the expiration of
the two-year period, the competent authorities may agree to a longer or
shorter time period with respect to a particular case, and should notify the
person presenting the case of such agreement.332 Article 19 (8) permits a
Party to reserve the right to substitute a three-year period for the two-year
period for the purposes of applying article 19 to its Covered Tax
Agreements.333
Article 19 (2) is intended to avoid a complicated and unpredictable
situation and to ensure that one remedy process will take place before the
other, where a taxpayer’s case goes through both the MAP and domestic
court or administrative proceedings.334 The period for arbitration request
shall stop running if a competent authority has suspended the MAP be-
cause a case related to one or more of the same issues is pending before
the court or administrative tribunal.335 The period will start running again
when a final decision has been rendered by the court or administrative
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id., art. 18.
328. Id.
329. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 216.
330. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(1).
331. Id.
332. Id., art. 19(1)(b).
333. Id., art. 19(8).
334. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 217.
335. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(2).
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tribunal or the case has been suspended or withdrawn.336 The period will
also stop running if a person presenting the case and a competent author-
ity have agreed to suspend the mutual agreement process for any reason,
especially for taxpayer-friendly consideration of unexpected personal
hardships. The period will start running again once that suspension has
been lifted.337
Given that additional information from the taxpayer might be re-
quested by either competent authority to undertake substantive considera-
tion of the case, article 19(3) permits the period for arbitration request to
be extended, “where both competent authorities agree that a person di-
rectly affected by the case has failed to provide in a timely manner any
[requested] additional material information . . .  for an amount of time
equal to the period beginning on the date [of] information request and
ending on the date of ultimate provision of information . . .”.338
Article 19(4)(b) is intended to clarify the validity of the arbitration
decision.339 First, the arbitration decision shall be final,340 and “cannot be
changed either by the competent authorities or by the arbitration panel
unless . . . article 24 appl[ies] to permit agreement on a different resolu-
tion.”341 Second, because the arbitration process is an extension of the
MAP in case of deadlock, and the arbitration decision is per se unable to
automatically resolve all the issues without the subsequent supportive mu-
tual agreement, the arbitration decision shall be implemented through mu-
tual agreement concerning the case.342 “Third,
[T]he arbitration decision shall be binding on both Contracting
Jurisdictions except in [three circumstances]: i) if a person directly
affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that
implements the arbitration decision. In such a case, the case shall
not be eligible for any further consideration by the competent au-
thorities) . . . ; ii) if a final decision of the courts of one of the
Contracting Jurisdictions holds that the arbitration decision is in-
valid. In such a case, the request for arbitration [ ] shall be consid-
ered not to have been made, and the arbitration process shall be
considered not to have taken place, . . . and a new request for
arbitration may be made unless the competent authorities agree
that such a new request should not be permitted); and iii) if a
person directly affected by the case pursues litigation on the issues
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id., art. 19(3).
339. Id., art. 19(4)(b).
340. Id., art (19(4)(a).
341. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 220.
342. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(4)(a); OECD MLI Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 24, ¶ 220.
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which were resolved in the mutual agreement implementing the
arbitration decision in any court or administrative tribunal.”343
Articles 19(5) through (7) set forth detailed requirements as to the
dates for the competent authority to notify the person presenting the case
and the other competent authority regarding the receipt of the MAP re-
quest and the request for additional information.344
Articles 19(8) through (9) provide detailed rules to establish the start
date of the period before unresolved issues in a case are first eligible to be
submitted to arbitration, depending on whether the competent authorities
have requested additional information.345
To ensure smooth and predictable functioning of the arbitration pro-
cess by and through close collaboration between the competent authorities
based on jointly agreed procedural and operational rules, article 19(10)
requires that the competent authorities “settle the mode of application of
the [arbitration] provisions [by mutual agreement] . . . , including the mini-
mum information necessary for each competent authority to undertake
substantive consideration of the case. Such an agreement shall be con-
cluded before the date on which unresolved issues in a [MAP] case are
first eligible to be submitted to arbitration.”346 This mode of application
may be changed from time to time thereafter.347
Article 19(11) allows a Party to “reserve the right to replace the two-
year period set forth in [Article 19(1)(b)] with a three-year period”348 for
the purposes of applying Part VI to its Covered Tax Agreements.
Under Article 19(12), a Party may reserve the right to exclude from
arbitration issues with respect to which a decision has been rendered by a
court or administrative tribunal of either Contracting Jurisdiction.349
First, ”any unresolved issue arising from a [MAP] case shall not be submit-
ted to arbitration, if a decision on this issue has already been rendered by
a court or administrative tribunal of either Contracting Jurisdiction.”350
Second, the arbitration process shall terminate, if a court or administrative
tribunal decision is rendered during the arbitration process.351 The reason
is that some jurisdictions do not permit a mutual agreement concluded by
the competent authority to override the decision of domestic court or ad-
ministrative tribunal, either as a matter of law or practice.352
343. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. (4)(b).
344. Id., art. 19(5) – (7).
345. Id., art. 19(8) – (9).
346. Id., art. 19(10).
347. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 230.
348. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 19(11).
349. Id., art. 19(12).
350. Id., art. 19(12)(a).
351. Id., art. 19(12)(b).
352. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 232.
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2.10.3 Appointment of Arbitrators
Although Article 20 sets out detailed default rules for the appoint-
ment and qualifications of arbitrators, the competent authorities may mu-
tually agree on different rules, either generally or with respect to a
particular case.353
“The arbitration panel consist of three individual members with ex-
pertise or experience in international tax matters.”354 “Each competent
authority shall appoint one panel member within 60 days of the date of
request for arbitration.”355 The two members shall then, “within 60 days
of the latter of their appointments, appoint a third member who is not a
national or resident of either Contracting Jurisdiction to serve as Chair of
the panel.”356 Each member must maintain her or his impartiality and in-
dependence of the arbitrators through the arbitration proceedings.357
If the competent authority fails to appoint a panel member, or if the
two initial members fail to appoint the Chair, within the specified or
agreed time periods, the highest ranking official of the OECD Centre for
Tax Policy and Administration that is not a national of either Contracting
Jurisdiction, shall appoint the vacant member or the Chair respectively.358
2.10.4 Confidentiality of Arbitration Proceedings
Confidential information in arbitration proceeding is not supposed to
be leaked without due authorization process.359 Article 21 is intended to
ensure smooth arbitration proceedings without undermining the confiden-
tiality of the MAP.360
The “information received by the arbitration panel or prospective ar-
bitrators and information that the competent authorities receive from the
arbitration panel shall be considered information [ ] exchanged [under the
exchange of information and administrative assistance provisions of the
Covered Tax Agreement]”.361 “The competent authorities . . . shall ensure
that [panel] members and their staff agree in writing . . . to treat any infor-
mation relating to the arbitration proceeding consistently with the confi-
dentiality and nondisclosure [requirements].362 . . .The consequences of
breach of confidentiality will be determined under the agreement terms
and the domestic laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions.363
353. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 20(1); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 234.
354. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 20(2)(a).
355. Id., art. 20(2)(b).
356. Id.
357. Id. art. 20(2)(c).
358. Id., art. 20(3).
359. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 238.
360. See id.
361. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 21(1).
362. Id., art. 21(2).
363. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 239.
Spring 2018] A Global Treaty Override? 199
2.10.5 Resolution of a Case Prior to the Conclusion of the Arbitration
Given that arbitration is the last resort for the disputes between the
competent authorities arising from MAP cases,364 and recognizing the sig-
nificance of the taxpayer’s autonomy, article 22 provides that if the compe-
tent authorities reach a mutual agreement to resolve the case, or if the
taxpayer withdraws either its request for arbitration or MAP during the
arbitration process, the MAP and the arbitration procedure with respect
to such case shall terminate.365
2.10.6 Type of Arbitration Process
To expedite the arbitration process, article 23 offers the “final offer”
approach and the “independent opinion” approach as default types.366
However, the competent authorities may mutually agree on different
rules.367
Under the “final offer” approach, “the competent authorities [ ] shall
[each] submit to the panel . . . a proposed resolution which addresses all
unresolved issue(s) in the case, . . . [but including only] the disposition of
specific monetary amounts [ ] or [ ]the maximum rate of tax charged pur-
suant to  the Covered Tax Agreement.”368 Where the unresolved issues
include threshold questions, “such as whether an individual is a resident or
whether a permanent establishment exists, the competent authorities may
submit alternative proposed resolutions . . . contingent on resolution of
[the unresolved] threshold questions”.369 Each competent authority may
submit a supporting position paper or a reply submission in response to
the proposed resolution and supporting position paper submitted by the
other competent authority.370 The panel shall select one of the proposed
resolutions, and shall not include a rationale or any other explanation of
the decision.371
A Party unwilling to accept the “final offer” approach may adopt the
“independent opinion” approach.372 Each competent authority shall pro-
vide all panel members with any information necessary for the arbitration
decision .373 The panel shall decide the issues pursuant to the applicable
provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement and, subject to these provisions,
of the domestic laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions.374 The panel shall
also consider any other sources identified by mutual agreement of the
364. Id., ¶ 240.
365. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 22.
366. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 242, 246.
367. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 23(1).
368. Id., art. 23(1)(a).
369. Id.
370. Id., art. 23(1)(b).
371. Id., art. 23(1)(c).
372. Id., art. 23(2).
373. Id., art. 23(2)(a).
374. Id., art. 23(2)(b).
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competent authorities .375 The decision shall indicate the sources of law
relied upon and the reasoning which led to its result.376
The arbitration decision shall be delivered to the competent authori-
ties in writing but will not have any precedential value.377
Where two Parties prefer different types of arbitration processes, the
competent authorities shall endeavor to reach agreement on the type of
arbitration process that shall apply with respect to all cases arising under
that Covered Tax Agreement.378 Until such an agreement is reached, arti-
cle 19 shall not apply.379
A Party may choose to apply article 23(5) “with respect to its Covered
Tax Agreements.”380 The competent authorities, prior to the beginning of
arbitration proceedings, should ensure that each taxpayer presenting the
case and their advisors sign a confidentiality agreement.381 A material
breach of the nondisclosure agreement after the request for arbitration
and before the panel has delivered its decision shall result in the termina-
tion of the MAP and the arbitration proceedings on the case.382 However,
Parties may opt out of article 23(5).383 A Party choosing to apply article
23(5) may reserve the right for Part VI not to apply with respect to all
Covered Tax Agreements with the reserving Contracting Jurisdiction.384
Articles 23(4) though article 23(7) are intended to encourage the best
practice of confidentiality.385 Where Parties disagree on the significance of
confidentiality, Parties considering confidentiality essential may opt out of
arbitration entirely if a Party opts out of the nondisclosure rule.386
2.10.7 Agreement on a Different Resolution
Article 24 permits both Contracting Jurisdictions to choose to apply
an optional provision, which allows the competent authorities to depart
from the arbitration decision and to agree on a different resolution within
three calendar months after the decision has been delivered to them.387
Given that such a provision would be unlikely to be applied where the
“final offer” approach is used, Parties may apply article 24 only to its Cov-
375. Id.
376. Id., art. 23(2)(c).
377. Id.
378. Id., art. 23(3).
379. Id.
380. Id., art. 23(4).
381. Id., art. 23(5).
382. Id.
383. Id., art. 23(6).
384. Id. art. 23(7).
385. See OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶¶ 250-251.
386. Id. ¶ 251.
387. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 24.
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ered Tax Agreements for which the “independent opinion” approach
applies.388
2.10.8 Costs of Arbitration Proceedings
Under article 25, costs of arbitration proceedings “shall be borne by
the Contracting Jurisdictions in a manner to be settled by mutual agree-
ment between the competent authorities . . . .”389 “In the absence of such
agreement, each Contracting Jurisdiction shall bear its own expenses and
those of its appointed [arbitrator]”.390 “The cost of the chair . . . and other
expenses associated with the conduct of the arbitration proceedings shall
be borne by the Contracting Jurisdictions in equal shares.”391
2.10.9 Compatibility
The compatibility clause in article 26 clarifies that Part VI
[S]hall apply in place or in the absence of provisions of a Covered
Tax Agreement that provide for arbitration of unresolved issues
arising from a [MAP] case. Each Party that chooses to apply Part
VI shall notify the Depositary [accordingly] . . . . Where two Con-
tracting Jurisdictions have made [such] a notification . . . , that
provision shall be replaced by [Part VI] as between those Con-
tracting Jurisdictions.392
To avoid duplicative arbitration efforts,393 “any unresolved issue aris-
ing from a [MAP] case . . .  shall not be submitted to arbitration [under
Part VI] if an arbitration panel or similar body has previously been set up
[with respect to the issue under another] bilateral or multilateral conven-
tion that provides for mandatory binding arbitration [for] unresolved is-
sues . . .”.394
Nothing in Part VI is intended to “affect the fulfillment of wider obli-
gations with respect to the arbitration of unresolved issues arising in the
context of a [MAP] resulting from other conventions to which the Con-
tracting Jurisdictions are or will become parties.”395
“A Party may preserve the right for . . . Part [VI] not to apply with
respect to one or more identified Covered Tax Agreements . . . that al-
388. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 252.
389. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 25.




393. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 257.
394. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 26(2).
395. Id., art. 26(3).
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ready provide for mandatory binding arbitration of unresolved issues aris-
ing from a [MAP] case.”396
2.11 Final Provisions of the MLI
2.11.1 Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, or Approval
As of December 31, 2016, the MLI was open for signature by all
States, three listed jurisdictions, and any other non-State jurisdiction au-
thorized to become a Party by consensus of Parties and Signatories. Signa-
ture of the MLI shall be followed by ratification, acceptance, or
approval.397
2.11.2 Reservations
Article 28 (1) lists twenty-one authorized reservations by reference to
the provision in which they are set out.398 With the exception of reserva-
tions to Part VI, these are the only reservations which may be made under
the MLI.399
To provide Parties committing to arbitration with flexibility to tailor
the scope of cases based on their domestic policies,400 article 28(2) permits
any Party that chooses to apply Part VI to formulate one or more reserva-
tions as to the scope of cases eligible for arbitration under Part VI.401 Res-
ervations are subject to acceptance.402
Article 28(3) clarifies the symmetric effect (i.e., reciprocal application)
of reservations made under article 28(1) or (2) on the application of the
relevant provisions of the MLI between the reserving Party and the other
Parties.403 “Unless explicitly provided otherwise . . . , a reservation will
modify . . . the [relevant] provisions of the Convention” as between the
reserving Party and all other Parties to the Convention in a symmetric
way.404
Article 28(4) requires the State Party responsible for the international
relations of a jurisdiction or territory to deposit a separate list of reserva-
tions for that jurisdiction or territory, which may be different from the
State Party’s own list of reservations.405
Articles 28(5) through (7) impose the timing requirements for making
reservations.406 A provisional list of reservations shall be provided to the
396. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
BEPSId., art. 26(4).
397. Id., art. 27.
398. Id., art. 28(1).
399. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 264.
400. Id., ¶ 265.
401. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(2).
402. Id., art. 28(2)(b).
403. Id., art. 28(3).
404. Id.
405. Id., art. 28(4).
406. Id., art. 28(5) – (7).
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Depositary at the time of signature,407 and a final list of reservations shall
be provided at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification,
acceptance, or approval.408 It is permitted for a final list of reservations to
be provided to the Depositary at the time of signature.409 If reservations
are not made at the time of signature, a provisional list of expected reser-
vations shall be provided to the Depositary at that time.410
Under article 28(8), when reservations are made under the fifteen
types of listed provisions, an exhaustive list of the Covered Tax Agree-
ments which are within the scope of the reservation as defined in the rele-
vant provision must be provided.411
To encourage comprehensive modifications of the Covered Tax
Agreements by the MLI, article 28(9) permits a Party to withdraw a reser-
vation or replace it with a reservation which is more limited in scope by
notifying the Depositary.412 Articles 28(9)(a) and (b) set out the dates on
which such a withdrawal or replacement of a reservation will take
effect.413
2.11.3 Notifications
Article 29 sets forth detailed requirements for the notification proce-
dure.414 The twenty categories of notification specified in the MLI shall be
made either at the time of signature or when depositing the instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval.415 The State Party responsible for the
international relations of the jurisdiction or territory shall provide a list of
notifications with respect to that jurisdiction or territory, which may be
different from the State Party’s own list of notifications.416
“If notifications are made at the time of signature, they shall be con-
firmed upon deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, or ap-
proval, unless the document containing the notifications explicitly specifies
that it is to be considered definitive.”417 “If notifications are not made at
the time of signature, a provisional list of expected notifications shall be
provided at that time.”418
The list of agreements described in  article 2(1)(a)(ii) may be ex-
tended at any time by notifying the Depositary.419 If the agreement falls
407. Id., art. 28(7).
408. Id., art. 28(6).
409. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 276.
410. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 28(7).
411. Id., art. 28(8).
412. Id., art. 28(9).
413. Id., art. 28(9)(a), 28(9)(b).
414. Id., art. 29.
415. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 292.
416. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 29(2).
417. Id., art. 29(3).
418. Id., art. 29(4).
419. Id., art. 29(5).
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within the scope of any of the reservations made by the Party listed in
article 28(8), the Party must specify this in this notification.420 The Party
shall also specify any additional required notifications to reflect the inclu-
sion of additional agreements.421 “If the extension results for the first time
in the inclusion of a tax agreement entered into by or on behalf of a [non-
State jurisdiction or territory] . . . , [the responsible Party] shall specify [at
that time] any reservations or notifications applicable to Covered Tax
Agreements.”422 On the date on which a newly added agreement becomes
a Covered Tax Agreement, “Article 35 . . . shall govern the date on which
the modifications to the Covered Tax Agreement shall have effect.”423
Parties may make additional notifications under articles 29(1)(b)
through (s) by notifying the Depositary.424 Articles 29(6)(a) and (b) clar-
ify when such additional notifications will take effect.425 The provision
mirrors article 28(9) relating to the date on which the withdrawal or re-
placement of a reservation will take effect.426
2.11.4 Subsequent Modifications of Covered Tax Agreements
Recognizing the necessity of subsequent treaty modification,427 article
30 provides that “the provisions in [the MLI] . . . are without prejudice to
subsequent modifications to a Covered Tax Agreement which may be
agreed to by the Contracting Jurisdictions.”428
2.11.5 Conference of the Parties
Article 31 authorizes the Parties to “convene a Conference of the Par-
ties for the purposes of taking any decisions or exercising any functions as
may be required or appropriate under the provisions of . . . [the MLI]”.429
“Any Party may request a Conference by communicating a request to the
Depositary.”430 The Depositary will then convene a Conference provided
that the request is supported by one-third of the Parties within six calendar
months of the communication by the Depositary of the request.431
2.11.6 Interpretation and Implementation
Under article 32, “any question[s] arising from the interpretation or





424. Id., art. 29(6).
425. Id., art. 29(6)(a), 29(6)(b).
426. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 307.
427. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 310.
428. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 30.
429. Id., art. 31(1).
430. Id., art. 31(3).
431. Id.
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determined under the relevant provision(s) of [that] . . . Agreement [it-
self] . . . [and] any questions arising as to the interpretation or implementa-
tion of . . . [the MLI] may be addressed either by a Conference of the
Parties” or by the agreement between the competent authorities.432
2.11.7 Amendment
Article 33 permits any Party to propose an amendment to the MLI
“by submitting the proposed amendment to the Depositary.”433 “A Con-
ference of the Parties may be convened to consider the proposed
amendment.”434
2.11.8 Entry into Force
Under article 34, the MLI “shall enter into force on the first day of the
month following the expiration of a period of three calendar months be-
ginning on the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, ac-
ceptance, or approval.”435 “For each Signatory ratifying, accepting, or
approving . . . [the MLI] after the. . . [fifth deposit], . . . [the MLI] shall
enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a
period of three calendar months beginning on the date of the deposit by
such Signatory of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or
approval.”436
2.11.9 Entry into Effect
Article 35 sets out when the provisions of the MLI shall take effect in
each Contracting Jurisdiction with respect to two categories of taxes which
fall within the scope of a Covered Tax Agreement.437
Article 35(1)(a) addresses the entry into effect of provisions of the
MLI “with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited
to non-residents”.438 The first taxes for which the MLI shall have effect
are those for which “the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after
the first day of the next calendar year that begins on or after the latest of
the dates on which the [MLI] enters into force for each Contracting Juris-
diction . . .”.439
Article 35(1)(b) addresses the entry into effect of provisions of the
MLI “with respect to all other taxes levied by a Contracting Jurisdic-
tion”.440 Unless the Contracting Jurisdictions agree to apply a shorter pe-
riod, the first taxes for which provisions of the MLI will enter into effect
432. Id., art. 32.
433. Id., art. 33(1).
434. Id., art. 33(2).
435. Id., art. 34(1).
436. Id., art. 34(2).
437. Id., art. 35(1).
438. Id., art. 35(1)(a).
439. Id.
440. Id., art. 35(1)(b).
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are those levied “with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after the
expiration of a period of six calendar months from the latest of the dates
on which the MLI enters into force for each  of the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions . . .”.441
To address the situations in which the taxable period does not follow
the calendar year in some Contracting Jurisdictions, article 35(2) permits a
Party to “choose to substitute “taxable period” for “calendar year”” solely
for the purposes of its own asymmetrical application of article 35(1)(a)
and (5)(a).442
To allow the MLI to enter into effect only after the start of a calendar
year in certain Contracting Jurisdictions,443 article 35(3) permits a Party to
replace the reference to “taxable periods beginning on or after the expira-
tion of a period” with a reference to “taxable periods beginning on or after
1 January of the next calendar year beginning on or after the expiration of
a period” solely for the purposes of its own asymmetrical application of
article 35(1)(b) and (5)(b).444
To ensure that the MAP provisions apply as soon as possible,445 arti-
cle 35(4) clarifies that article 16 “shall have effect with respect to a Cov-
ered Tax Agreement for a case presented to the competent authority on or
after the latest of the dates on which the MLI enters into force for each of
the Contracting Jurisdiction”, except for cases that were ineligible to be
presented prior to the modification of Covered Tax Agreement by the
MLI, regardless of the taxable period to which the case relates.446 How-
ever, a Party may opt out of article 35(4),447 in which case the entry into
effect of article 16 for its Covered Tax Agreement will be governed by
article 35(1) through (3).448
Article 35(5) provides for the entry into effect in each Contracting
Jurisdiction of the MLI’s provisions for new Covered Tax Agreements re-
sulting from an extension of the list of agreements notified under article
2(1)(a)(ii).449 The time periods run similarly to those described in article
35(1) in many respects.450
Article 35(7) permits a Party to reserve the right to delay the date of
entry into effect of the provisions of the MLI, of the withdrawal or re-
placement of a reservation, of an additional notification with respect to
that Covered Tax Agreement, or of Part VI (Arbitration), until that Party
441. Id.
442. Id., art. 35(2).
443. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 331.
444. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(3).
445. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 333.
446. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(4).
447. Id., art. 35(6).
448. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 337.
449. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(5).
450. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 335.
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has completed its internal procedures for this purpose.451 In such cases,
the default specific rules on entry into effect would apply as from the date
30 days after the Depositary has received the latest notification by each
reserving Contracting Jurisdiction that it has completed its internal proce-
dures for the entry into effect of the provisions of the MLI with respect to
that specific Covered Tax Agreement.452
2.11.10 Entry into Effect of Part VI
Article 36 exclusively addresses the entry into effect of the provisions
of Part VI, notwithstanding the provisions of article 28(9) (addressing the
withdrawal of a reservation), article 29(6) (addressing additional notifica-
tions), and article 35 (other than paragraph 7) (addressing the entry into
effect of the Convention).453
Under article 36(1), Part VI shall take effect with respect to cases
presented to the competent authority . . . on or after the later of the dates
on which the [MLI] enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdic-
tions”.454 However, to allow competent authorities to reasonably defer the
eligibility of existing cases until they have agreed on the mode of applica-
tion of Part VI, Part VI shall take effect “with respect to cases presented
to the competent authority [ ] prior to the later of the dates on which the
[MLI] enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdictions [ ], on the
date when both Contracting Jurisdictions have notified the Depositary
that they have reached mutual agreement [on the application of Part VI],
along with information regarding the date or dates on which such cases
shall be considered to have been presented to the competent authority . . .
according to the terms of that mutual agreement.455
Recognizing that the arbitration eligibility deferral under article
36(1)(b) is unlikely to alleviate the challenging resource constraints for
Contracting Jurisdictions with a large backlog of cases to apply Part VI
effectively to those cases, article 36(2) permits Parties to “reserve the right
for Part VI to apply to an [existing MAP] case . . . only to the extent that
[both] competent authorities agree that it will apply to that specific
case”.456
Articles 36(3) through 36(5) address the entry into effect of Part VI in
the case in which a Party begins applying Part VI to a Covered Tax Agree-
ment only after incorporating a new Covered Tax Agreement into the ex-
tended list of agreements, withdrawing or replacing a reservation made
“under article [26(4)] pursuant to [article 28(9)], or the withdrawal of  an
451. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(7).
452. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(5); OECD MLI Explanatory Statement,
supra note 24, ¶ 338.
453. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24, art. 35(6).
454. Id., art. 36(1)(a).
455. Id., art. 36(1)(b).
456. Id., art. 36(2).
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objection to a reservation made under article [28(2)]”.457 In all such cases,
the date of entry into effect is based on the date of communication by the
Depositary of the notification of the extension of the list of agreements,
withdrawal or replacement of reservation, or withdrawal of objection,
rather than the date of entry into force of the MLI.458
2.11.11 Withdrawal
Article 37 permits any Party to withdraw from the MLI at any time.459
In cases where the MLI has entered into force with respect to all Con-
tracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement before the date on
which a Party’s withdrawal becomes effective, that Covered Tax Agree-
ment shall remain as modified by this Convention.460 The rationale is that
a unilateral withdrawal from the MLI does not have any retrospective ef-
fects, and would not reverse the modifications already made to the Cov-
ered Tax Agreement.461
2.11.12 Relation with Protocols
Article 38 provides that the MLI may be supplemented by one or
more protocols.462 To become a party to a protocol, a State or jurisdiction
must be a Party to the MLI.463 “A Party to . . . [the MLI] is not be bound
by a protocol unless it becomes a party to the protocol in accordance with
its provisions.”464
2.11.13 Depositary
Article 39 defined the role of the Depositary.465 The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the OECD shall be the Depositary of the MLI and any proto-
cols.466 “The Depositary shall notify the  Parties and Signatories within
one calendar month” of the specified list of acts, notifications, or commu-
nications in relation to the MLI.467 The Depositary shall maintain publicly
available lists of Covered Tax Agreements, reservations made by the Par-
ties, and notifications made by the Parties.468
457. Id., art. 36(3) – 36(5).
458. Id.
459. Id., art. 37(1).
460. Id., art. 37(2).
461. OECD MLI Explanatory Statement, supra note 24, ¶ 353.
462. OECD 2017 MLI, supra note 24 art. 38(1).
463. Id., art. 38(2).
464. Id., art. 38(3).
465. Id., art. 39.
466. Id., art. 39(1).
467. Id., art. 39(2).
468. Id., art. 39(3).
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3. Why Are Tax Treaties Necessary?
Before we proceed to evaluate the MLI, it is helpful to raise a more
fundamental question: Why are tax treaties needed in the twenty-first
century?
Traditionally, tax treaties were thought to be needed to prevent classi-
cal “juridical” double taxation, in which both the source and the residence
jurisdictions taxed the same taxpayer on the same income, one on the ba-
sis of source (in rem) jurisdiction and the other on the basis of residence
(in personam) jurisdiction.469 This problem was the reason the League of
Nation drafted the first model “convention for the prevention of double
taxation” in 1927 – 28.470 But as Stanley Surrey already pointed out in
1957 and as Tsilly Dagan has emphasized more recently, tax treaties are
not needed to prevent double taxation because almost all residence coun-
tries grant relief from double taxation by way of credit or exemption uni-
laterally, without the need for a treaty.471 Other double taxation situations
(dual residence, source/source) are not always resolved even with a tax
treaty in place.
As Dagan also pointed out, the main function of tax treaties is to en-
force the “Benefits Principle”, i.e., the compromise reached in the 1920s
between the tax claims of residence and source jurisdictions.472 Under the
Benefits Principle, which is incorporated into every tax treaty, active (busi-
ness) income should be taxed primarily at source as long as the taxpayer
meets the “Permanent Establishment” threshold, while passive (invest-
ment) income should be taxed primarily at residence.473 Since without a
treaty both active and passive income are taxed at source with relief
granted by the residence jurisdiction, the main function of the treaty is to
shift the right to tax passive income from source to residence by limiting
withholding tax rates. Under the OECD model, withholding taxes are lim-
ited to fifteen percent for dividends, ten percent for interest and zero per-
469. For example, Article 1 of the Mexico and London Models states that “[t]he present
Convention is designed to prevent double taxation in the case of taxpayers of the contracting
states.” Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of International Double Taxation of
Income and Fiscal Evasion, supra note 10, art. I (Mexico Draft); Model Bilateral Convention
on the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income and Property, supra note 11, art. I
(London Draft).
470. MICHAEL KOBETSKY, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF PERMANENT ESTABLISH-
MENTS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 106 – N 108 (2011).
471. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 939 (2000);
Stanley S. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and “Tax Sparing”, 11 Nat’l Tax J. 156, 156
(1958).
472. Dagan, supra note 471, at 941 – 942.
473. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the
Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185, 188 (2016). On
the benefits principle and its origins, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW ch. 1 (2015); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxa-
tion of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301
(1996).
210 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:155
cent for royalties, capital gains and “other income” (e.g., payments on
derivatives).474 That leaves the residence country with the right to tax such
payments without granting too much foreign tax credit.
Dagan goes on to argue that this means that tax treaties are helpful
among developed countries because the investment flows are reciprocal,
but injurious to developing countries.475 Others (including the developing
countries) have rejected this argument because they believe tax treaties
are helpful in attracting investment and guaranteeing some measure of tax
stability to the investors.476
But are tax treaties necessary to enforce the Benefits Principle? It can
be argued that the answer is no under conditions of tax competition. Econ-
omists have long argued that a small, open economy should not tax in-
bound investment because the tax will cause the investment to either go
elsewhere or be shifted to source country taxpayers, who can be taxed
directly.477 The latter is not entirely convincing because it may be adminis-
tratively easier for the source country to levy withholding taxes even if the
burden is shifted, but the argument that the investment will go elsewhere
is generally convincing, especially for interest but increasingly also for div-
idends (capital gains cannot usually be taxed by withholding).
Under conditions of tax competition to attract investment, there are
two possible scenarios. The first and more common is that the same return
can be earned in many places and is therefore subject to tax competition.
For interest that is clearly the case and that is why after the United States
unilaterally eliminated its withholding on interest in 1984,478 most coun-
tries went along.479 No tax treaty is needed to reduce withholding on port-
folio interest, while “direct” interest among related parties is better
policed by transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules.
In the case of dividends, it can perhaps be argued that an investment is
more unique, but (a) it is hard to distinguish dividends from interest, espe-
cially if derivatives that can be used to convert equity to debt are not taxed
at source, and (b) the uniqueness of equity investments is declining as mul-
tinationals become more similar to each other under globalization. In ad-
dition, dividends are optional and not deductible, so it is not clear what
474. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital arts. 10–13, 21 (July 15,
2014).
475. See Dagan, supra note 471.
476. See, e.g., Arjan Lejour, The Foreign Investment Effect of Tax Treaties, (CPB Neth.
Bureau for Econ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 14/03, 2014), http://www.eesc.europa
.eu/resources/docs/2014-the-foreign-investment-effects-of-tax-treaties_oxford-univ-centre-
for-business-taxation.pdf.
477. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, Capital Income Taxation in the Globalized World,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 10630, 2004), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w10630.pdf.
478. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494, 648-
50 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 871(h) (1994)).
479. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2000).
Spring 2018] A Global Treaty Override? 211
function is achieved by having a withholding tax on dividends, and a tax
treaty should not be needed to eliminate such taxes.
This leaves royalties, where the tax treaty is the only effective way to
reduce withholding tax. But royalties from intellectual property generally
represent economic “rents,” i.e., unique returns from specific assets, and in
that case, it is hard to see the rationale for reducing the withholding tax
because the investor cannot earn the returns elsewhere. Admittedly, mul-
tinationals have become extremely adept at locating IP in low-taxed juris-
dictions and using deductible royalties to shift profits there. But that is
precisely why royalties should be subject to full withholding tax rates by
source countries (or alternatively not be deductible). Most royalties in any
case are paid within multinationals and represent active income that
should be taxed at source.
Thus, it can be argued that treaties are not needed to enforce the Ben-
efits Principle under conditions of tax competition because the income can
either be earned somewhere else, in which case the competition will lead
to unilateral erosion of the withholding tax, or not, in which case the with-
holding tax should not be reduced.
But what about the function of tax treaties to attract investment and
guarantee tax stability? While the empirical literature does suggest that
tax treaties help investment, the same function can be achieved by bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs).480 BITs have two advantages over tax
treaties: they are closer to being functionally multilateral because they
contain a “most favored nation” (MFN) clause,481 and they have much
stronger dispute resolution mechanisms.482 If a source country changes its
tax rules in a way that injures investors, they can force it into binding arbi-
tration under the BIT, as the government of India found out recently
when it overturned its own Supreme Court to tax Vodafone
retroactively.483
So can we just dispense with tax treaties? The question may seem too
theoretical to be worth pursuing. However, current developments, and es-
480. See Peter H. Egger et. al, The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Di-
rect Investment: Theory and Evidence, 39 CANADIAN J. ECON. 901 (2006); Mumtaz Hussain
Shah & Saba Qayyum, Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Inward FDI in Latin American
and Caribbean Developing Countries, 7 BUS. & ECON. REV. 1 (2015); Eric Neumayer, Do
Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J.
DEV. STUD. 1501 (2007); Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax
Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity (Univ. of Or. Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 2001-14, 2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=445980; K. V. Bhanu Murthy & Niti Bhasin, The Impact of Bilateral
Tax Treaties on FDI Inflows: The Case of India (March 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2234966.
481. MFN clauses link investment agreements by ensuring that parties to one treaty
provide treatment no less favorable than the treatment they provide investors under other
treaties. See, e.g., German Model Treaty 1998, art. 3.
482. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement: Investor-
State, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30, at 41 (May 2003) (noting that in a survey of 335 BITs
in force in 1992, 334 contained provisions for arbitration).
483. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Vodafone Goes To International Court Over Indian
Tax Dispute, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 41 (2016).
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pecially the proliferation of new taxes designed to avoid treaty limitations
such as the UK “diverted profits tax” and similar enactments elsewhere,484
raise the possibility that the whole bilateral tax treaty network will col-
lapse, and perhaps that is no great loss. Countries will either tax at the
source or not, depending on whether the tax competition market allows
them to do so. Double taxation will be avoided unilaterally, and in those
cases in which source countries can tax, the BIT network (which is larger
than the tax treaty network) will prevent abuses by the source country.
However, tax treaties in the twenty-first century have another func-
tion: they can serve to enforce the other principle underlying the ITR, the
Single Tax Principle. The Single Tax Principle is the idea that underlies the
OECD BEPS project, namely that cross-border income should not be sub-
ject to double taxation but also not to double non-taxation.485 This means
that source taxation should generally not be reduced unless residence tax-
ation is in place.486
For active income, the Single Tax Principle can be achieved without a
treaty because if this income is not taxed at source, residence jurisdictions
can tax it under “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) rules without a
tax treaty (in fact, tax treaties have been used in some cases to undermine
CFC rules).487 But for passive income, in the absence of a tax treaty net-
work, reduction of withholding taxes are achieved unilaterally by tax com-
petition without any assurance that the income will be taxed at source. The
prime culprit is the U.S. portfolio interest exemption from 1984, which has
led not just to massive capital flight from developing countries to the “tax
haven” United States, but also to U.S. residents pretending to be foreign
and investing into the United States through “incorporated pocketbooks”
in the Caymans and friendly Swiss banks.488 This practice is illegal but
hard to prevent in the absence of withholding or information exchange,
and the latter can only be achieved by treaty.
For individual taxpayers, the needed exchange of information to en-
force residence based taxation can be achieved by special treaties like bi-
lateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and the new
484. On these developments see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Three Steps Forward, One Step
Back? Reflections on “Google Taxes” and the Destination-Based Corporate Tax, 2 Nordic Tax
J. 69 (2016).
485. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, supra note 473, at 208 (2016); see OECD 2017
MLI, supra note 24, pmbl. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 12–22; Daniel
Shaviro, The Two Faces of the Single Tax Principle (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Pa-
pers, Paper 419, 2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=nyu_
lewp.
486. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the
History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2015).
487. Marcellin N. Mbwa-Mboma, France-Switzerland Treaty Overrides CFC Regime,
French Tax Court Rules, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 143 (2002).
488. Reuven Avi-Yonah, What Goes Around Comes Around: Why the US is Responsi-
ble for Capital Flight (And What It Can Do About It) (Jan. 23, 2013) (Univ. of Mich. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 307, 2013), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2208553.
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Multilateral Agreement on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
(MAATM).489 These instruments do not require a full-fledged tax treaty,
although in our opinion they are imperfect and it would be preferable if
the United States and the EU could agree to reinstate withholding taxes
on interest and only reduce them by treaty (so that only residents in coun-
tries that tax income and exchange information could benefit from re-
duced withholding tax rates). Since portfolio interest is always earned in
developed countries, the cooperation of tax havens is not needed to
achieve this result.
But for corporate taxpayers, the tax treaty network is needed to im-
plement the single tax principle. That can be seen from the experience of
countries that allow one of their treaties to be abused by not enforcing a
limitation on benefit principles, so any taxpayer can come and use the
treaty. The result is a reduction in source taxes on active income (business
profits, royalties, direct dividends) without assurance that the income is
taxed at residence.
The whole point of the BEPS project and the MLI is to enforce the
single tax principle by ensuring that source taxation will apply in situations
where there is no residence taxation because of tax arbitrage or the use of
pass-through entities.490 And that is why in the absence of the MLI trea-
ties could become useless, but with the MLI they are still quite useful.
A United States example can be used to illustrate this point. Before
1984, investors into the United States used the Netherlands Antilles treaty
as a way of deriving interest, dividends, and royalties from U.S. sources at
reduced rates.491 The Antilles treaty was a “treaty with the world,” like
the Russia-Cyprus or India-Mauritius treaties (although the latter was re-
cently revised).492 But in 1984 the United States unilaterally terminated
the Antilles treaty and at the same time started inserting Limitation on
Benefits (LOB) clauses in all its treaties.493 LOBs are designed to enforce
the Single Tax principle, and they have become an essential and non-nego-
tiable element in U.S. treaty practice and now through the MLI OECD
treaty practice as well.
In the absence of treaties with LOBs, it is increasingly likely that cor-
porate taxpayers could derive not just interest but even royalties without
paying tax at source or at residence. That is the situation in Europe be-
cause of the EU Directives, which override the treaties.494 The MLI is
489. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gil Savir, IGAs vs. MAATM: Has Tax Bilateralism Out-
lived Its Usefulness? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 384, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2392702.
490. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 28; Reuven Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, supra note 473.
491. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 28 at 14.
492. For a general discussion, see Leslie E. Papke, One-Way Treaty with the World: The
U.S. Withholding Tax and the Netherlands Antilles.7 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 295 (2000).
493. Avi-Yonah, supra note 486.
494. See Phillipe Freun & Kelly Stricklin-Coutinho, United Kingdom, in TAXATION OF
INTERCOMPANY DIVIDENDS UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EU LAW 984 (Guglielmo Maisto
ed., 2012); HM REVENUES & CUSTOMS, UK Residents with Foreign Income or Gains: Divi-
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designed to prevent this type of BEPS by requiring LOBs so that source
taxes are not reduced unless there is likely to be tax at residence. That is
what the treaties are needed for in the twenty-first century, and that is why
the MLI is such a useful addition.
3. A MFN CLAUSE FOR TAX TREATIES?
Now that the MLI has been adopted by most of the OECD and G20
(excluding the United States), what next?
A full-fledged multilateral tax convention remains an unlikely idea
even if the withholding tax rates and method for preventing double taxa-
tion are left for bilateral negotiations.495 But there may be another way to
create a de facto multilateral treaty: inserting a MFN clause into tax
treaties.496
BITs have MFN clauses.497 The effect has been that innovations in
any given BIT tend to spread automatically, and by now the BIT network
is close to a de facto multilateral one, despite the lack of consensus that
derailed the attempt to negotiate the multilateral investment agreement in
the 1990s.498
dends: EC Directive, in INTERNATIONAL MANUAL (2018), https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/international-manual/intm164030.
495. Although the desire to develop a multilateral convention has been expressed as
early as 1927, Report Presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation
and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216.M.85. 1927 II (1927), at 8, and expressed
again in 1958, Fiscal Committee of the Org. for European Econ. Cooperation, The Elimina-
tion of Double Taxation (1958), the introduction to the 2014 OECD Model Convention still
states that “[t]here are no reasons to believe that the conclusion of a multilateral tax conven-
tion involving all member countries could now be considered practicable.” Model Tax Con-
vention on Income and on Capital, supra note 30, at 16.
496. See Albert J. Radler, Most Favored Nation Concept in Tax Treaties, in MULTILAT-
ERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 1–14 (Michael
Lang, ed., 1998). It should also be pointed out that there has been a discussion on whether
the non-inclusion of MFN treatment in EU bilateral tax treaties violates EU law. See, e.g.,
Georg W. Koefler, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment in Direct Taxation: Does EC Law Pro-
vide For Community MFN in Bilateral Double Taxation Treaties?, 5 Houston Bus. & Tax L.J.
1 (2005); Luc Hinnekens, Compatibility of Bilateral Tax Treaties with European Community
Law - Applications of the Rules, 4 EC Tax Review, 209 (1995); Helmut Loukota, Multilateral
Tax Treaty versus Bilateral Treaty Network, in MULTILATERAL TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 100–101 (Michael Lang, ed., 1998).
497. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 4, which provides the
following: (1.) Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with re-
spect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale
or other disposition of investments in its territory. (2.) Each Party shall accord to covered
investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to invest-
ments in its territory of investors of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.
498. Chalamish, Efraim, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multi-
lateral Agreement? 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 304, 304–53 (2009).
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The obvious difference between tax treaties and BITs is that tax trea-
ties directly affect revenues and therefore countries may resist MFNs be-
cause that will force them to give up revenue if investment flows differ
from one treaty partner to another.
But this argument is not entirely convincing. First, investment flows
can change under current treaties, and that does not deter countries from
entering treaties. They know that treaties can be renegotiated if the
change in flows upsets the treaty bargain.
Second, the knowledge that MFN exists can simply be incorporated in
treaty negotiations. Suppose the United States had MFN in its tax treaties
and that it did not wish to reduce its withholding tax rate on portfolio
dividends below fifteen percent. Knowing that MFN exists would simply
ensure that it sticks by this position because it knows that a lower rate will
spread to all existing treaties. On the other hand, suppose the United
States decided that the right rate for direct dividends is zero rather than
five percent. Having an MFN clause would mean this new negotiating po-
sition spreads automatically to all U.S. treaties without requiring opening
treaties to renegotiation.499
In the case of a country like the United States that already has treaties
with most of the countries that it wants to have treaties with, and that
already reduces most withholding taxes to zero by its existing treaties (the
U.S. model has zero for interest, royalties, capital gains and other income),
adopting MFN is unlikely to lead to significant revenue losses and can
make it easier to install innovations like the zero-tax rate for direct divi-
dends across the U.S. treaty network. It is likely that other OECD mem-
ber countries are in the same position.500 Developing countries may be
more reluctant, and should be free to avoid the MFN, but for the OECD
499. An MFN clause is included in several Indian treaties. For example, under the tax
treaty between India and Switzerland, if the Indian government grants better terms to an-
other OECD member country with respect to taxes on interest, dividends, and royalties, and
for fees for technical services, an automatic most-favoured-nation clause applies, whereby the
reduced rate of tax granted to the other OECD member country is automatically provided to
Switzerland under the tax treaty. There are many double tax treaties that include MFN
clauses or clauses with similar consequences. E.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital Protocol ¶ 3, Arg.-Belg., June 12, 1996, 2091 U.N.T.S. 279; Agreement on the Promo-
tion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Protocol Ad. art. 5, Mex.-Switz., July 7, 1995,
1965 U.N.T.S. 269; Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Certain Other Taxes art. 24, ¶ 4, Can.-Ger., July 17, 1981, 1387 U.N.T.S 135;
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital art. XXV, Can.-U.S., Sept. 26,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087. The IBFD Tax Research Platform yields almost 250 treaties in force
that include MFN clauses.
500. Interestingly, although paras. 54 and 55 of the 1977 OECD Commentary on Model
Tax Convention explicitly rejected the application of MFN treatment, both of these
paragraphs were deleted from the 1992 OECD Commentary on Model Tax Convention.
Compare OECD, Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention ¶¶ 54, 55
(1977), with OECD, Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention p. C(24)–31
(1992).
216 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:155
including the MFN clause in tax treaties would seem a logical next step
toward the ultimate goal of a full-fledged multilateral tax convention.
4. CONCLUSION: THE MLI AND THE FUTURE OF THE ITR
The MLI is an important innovation in international law. Hitherto,
international economic law was built primarily on bilateral treaties (e.g.,
tax treaties and BITs) or multilateral treaties (the WTO agreements). The
problem is that in some areas, like tax and investment, multilateral treaties
have proven hard to negotiate, but only a multilateral treaty can be
amended simultaneously by all its signatories.
The MLI provides an ingenious solution: a multilateral instrument
that automatically amends all the bilateral treaties of its signatories. If the
MLI succeeds, it can be a useful model in other areas, such as investment,
where a multilateral agreement was not successful but there is a growing
consensus about the need to adjust the terms of BITs to address investor
responsibilities and the definition of investment comprehensively.
Whether the MLI will succeed remains to be seen. While its adoption
by seventy countries (with more to come) is an achievement, the absence
of the United States is important, and other OECD members have agreed
to only a limited set of provisions. On the other hand, the MLI may prove
more appealing to developing countries because it enhances source-based
taxation and limits treaty shopping.
If the MLI is successfully adopted by the majority of taxing jurisdic-
tions, this will have implications for non-taxing jurisdictions as well. For
example, it is likely that the PPT will be used by courts in signatory coun-
tries to interpret treaties with non-signatory countries like the United
States if those countries have signaled their agreement with the single tax
principle embodied in the PPT by, for example, incorporating the LOB in
their tax treaties.
Even a limited MLI would be a step forward. The current tax reform
proposals in the United States pose a significant threat to the ITR, be-
cause they would sharply reduce the U.S. corporate effective tax rate to
attract investment from other jurisdictions.501 Countries that wish to limit
the damage would be wise to accede to the MLI this year and prevent a
massive race to the bottom that could ensue if the United States becomes
(from the perspective of the rest of the world) a giant tax haven.
501. On these proposals see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Problems with
Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, 8 Colum. J. Tax L. 229 (2017); for
the current tax reform framework, which has dropped the controversial border adjustment
tax but retains a lower effective corporate tax rate see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Slicing and
Dicing: The Structural Problems of the Tax Reform Framework (U of Michigan Law & Econ




Reuven Avi-Yonah 1,* and Haiyan Xu 1,2
1 Law School, the University of Michigan, 625 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215, USA
2 Law School University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China; haixu@umich.edu
* Correspondence: aviyonah@umich.edu
Received: 15 November 2017; Accepted: 16 January 2018; Published: 24 January 2018
Abstract: This article provides an overview of China’s reaction to the G20/OECD Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. From 2013 to 2015, the OECD developed a series of actions designed
to address BEPS activities by multinational enterprises, culminating in a final report of 15 action
steps. The article reviews and explains China’s reaction to the BEPS project and its actions in detail,
with a particular focus on transfer pricing issues. It shows that China has actively participated in both
developing and implementing the BEPS project. The article further suggests that in the post-BEPS
era, China is expected to implement the BEPS project in a more consistent and coherent way, and will
take whatever measures necessary to guarantee the successful implementation of the BEPS package
in collaboration with the global community.
Keywords: BEPS; China
1. Introduction
Following the financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing austerity, the OECD and G20 launched the
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project in 2013. The BEPS project culminated in October,
2015 with the release of a series of action steps that the OECD and G20 countries have undertaken
to adopt.1 OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria has stated that “Base erosion and profit shifting
affects all countries, not only economically, but also as a matter of trust. BEPS is depriving countries
of precious resources to jump-start growth, tackle the effects of the global economic crisis and create
more and better opportunities for all. However beyond this, BEPS has been also eroding the trust of
citizens in the fairness of tax systems worldwide. The measures we are presenting today represent
the most fundamental changes to international tax rules in almost a century: They will put an end to
double non-taxation, facilitate a better alignment of taxation with economic activity and value creation,
and when fully implemented, these measures will render BEPS-inspired tax planning structures
ineffective” (OECD 2015).
China has actively participated in both developing and implementing the BEPS project. China’s tax
base has been seriously eroded by aggressive international tax planning that has the effect of artificially
shifting profits to locations where they are subject to non-taxation or substantially reduced taxation.
In the first three earlier decades since the late 1970s, China had received more inbound foreign
direct investments including advanced technologies and intangibles than the outbound investment of
Chinese investors. However, as China started to implement the “Going-out” strategy in the 21st century,
in particular the initiative of “one belt and one road” (OBOR), more and more China-based corporations
are increasingly active in outbound investment and intangibles export oversea. In response to the
new scenario of increasingly accelerated globalization of China-based MNE groups, China has to
1 On BEPS see, e.g., (Ault 2013; Dharmapala 2014a, 2014b; Brauner 2014; Ault et al. 2014; Vann 2014; Shaviro; Rosenzweig 2014;
Grinberg 2015).
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take a very holistic approach to deal with the BEPS challenges from different perspectives, including
domestic action items (items 2–5), treaty-based action items (items 6–7) and transfer pricing measures
(items 8–10 and 13).
In the post-BEPS era, China is expected to implement the BEPS project in a more consistent and
coherent way, and will take whatever measures necessary to guarantee the successful implementation
of the BEPS package in collaboration with the global community. That is why the SAT has quickly
translated many minimum standards and recommendations of BESP project into domestic regulations.
The following sections describe China’s involvement in the BEPS project in detail, with particular
emphasis on transfer pricing. They explain why China needs to continue to implement the BEPS action
steps and what problems might be anticipated as it does so.
2. Overview of China’s Involvement in the BEPS Project
2.1. China as a Victim of BEPS
Although China is the second largest economy, the largest trader of goods, the top thirf country of
outbound direct investment in the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2016),
and the top third country of the inbound direct investment2, China is one of the major victims of
BEPS. In the past four decades of market-oriented reform since the late 1970s, China’s tax base has
been seriously eroded by aggressive international tax planning that has the effect of artificially shifting
profits to locations where they are subject to non-taxation or reduced taxation.
In response to Subcommittee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Issues for Developing Countries
of UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, China clearly indicated,
“China currently does not have a system which quantitatively analyzes the base erosion in our country.
Yet, we do find, and it is obvious, that the major threat China faces is that many MNE groups have
shifted their profits by means of tax planning and transfer pricing” (UN n.d.).
Without any exaggeration, almost all the highly speculative tax evasion and avoidance strategies
and tactics have been widely used by MNEs doing business in China, including but not confined to
hybrid mismatch arrangements, controlled-foreign-company (CFC), interest deductions, harmful tax
practices, treaty shopping, artificial avoidance of permanent establishment (PE) status, manipulative
transfer pricing, etc.
In particular, China has identified some most common BEPS practices and structures as the
followings. First, MNE groups tend to adopt transfer pricing principles and methodologies in such
intra-group dealings as purchase and sale transactions, financing transactions, equity transfer
transactions and service provision transactions, in order to lower the profits of their subsidiaries
in China. Second, MNE groups establish shell companies with no genuine economic substances in
the low-tax jurisdictions and tax heavens to shift profits. As responses to the above mentioned BEPS
concerns, China has enacted the general anti-avoidance rules and carry out TP audits to recover the
taxes (UN n.d.).
Chinese tax authorities makes their judgment by auditing MNE groups’ annual filing and
reviewing their contemporaneous documentation, considering the profit levels of the industry and
comparable companies, and performing functional analysis. They then make adjustments as necessary
when their judgment is made. However, China has encountered two primary obstacles in assessing
whether the appropriate amount of profit is reported in China and in ensuring that tax is paid on
such profit. First, China is in lack of comparable companies. China’s domestic legislation requires
that the listed companies must make mandatory disclosures, but the unlisted companies are not
required to make such disclosures. Therefore, it is unrealistic to find comparables from the over
2 China has retained its top-three ranking in the 2017 edition of A.T. Kearney’s Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index
as investors turn more optimistic about its economic prospects (China Daily 2017).
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2000 listed companies in China. Second, some corporate taxpayers are often unwilling to provide the
tax authorities with necessary information, such as resale prices, especially the business operation and
profits throughout the supply chain. Their reluctance to cooperate increases the difficulties for the tax
authorities to have a big picture in mind in their audits.3
As far as the most important BEPS action is concerned, China believes that TP-related actions are
most important to it. China also considers BEPS Action 11 increasingly important, as China is dedicated
to establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS, which is something developing
countries should work hard on.4
To warrant sustainable growth and development, China has good reasons to share the priorities
identified by OECD/G20 BEPS package, and to take a stronger and more coordinated stance in fighting
against the excessive BEPS opportunist behaviors of MNEs that seek to avoid paying their fair share of
taxes. Generally speaking, China has prioritized its efforts on the implementation of BEPS project in
various aspects in the past years.
2.2. Active Participation in the Development of BEPS Project
China has been active in shaping the process of developing the BEPS package not only by
and through the platform OCED/G20, but also by and through the UN Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters (the UN Tax Committee). As a subsidiary body of the
Economic and Social Council, the UN Tax Committee is responsible for keeping under review and
update, as necessary, the UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing
Countries and the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and
Developing Countries, and providing a framework for dialogue with a view to enhancing and
promoting international tax cooperation among national tax authorities and assesses how new
and emerging issues could affect this cooperation (Financing for Development n.d.). The current
member from China is Ms. Xiaoyue Wang, the Director for Anti-avoidance Division, International
Taxation Department, State Administration of Taxation (SAT) (Economic and Social Council 2014).
The Subcommittee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Issues for Developing Countries was established
at the ninth session of the UN Tax Committee in October 2013, aiming at communicating with officials
in developing countries and ensure their views are fed into both the OECD/G20 BEPS project as well
as the on-going United Nations tax cooperation work (Committee of Experts on International 2014).
China has been closely working together with other countries in advancing the progress of the BEPS
project, including but not confined to making submission to the Subcommittee questionnaire on how
developing countries view and prioritize the BEPS project issues in 2014.
Although not a member of the OECD, China has been the key partner of the OECD since 2007.5
A Key Partner of the OECD plus a member of G20, China has contributed actively to the development
of BEPS package. As Angel Gurría, the OECD Secretary-General indicated, China’s unique perspectives
and policy experience have enriched the work of the OECD, increased the relevance of our analyses and
supported a more inclusive global policy debate in today’s challenging global economic environment.
Looking ahead, even stronger engagement of China with the OECD would help increase recognition
of the country’s reform progress and strengthen its role in global economic governance (OECD 2016a).
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the G20 Summit of St. Petersburg, and declared
that, “China supports strengthening of multilateral collaboration on tackling tax avoidance, and is
willing to make its contribution to the improvement of international tax governance mechanism” on
3 See China’s reply to the BEPS Questionnaire of the UN Subcommittee, available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/ta-BEPS-CommentsChina.pdf.
4 See China’s reply to the BEPS Questionnaire of the UN Subcommittee, available at www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/ta-BEPS-CommentsChina.pdf.
5 In May 2007, the Council, meeting at ministerial level, invited the Secretariat to strengthen OECD cooperation with Brazil,
India, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and South Africa through “Enhanced Engagement” programs. These Key
Partners contribute to the OECD’s work in a sustained and comprehensive manner (OECD n.d.).
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the first session of the Eighth Summit of G20 leaders” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China 2013). G20 Leaders’ Declaration of September 6, 2013 acknowledged the urgency
to address BEPS, tackle tax avoidance, and promote tax transparency and automatic exchange of
information. In order to minimize BEPS, we call on member countries to examine how our own
domestic laws contribute to BEPS and to ensure that international and our own tax rules do not allow
or encourage multinational enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to
low-tax jurisdictions. We acknowledge that effective taxation of mobile income is one of the key
challenges (G20 Information Centre 2013).
In 2014, President Xi Jinping attended the G20 Summit of Brisbane, and further supported the
development of BEPS package. G20 Leaders’ Communiqué of 16 November 2014 declared, “Profits
should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is
created. We welcome the significant progress on the G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan to modernize
international tax rules. We are committed to finalizing this work in 2015, including transparency of
taxpayer-specific rulings found to constitute harmful tax practices. We welcome progress being made
on taxation of patent boxes (G20 Information Centre 2014)”.
Quickly following the publication of the BEPS package by OECD on 5 October 2015, SAT released
the Chinese version of the BEPS package on its official website on 10 October 2015 (State Administration
of Taxation 2015a). The translation of BEPS package is very helpful for the research and application of
the BEPS packages in China.
In November 2015, President Xi Jinping attended the G20 Summit of Antalya, and co-adopted
G20 Leaders’ Communiqué of 16 November 2015, which endorsed the package of measures developed
under the ambitious G20/OECD BEPS project. The Communiqué stated that, “We, therefore, strongly
urge the timely implementation of the project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including
developing ones, to participate. To monitor the implementation of the BEPS project globally, we call on
the OECD to develop an inclusive framework by early 2016 with the involvement of interested non-G20
countries and jurisdictions which commit to implement the BEPS project, including developing
economies, on an equal footing (G20 Information Centre 2015).”
To be well prepared for the involvement at the level of OECD discussion on BEPS, the SAT set up
both Leadership Group and Working Group on the G20 Tax Reform Project, and clarified the duties and
working plans these two groups. More than 50 officials have deeply participated in the conferences,
research activities and advice feedbacks on all relevant topics of BEPS project. The SAT also appointed
its representative to the Steering Committee of the BEPS, working with other committee members on
designing, supervising and reviewing the proposed BEPS actions. From 2013 through 2015, the SAT
has participated 86 meetings relevant to the BEPS project, and submitted over 1000 pieces of position
statements and proposals to the OECD. Many of the proposals have been adopted and reflected in the
final BEPS package. China has made significant contributions to the recognition of core principles of
the BEPS package and the successful completion of the BEPS project, and also effectively advocated
for the developing countries and emerging economies (State Administration of Taxation 2015a).
On 11 May 2016, China hosted the 10th Forum on Tax Administration in Beijing, and attracted
the Heads of 44 tax administrations in different jurisdictions. The Forum addressed the coordinated
action required for the effective implementation of the G20/OECD international tax agenda, as well as
the challenges related to building modern tax administrations. Wang Jun, the Commissioner of SAT,
and Pascal Saint-Amans, the Director of OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, attended
the Forum.
In June 2016, the Inclusive Framework to Implement BEPS was established to allow OECD
Member and Partner countries to discuss the BEPS issues on an equal footing. As an active member of
the steering group and as the deputy chair for the Inclusive Framework, China is expected to play an
important role in helping define and implement international tax policies.
In September 2016, China hosted the G20 Summit of Hangzhou. The close collaboration throughout
China’s G20 Presidency in 2016 brought the role of China in implementing the BEPS project to a new
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level. BEPS project was a highlighted priority in G20 Leaders’ Communiqué of 4–5 September 2016.
“We will continue our support for international tax cooperation to achieve a globally fair and modern
international tax system and to foster growth, including advancing on-going cooperation on BEPS,
exchange of tax information, tax capacity-building of developing countries and tax policies to promote
growth and tax certainty. We welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on
BEPS, and its first meeting in Kyoto”; “China would make its own contribution by establishing an
international tax policy research center for international tax policy design and research”.6
In 2016, the OECD and the SAT jointly established a Multilateral Tax Centre in Yangzhou, the first tax
center in a non-member country. The Centre, integrated into the OECD Network of MTCs, will continue
to support a consistent implementation of BEPS outcomes for the benefit of developing countries.
To reflect and accommodate reasonable claims and suggestions from the local tax authorities,
business community and the civil society, SAT communicates with the interested organizations and
individuals on a regular basis. In addition to promoting the mutual understanding between the
BEPS Working Group and the local tax authorities responsible for international tax law enforcement,
the SAT has paid great attention to the opinions from the MNEs, domestic firms, accounting firms,
tax consulting firms and universities. For instance, representatives from KPMG, PWC, EY, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu Limited, Baker McKenzie, Microsoft (China), JD.Com Inc., Lenovo Group Ltd.,
Central University of Finance & Economy and Xiamen University were invited to participate the
workshops on BEPS of 8 June of 2015 sponsored by the SAT. Zhang Zhiyong, the Deputy Commission
of the SAT acknowledged the significance of the efficient communication channels between SAT and
stakeholders (State Administration of Taxation 2015b).
The dialogues and interactions between the government and the private sector has enabled
SAT to have a clear picture of the different concerns and expectations of taxpayers, consulting firms,
and independent third parties for the purpose of making informed and feasible on shaping and
implementing the BEPS project. Needless to say, the technical details of the BEPS package and the
domestic rules and mechanism are also easy to be understood by the taxpayers and the professionals.
The informed academia is also able to advise the government in choosing better policy alternatives in
case of controversy.
China’s active participation in the formulation of the BEPS package naturally leads to its efficient
translation of BEPS package into domestic rules. In addition to successfully introducing some of
its best practices into the BEPS package, China has opportunities to understand the positions and
rationales of other jurisdictions. Thus, potential misunderstandings could be minimized in the process
of bilateral or multilateral collaboration on implementation of the BEPS package.
2.3. Chinese Legal Framework Of Corporate Income Tax as it Relates to BEPS Implementation
The Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (ITLEFIFE)
of 9 April 1991 created many measures providing tax relief for the purpose of boosting foreign
investment. For instance, under Article 8 (1) of ITLEFIFE, any manufacturing enterprise with foreign
investment scheduled to operate for a period of not less than ten years shall, from the year beginning to
be profitable, be exempted from income tax in the first and second years and allowed a 50% reduction
in the third through fifth years. However, the income tax exemption or reduction for enterprises with
foreign investment engaged in the exploitation of resources such as petroleum, natural gas, rare metals,
and precious metals shall be regulated separately by the State Council. Enterprises with foreign
investment which actually operate for a period less than ten years, shall repay the amount of income
tax exempted or reduced.
Although there are no exact statistics on the use of these provisions and their effectiveness,
many foreign-funded enterprises and foreign enterprises benefited a lot from the tax holidays offered
6 G20 Leaders’ Communique Hangzhou Summit, 4–5 September 2016 (G20 2016).
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by the ITLEFIFE. However, most of the tax reliefs offered to the enterprises with foreign investment
and foreign enterprises, were not available to Chines domestic firms that were governed by the
Interim Regulation on Corporate Income Tax promulgated by the State Council on 13 December
1993. The double tax standards and the tax reliefs only available to foreign firms were criticized by
many domestic firms, especially private firms as discrimination against domestic firms. Theoretically
speaking, the double tax standards were incompatible with the national treatments and fair competition
requirements of globalized market economy. Therefore, it is necessary to terminate the double tax
relief standards for domestic firms and foreign firms after China joined WTO in 2001.
The Corporate Income Tax Law (CITL), applicable to both domestic and foreign firms,
was promulgated on 16 March 2007, and came into force as of 1 January 2008. The ITLEFIFE was
repealed simultaneously as of 1 January 2008. To ensure smooth transitional period, Article 57 of
the CITL declares, for the enterprises that were established prior to the promulgation of the CITL
and enjoyed lower tax rates according to the provisions of the previous tax laws and administrative
regulations, their income tax rates shall, according to the provisions of the State Council, be gradually
transferred to the tax rate provided in the CITL within five years after the CITL is promulgated.
The enterprises that have enjoyed the preferential treatment of tax exemption for a fixed term may,
according to the provisions of the State Council, continue to enjoy such treatment after the promulgation
of the CITL until the fixed term expires.
However, for those that have failed to enjoy the preferential treatment due to failure to make
profits, the term of preferential treatment may be counted as of the year when the CITL is promulgated.
The high- and new-tech enterprises that need the key support of the state newly established in the
particular areas established by law for developing foreign economic cooperation and technological
exchanges or in the areas where the State Council has provided for the implementation of the above
mentioned special policies may continue to enjoy transitional preferential tax treatments, according to
the specific measures to be formulated by the State Council. Other enterprises falling in the encouraged
category as already determined by the State Council may enjoy the preferential treatment of tax
reduction or exemption according to the provisions of the State Council.
Therefore, the implementation of BEPS package in China has to be conducted in the context of
Chines tax legal system based on the CITL and its subordinated regulations and guidances.
2.4. Taxpayers Rights and BEPS Implementation
All categories of taxpayers, including individuals, investors, small businesses, large businesses,
tax-exempt organizations are most likely to be affected by the implementation of BEPS in different
ways. For instance, the domestic firms might be able to acquire a level playing field to compete with
the multinationals, as the multinational competitors will be forced to give up their over-speculative
BEPS strategies as a comparative competitive advantage. Of course, the corporate taxpayers active in
global trade and investment will be affected most among the taxpayers. Anyway, the traditional race
to the bottom are expected be reversed to some extent in terms of international tax planning.
Taxpayers in China enjoy a series of rights under the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection
(LATC) of 2015. Article 8 of the LATC says, “Taxpayers and withholding agents shall have the right to
inquire of the tax authorities about the tax laws and administrative regulations of the State as well
as the information related to tax payment procedures. Taxpayers and withholding agents shall have
the right to require the tax authorities to maintain confidentiality for the information of the taxpayers
and withholding agents. The tax authorities shall maintain confidentiality for the information of
the taxpayers and withholding agents in accordance with the law. Taxpayers shall, in accordance
with the law, have the rights to apply for the reduction, exemption and refund of tax. Taxpayers
and withholding agents shall have the right to statement and the right of defense to the decisions
made by tax authorities; and shall have the rights to apply for administrative reconsideration, institute
administrative litigation, ask for State compensation, etc. in accordance with the law. Taxpayers and
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withholding agents shall have the right to bring charges against or make exposure of any tax authority
or tax official for violation of laws or disciplines”.
The taxpayers’ rights are closely relevant to the implementation of BEPS in China, as the
implementation of BEPS in China must be based on the rule of law, which is clearly recognized
by Chinese Constitution and legal framework. This means that domestic tax statutes or regulations
need to be reformed to reflect the outcomes of BEPS package, and that the anti-BEPS rules will be
enforced in a transparent and fair way.
The taxpayers’ rights may influence with BEPS-related reforms in various ways. First, the taxpayers
may propose the legislative or regulatory advice in the process of legal reform. According to Article 5
of Legislation Law of 2015, legislation shall represent the will of the people, carry forward socialist
democracy, and in adherence to openness in legislation, ensure the people’s participation in legislative
activities through various channels. Second, the taxpayers may claim their rights, including the right
to information, the right of fair treatment and the right to judicial remedy if they disagree with the tax
authorities on certain BEPS issues.
If the taxpayers are unsatisfied with the administrative decisions of the tax authorities in China,
they are entitled to take legal actions to the courts of justice. Although the cross-border tax litigations
were not so active as the international commercial disputes in the past years, the judicial remedy will
be available to the corporate taxpayers including the MNEs unsatisfied with the special tax adjustment
made by Chinese tax authorities.
3. Rigorous Responses to Mainly Domestic BEPS Action Items (Items 2–5)
3.1. Brief Introduction
The enactment of the CITL of 2007 and the abolishment of the ITLEFIFE of 1991 were identifiably
already compatible with the purpose of the BEPS project, in particular, the single tax principle. The rules
on special adjustments to tax payments in Chapter VI of the CITL are particularly compatible with the
BEPS project.
China has also made numerous BEPS-related rule changes after and even before the publication
of the BEPS package. The SAT has issued a series of regulations or guidances to implement BEPS,
including but not confined to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR), the Offshore Indirect Transfers
Circular of 2015, Beneficial Ownership Circulars and the Outbound Payment Notice (2015). The GAAR
can be invoked to prevent arrangements or transactions that result in the abuse of tax preferences,
the abuse of tax treaties, the abuse of corporate forms and tax avoidance using tax heavens, and other
arrangements without reasonable business purposes.
3.2. Responses to BEPS Action 2
The BEPS Action 2 Report “Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrids Mismatch Arrangements” is
designed to fix the loopholes associated with the hybrid mismatch arrangements. On 22 August
2016, OECD releases discussion draft on branch mismatch structures under BEPS Action 2 Report
(OECD 2016b). This discussion draft applies the analysis and recommendations set out in the Action 2
Report to mismatches that can arise through the use of branch structures. The discussion draft identifies
five basic types of branch mismatch arrangements and sets out preliminary recommendations for
domestic rules, based on those in the Action 2 Report, which would neutralize the resulting mismatch
in tax outcomes.
China has been trying its best to address certain hybrid mismatch arrangements, to implement
and apply hybrid mismatch rules in accordance with policy objectives of BEPS Action 2 Report. As debt
and equity are treated differently for income tax purposes under current tax system, it is important
to properly characterize a hybrid instrument. In order to determine accurately the tax treatment of
hybrid mismatch, Bulletin Regarding Corporate Income Tax Treatments for Companies Engaging in
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Hybrid Investments (SAT Bulletin 41 of 2013) was promulgated on 15 July 2013 by the SAT, pursuant
to the CITL and its Implementation Regulations (CITLIR) (State Administration of Taxation 2013).
Hybrid investment is defined as a form of investment characterized by both equity and debt.
The corporate income tax treatments stipulated in Bulletin 41 shall apply to hybrid investments meeting
all of the following five conditions.
First, the recipient corporation of a hybrid investment (“target corporation”) should make regular
interest payments (including minimum interest, fixed profit or fixed dividends) as agreed in investment
contract/agreement. This means that the investment return of the hybrid investment is not dependent
on the financial performance of the target corporation.
Second, the hybrid investments should either have a clear term of investment or specific
investment conditions, and the target corporation must redeem the investment or repay the principal
upon the expiration of the term of investment or the satisfaction of specific investment conditions.
Third, the hybrid investor may not have the ownership of the net assets of the target corporation.
Fourth, the hybrid investor should not have the right to elect or to be elected on governing bodies
of the target corporation, including the general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors or the
board of supervisors. This means that the hybrid investor shall be neither qualified to vote on the
appointment and dismissal of directors, supervisors and senior executives, nor qualified to be elected
as directors, supervisors and senior executives.
Fifth, the hybrid investor may not participate in daily production and management of the
target corporation.
In case of payment of the interest, the interest income received by the hybrid investor from
the target corporation, shall be recognized and included in taxable income for corporate income
tax purposes on the day when the interest payment becomes due, the interest expense incurred by
the target corporation, shall be recognized on the day when the interest payment becomes due and
deductible for corporate income tax purposes according to the CITL, CITLIR and Article 1 of SAT
Bulletin Regarding Certain Issues Related to Corporate Income Tax (SAT Bulletin 34 of 2011). In case
of redemption of the investments, the difference between redemption price and investment cost shall
be recognized as debt restructuring gain upon redemption and separately included in taxable income
of the current period for corporate income tax purposes.
SAT Bulletin 41 of 2013 took effect on 1 September 2013. For tax cases on hybrid investment
already settled before its enforcement, no adjustments should be made, although the unsettled cases
should be governed by SAT Bulletin 41.
However, the SAT has not issued further special rules on hybrid mismatch arrangements
after the release of the BEPS package in October 2015. According to the BEPS Action 2 Report,
China is expected to undertake internal periodic review of the operation of hybrid mismatch rules as
necessary to determine whether they are operating as intended, and make information about hybrid
mismatch exchange procedures available to taxpayers. This author kindly recommends the SAT to
comprehensively update its hybrid mismatch rules including those arising through the use of branch
structures in the near future.
3.3. Responses to BEPS Action 3
According to the BEPS Action 3, it is a minimum standard for the countries to undergo periodic
OECD monitoring of CFC rules. Although Action 3 does not contain any rules or prescriptions relating
to CFCs, this is an important item.
Article 45 of CITL provides for the general principles on identification of the CFCs by clarifying
that, with regard to an enterprise that is established by a resident enterprise, controlled by a resident
enterprise, or by a Chinese resident who is located in a country (region) where the actual tax burden is
obviously lower than the tax rate as prescribed in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Law, if the profits
are not distributed or are distributed partially for a cause that is not a reasonable business operation,
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the portion of the aforesaid profits attributable to this resident enterprise shall be included in its
incomes of the current period.
Chapter VIII of the Measures for the Implementation of Special Tax Adjustments (for Trial
Implementation) (Circular 2 of 2009) released by the SAT deals with the CFCs in details from Article
76 through Article 84. The CFC refers to a foreign enterprise which is formed in a country (or region)
where the actual tax rate is lower than 50% of the tax rate set out in Article 4 (1) of the EITL and
is controlled by a resident enterprise or by a resident enterprise and Chinese individual residents
and whose profits are not distributed or are distributed in a reduced amount for reasons other than
reasonable needs for business operation.7
The term “control” refers to a substantive control in terms of shares, capital, business operation,
purchase and sales, etc. Control in shares means that a single Chinese resident shareholder directly
holds or indirectly in a multilayered structure holds at least 10% of the voting shares of a foreign
enterprise in any day of a taxable year, and the Chinese resident shareholders shall jointly hold at
least 50% of the shares of the foreign enterprise. If the Chinese resident shareholders hold shares
indirectly in a multilayered structure, their shareholding proportion shall be computed by multiplying
the shareholding proportions at all layers. If the shareholding proportion in a middle layer exceeds
50%, the proportion shall be treated as 100% in calculation.8
The taxation authority shall summarize and examine the information on overseas investment
declared by a Chinese resident enterprise shareholder, and serve a Notice of Confirmation of a Chinese
Resident Enterprise Shareholder of a Controlled Foreign Enterprise on the Chinese resident enterprise
shareholder of the controlled foreign enterprise. If the Chinese resident enterprise shareholder meets
the taxation conditions as prescribed in Article 45 of the CITL, the taxation authority shall levy tax on
it according to the relevant provisions.9
If the Chinese resident enterprise shareholder has already paid any enterprise income tax overseas
for the current-period income deemed as from dividend distribution, it may be entitled to a tax credit
according to the relevant provisions of the CITL or tax agreement.10
If the Chinese resident enterprise shareholder is able to provide information to prove that its CFC
meets any of the following conditions, the profits of the foreign enterprise that are not distributed or
the deficit when the profits are distributed in a reduced amount may not be deemed as distributed
dividends and not be included in the current-period income of the Chinese resident enterprise: (i) It is
an enterprise formed in a non-low tax rate country (or region) as specified by the SAT; (ii) its incomes
are mainly derived from its active business activities; or (iii) its total annual profits are less than
5 million RMB.11
In 2015, the SAT published the updated discussion draft of Circular 2 for the purpose of soliciting
public opinions (State Administration of Taxation 2015c). Chapter 10 of the new draft has more detailed
requirements on the CFCs from Article 114 through Article 125. However, this new draft has not been
finalized yet by the end of June 2017.
3.4. Responses to BEPS Action 4
As far as the BEPS Action 4 is concerned, Article 46 of the CITL of 2007 offers the thin capitalization
rule based on a fixed debt/equity ratio, by clarifying that the interest disbursement for any debt
investments and equity investments, which an enterprise accepts from its affiliates, in excess of the
prescribed criterion shall not be deducted in the calculation of the taxable amount of income. As the
7 Article 76, Circular 2 of 2009.
8 Article 77, Circular 2 of 2009.
9 Article 79, Circular 2 of 2009.
10 Article 82, Circular 2 of 2009.
11 Article 84, Circular 2 of 2009.
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thin capitalization is closely connected with the interest deduction, Article 46 could be considered a
general article on limiting base erosion involving interest deductions.
Pursuant to Article 46 of the CITL, Article 119 of CITLIR defines the term “debt investment” as
the financing which an enterprise directly or indirectly obtains but has to repay the principal and pay
interest or has to make compensation by any other means in the nature of interest payment. The debt
investment obtained by an enterprise from any related party shall include: (i) Debt investment a
related party provides through an unrelated third party; (ii) debt investment an unrelated third party
provides which is guaranteed by a related party that assumes several and joint liabilities; (iii) any other
debt investment indirectly obtained through any related party in the nature of obligation assumption.
The term “equity-based investment” refers to the type of investment which an enterprise accepts for
which it does not have to repay the principal and pay interest and the investor holds ownership over
the net assets of the enterprise.
According to the authorization of Article 119 of CITLIR, Chapter IX of the Circular 2 of 2009 deals
with the standards for identification of thin corporations in details from Article 85 through Article 91.
China has not issued further new detailed regulations to implement the recommended approach
by the BEPS Action 4, based on a fixed ratio rule which limits an entity’s net deductions for interest
and payments economically equivalent to interest to a percentage of its earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) by the end of 2016. However, generally speaking, the current
regulations on thin capitalization function well in China.
The BEPS Action 4 requires the countries to undergo periodic OECD monitoring of interest
deduction limitation rules according to a process to be determined.12 As China takes the BEPS package
very seriously, China is expected to collaborate with the OECD on the monitoring process.
3.5. Responses to BEPS Action 5
According to the BEPS Action 5, it is a minimum standard for the countries to modify existing IP
regimes to use nexus approach, and to use agreed grandfathering rules if modification will include
transition rules. Additional four prescriptions of the BEPS Action 5 are, to adopt procedures to inform
the OECD Harmful Tax Practices Forum if tax benefits are provided to specified IP assets, to adopt
measures to monitor and gather data on companies benefitting from regimes to promote development
in disadvantaged areas, to adopt procedures to spontaneously exchange statistical information with
respect to specified IP-related rulings, and to adopt procedures to spontaneously exchange statistical
information with respect to cases of insufficient IP-ruling related data gathering and exchange.13
Under Article 28 of CITL, the corporate income tax on important high-and-new-tech enterprises
that are necessary to be supported by the state shall be levied at the reduced tax rate of 15%.
Such preferential regime on reduced rate for advanced technology enterprises in China is considered
not harmful by the review process of the FHTP.14
4. Responses to Mainly Treaty-Based Action Items (Items 6–7)
4.1. Responses to BEPS Action 6 on Treaty Shopping
According to the BEPS Action 6, it is a minimum standard for the countries to include a principle
purpose test (PPT) alone or combined with a limitation on benefits (LOB) provision, or a LOB provision
combined with a specified anti-conduit rule. Additional three prescriptions of the BEPS Action 6
are, adopting anti-abuse rules to address tax avoidance strategies addressed throughout the Action
Plans, including an express statement about a common intention to eliminate double taxation without
12 Action 4 Report, p. 13.
13 Action 5 Report, pp. 67–68.
14 Action 5 Report, p. 64.
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creating double non-taxation or treaty shopping opportunities and including a saving clause to
preserve domestic taxation of residents subject to specified exceptions.15 Another relevant prescription
from the BEPS Action 2 is to address hybrid mismatches in accordance with revisions to OECD Model
Article.16
Several bilateral tax treaties China signed in the process of developing the BEPS package have
incorporated the LOB provision required by the Action 6. For instance, the Agreement between
China and Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Protocol thereto were formally signed
in Santiago, Chile on 25 May 2015. The two parties have completed the required domestic legal
procedures for the entry into force of the Agreement and the Protocol thereto. The Agreement and the
Protocol thereto have come into force on 8 August 2016, and applies to income obtained on and after
1 January 2017. In addition to the LOB provision, this Agreement also introduced the PPT and the rule
on identification of the existence of PE in triangular situations.
The similar approach was also taken in the Agreement between China and Russia for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income
and the Protocol thereto and the Protocol Amending this Agreement formally signed in Moscow
respectively on 13 October 2014 and 8 May 2015, and came into force on 9 April 2016.
Of course, no all the bilateral tax treaties have adopted the approach recommended by Action
6. However, as China has promised to implement the Action 6 as minimum standard, it is likely for
China to comprehensively adopt the approach of the Action 6 by updating its bilateral treaties based
on the new Multilateral Instrument required by the Action 15 in the near future.
To optimize the administration of non-resident taxpayers’ enjoyment of the treatment under tax
agreements, the SAT issued Bulletin on Issuing the Measures for the Administration of Non-Resident
Taxpayers’ Enjoyment of the Treatment under Tax Agreements (Bulletin 60 of 2015) on 27 August 2015.
Where non-resident taxpayers are eligible for the treatment under tax treaties, they may,
when filing tax returns, or when withholding agents make withholding declaration, enjoy the
treatment under agreements at their own discretion and be subject to the follow-up administration by
tax authorities.17
Where, under the circumstance of withholding at source or designated withholding, non-resident
taxpayers deem that they are eligible for the treatment under agreements, and need to enjoy the
treatment under agreements, they shall take the initiative to put forward the request to withholding
agents, and provide withholding agents with the relevant report forms and materials as prescribed in
Article 7 of Bulletin 60. Where such documents are complete, and the information filled in the relevant
report forms meets the requirements for enjoying the treatment under agreements, withholding
agents shall withhold taxes in accordance with the provisions of agreements, and forward the
relevant report forms and materials to the competent tax authorities while making withholding
declaration. Where non-resident taxpayers fail to put forward the request for enjoying the treatment
under agreements to withholding agents, or the materials provided for withholding agents or the
information filled in the relevant report forms fail to meet the requirements for enjoying the treatment
under agreements, withholding agents shall withhold taxes in accordance with the provisions of
domestic tax laws.18
Although the tax authorities will give up their traditional power of prior approval on the treaty
treatment or benefit, they will closely follow-up the non-resident taxpayers’ enjoyment of the treaty
benefit under agreements, and accurately execute tax agreements, so as to prevent the risks of treaty
shopping. Therefore, such reform is both taxpayer-friendly and efficient.
15 Action 6 Report, p. 10.
16 Action 2 Report, pp. 139–43.
17 Article 3 of Bulletin 60.
18 Article 6 of Bulletin 60.
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Where the competent tax authorities find in the process of the follow-up administration that the
general rules on anti-tax avoidance in tax agreements or domestic tax laws shall apply, the general
anti-tax avoidance investigation procedures may be initiated.19
A recent development of the restraint mechanism for the non-resident taxpayers is the credit
evaluation and disclosure system. The competent tax authorities shall maintain credit archives
for non-resident taxpayers’ improper enjoyment of the treatment under agreements, and take
corresponding follow-up administration measures.20
4.2. Responses to BEPS Action 7 on Permanent Establishment (PE)
The 2015 BEPS Report on Action 7 aims at preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status,
and provides for changes to be made to Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention (“MTC”), so as to
prevent artificial avoidance of PE status through use of commissionaires, fragmentation of activities
and abuse of independent agent status.21 On 4 July 2016, the OECD published the Discussion Draft of
Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to PE.
China has shown great interest in tightening the regulation of the PE, and has directly endorsed
the criteria for identifying the PE in the draft Report of Action 7 in the bilateral treaty with Chile signed
on 25 May 2015, almost five months before the finalization of BEPS package in October 2015. However,
it remains to observe whether similar approach will be followed in its subsequent treaties with other
countries in the future.
Considering the fact that the SAT previously promised to support the PE definition in the BEPS
package, it is expected that China will introduce this definition in most, if not all, of its bilateral treaties
by multilateral automatic treaty modification based on the Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion And Profit Shifting of 2016 in the future. As some
contracting countries are low tax jurisdictions, such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and
Singapore, the modification of the bilateral treaties between China and those low tax jurisdictions will
have huge impacts on the corporate structure and tax planning of the MNEs.
China has traditionally attributed the profit to PE based on the verification of the profit rate,
instead of the AOA. Therefore, China has to decide whether and/or to what extent it is willing to
implement the full AOA after the Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments is finalized in the future. It is expected that the national information exchange and
data analysis systems will help China identify the PE in the future.
Paragraph 1 of Article 5 (PE) of the tax agreements signed by China prescribes that: The term
“PE” refers to a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried out. Paragraph 4 of Article 5 prescribes that: The term “permanent establishment” shall not
include the fixed business place established solely for of the enterprise itself to carry out any other
activity of a preparatory or auxiliary nature.
To clarify the terms “business” and “preparatory or auxiliary” and other PE issues, the SAT
released the Bulletin on the Relevant Issues about the Determination of Permanent Establishments
in Tax Agreements (Bulletin No. 35 of 2006) on 14 March 2006.22 The term “business” refers to both
business operations and common business operations conducted by NPOs. The following principles
shall be followed when determining “preparatory or auxiliary” activities: (i) Whether the fixed base or
place only provides services to its head office or whether it has any business relation with any other
entity; (ii) whether the business nature of the fixed base or place is in line with that of its head office;
and (iii) whether the business operations of the fixed base or place are an important part of those
of its head office. If the fixed base or place not only provides services to its head office but also has
19 Article 22 of Bulletin 60.
20 Article 23 of Bulletin 60.
21 Action 7 Report, p. 9 et seq.
22 CLI.4.75564(EN).
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business relations with any other entity, or its business nature is in line with that of its head office and
its business operations are an important part of those of its head office, the activities of such fixed base
or place shall not be regarded as preparatory or auxiliary.
In the past years, China has paid great attention to the regulation of the service PE. The term
“PE” in tax treaties encompasses that “the furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an
enterprise of a Contracting State through employees or other personnel in the other Contracting State,
provided that such activities continue for the same project or a connected project for a period or periods
aggregating more than six months within any twelve-month period.”
The SAT clarified the determination of the PE of foreign enterprises providing services within
china and the Attribution of profits to PE in its reply to Jiangsu Tax Authority on 19 July 2016.23
First, if a foreign enterprise without PE sends its employees to provide services, including consultancy
services, for a connected project within China for more than six months within any twelve-month
period, the PE shall be identified. Second, if a project lasts for several years and if the employees
assigned by the foreign enterprise provide services more than six months, but other employees assigned
by this foreign enterprise provide services not more than six months, the existence of PE shall be
determined. This PE is based on all services which the foreign enterprise provides for the relevant
project rather than the services provided in a certain period. Third, for a foreign enterprise which has a
PE providing services for a certain project through its employees within China, the profits sourced
from such project shall be taxed as the profits of the PE.
A frequently cited PE case was reported by China Tax News. In this case, a parent corporation
incorporated in Singapore, X corporation, established an equity joint venture of auto making in China,
Y corporation. X corporation sent several groups of employees to provide technological instructions
and post-sale services for the projects of Y corporation in China. Beijing Tax Authority found that X
corporation had 51 PEs by sending employees providing services for more than 183 days between
January 2012 and December 2015 in China. Y corporation disagreed by arguing that the employees
of X corporation stayed less than 183 days, and therefore no PE would be constituted, and that the
employees’ income were paid outside the territory of China, therefore the employees of X corporation
not obligated to pay individual income tax in China24.
The methodology for calculating the period of 183 days in aggregation has been reflected in many
tax treaties signed by China and other contracting parties, and will play significant role in frustration
of the strategies of abusive splitting-up of contracts. It is expected that China will be more actively
in identifying the PE with the help of information sharing and regulatory collaboration between and
among Chinese domestic government agencies and international counterparts.
The growth of E-Commerce and new business models in the digital economy poses serious
challenges for applying the definition of PE to the world of e-commerce. China expressed its concern
about the challenge and significance on the taxing the corporate income deriving from e-commerce
in its comments on the UN Subcommittee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. “The development
of the digital economy increases the online transactions. How to tax these transactions remains a
difficulty for tax administrations. The action plans should consider how to tackle the challenges of
digital economy on the existing tax systems and the revenue base (UN n.d.)”.
While the OECD approach is to treat service income as business income under Article 7, the source
State has no taxing rights unless the service income is attributed to a PE situated therein. The UN
Model, however, grants greater taxing rights to the source State through the inclusion in Article 5 of a
deemed service PE provision (Art. 5 (3) (b)), which is based on a time threshold (i.e., 183 days in any
12-month period) concerning the service activities within a Contracting State.25
23 No. 694 [2006] of the State Administration of Taxation, 19 July 2006, CLI.4.78110(EN).
24 See http://www.ctaxnews.net.cn/html/2016-10/21/nw.D340100zgswb_20161021_1-05.htm.
25 See China Comments to BEPS, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/Beps/index.htm.
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As one of the basic features of the modern global economy is that a physical presence may no
longer be required for the conduct of business, it is very common for a large range of cross-border
services, such as design, engineering, financial consultancy, advertising to be performed from remote
locations. In our opinion, it should be possible to devise a workable PE threshold that does not
depend on physical presence but on a de minimis amount of sales of goods and services into a taxing
jurisdiction.26
5. Responses to Transfer Pricing Measures (Items 8–10 and 13)
5.1. General Requirements of BEPS Action Items 8–10 and 13
BEPS Action Items 8–10 and 13 focus on areas of concern involving transfer pricing, and aims at
bringing about rule changes involving the treatment of intangibles, of risks and capital, and of other
high-risk transactions, as well as improving new “country-by-Country” (CbC) reporting requirements.
It is a minimum standard for the countries to adopt CbC reporting procedures for three-tiered reporting
system of master file, local file, and CbC reports and to adopt international agreements and procedures
to automatically exchange CbC reports.27
Additional Prescriptions include undergoing periodic OECD monitoring of CBCR implementation,28
revising allocation rules to attribute risks to related parties on the basis of control and financial
capacity,29 revising allocation rules to prevent legal ownership as sole determinant of source of income
attributed to intangibles,30 revising allocation rules to attribute value to companies that perform
important functions,31 limiting non-controlling companies to risk-free return or less on financial
transactions,32 limiting values attributed to group synergy to companies contributing to synergistic
benefits33.
5.2. The Legal Framework of Transfer Pricing and TP Documentation in China before the Release of BEPS
Package in 2015
Chapter 6 of the CITL, under the title “Special tax adjustments”, provided the legal foundations
of transfer pricing and TP documentation in China, including the authorization of tax authorities to
adjust the tax, the arm length principle, cost contribution agreements (Article 41), advance pricing
arrangements (APA, Article 42), annual report on the related transactions, adjustment methodology,
CFCs (Article 45), thin capitalization (Article 46), and general anti-tax avoidance (GATA, Article 47),
etc. Chapter 6 of the CITLIR further defined the terms used by Chapter 6 of the CITL in details.
For instance, Article 43 of CITL imposed the TP documentation requirements in China. When an
enterprise files its annual corporate income tax returns with the tax authority, it shall enclose an annual
report on the related party transactions. When the tax authority investigates into the related party
transactions, the enterprise and its affiliates, as well as other enterprises relevant to the affiliated
transactions under investigation, shall provide the pertinent documents.
Article 36 of the LATC also authorized Chinese tax authorities to make reasonable adjustments in
case of the receipt or payment of charges or fees which are not priced at arm’s length prices and results
in a reduction of the taxable income.
Pursuant to the CITL, the CITLIR and the bilateral tax treaties on the avoidance of double
taxation, the SAT released the Measures for the Implementation of Special Tax Adjustments
26 For these proposals see, e.g., (Avi-Yonah 1997, 2016; Avi-Yonah and Xu 2016).
27 Action 13 Report, pp. 9–10.
28 Action 13 Report, pp. 10, 23.
29 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 10.
30 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 10.
31 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 10.
32 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 11.
33 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 11.
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(for Trial Implementation) of 2009 (Circular 2), which represents the most comprehensive and
significant regulation in addressing the transferring pricing and TP documentation in China before the
release of the BEPS package in 2015.34
5.3. Overview of the Transfer Pricing and CbC Reporting Changes in China
To effectively implement the BEPS package in China and to comprehensively update the existing
Circular 2, the SAT released a Discussion Draft of a Circular on Implementation Measures for Special
Tax Adjustments (“Discussion Draft”) in September 2015, ranging from Action 3 (CFC rules), Action
8–10 (Aligning TP outcomes with value creation) to Action 13 (TP documentation and CbC reporting)
in details (State Administration of Taxation 2015c). Compared with 13 chapters and 118 articles in
Circular 2, there are 16 chapters and 168 articles in the Discussion Draft of 2015.
Although the long-expected new single version of Circular 2 has not been finalized yet, a series
of patches have been made to replace the substantial part of Circular 2. For instance, Article 69 of
Circular 2 was replaced by the SAT Bulletin 45 of 16 June 2015.35 Chapters 2–3, Articles 74 and 89 of
Circular 2 were replaced by the SAT Bulletin 42 on Matters concerning Improving the Administration of
Affiliation Reporting and Contemporaneous Documentation of 29 June 2016. Chapter VI of the Circular
2 was replaced by the SAT Bulletin 64 on the Issues Concerning Improving the Administration of
Advance Pricing Arrangements of 11 October 2016. Chapters 4–5, 10–11 of the Circular 2 were repealed
by the SAT Bulletin 6 on Improving Administration of Special Tax Investigation and Adjustment and
Mutual Agreement Procedures of 17 March 2017 (State Administration of Taxation 2017a).
Following the release of the aforesaid Bulletins, the majority of innovative institutional
arrangements proposed in the 2015 Discussion Draft have been produced as s series of separate
items. It is likely that the remaining parts of the Discussion Draft will also be released as piecemeal
documents, rather than as a single comprehensive regulation. As a result, the existing valid parts
left in Circular 2 are only Chapter 7 (cost sharing agreements) except Articles 69 and 74 annulled by
Bulletin 42, Chapter 8 (CFC), Chapter 9 (thin capitalization) except Articles 89 annulled by Bulletin 42,
and Chapter 10 (general anti-avoidance).
Bulletin 45 of 2015, Bulletins 42 and 64 of 2016, and Bulletin 6 of 2017 have not only substantially
updated the transfer pricing specific clauses of Circular 2, but also basically reflected the final results
of the BEPS package, especially Actions 8–10, and Action 13. As China has totally endorsed the
underlying standards on transfer pricing, BEPS project enhances has substantially promoted the
convergence of transfer pricing standards between China and other countries.
5.4. TP Documentation Requirements of Bulletin 42 of 2016
The CbC report and contemporaneous documentation are one of the four minimum standards
of the BEPS package. To implement the BEPS Action 13, the SAT released Bulletin 42 of 2016,
which fundamentally updated the previous requirement for contemporaneous documentation under
Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Article 74 an Article 89 of Circular 2, and the requirement for annual reporting
of related party transactions under Circular No. 11436.
As the first step of the SAT to localize OECD/G20 BEPS Project recommendations into domestic
legislation, Bulletin 42 introduced the three-tiered framework of comprehensive related-party
transactions reporting and improved the existing contemporaneous documentation, based on
Circular 2. Bulletin 42 established ambitious TP compliance requirements at two levels: (i) RPT Forms,
including three forms/tables of CbC report; and (ii) three-tiered contemporaneous documentation,
including master file, local file and special file. As the CbC report is incorporated in the RPT Forms of
34 No. 2 [2009] of the SAT (Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2).
35 No. 45 [2015], SAT (State Administration of Taxation 2015d).
36 Document No. 114 [2008], SAT.
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2016, China has developed four-tiered standardized approach (master file, local file, special file and
CbC report).
Any resident enterprise subject to tax levied on auditing accounting books and non-resident
enterprise with establishments or offices in China subject to corporate income tax levied on an actual
basis, should report its related-party transactions in a fiscal year by filling the annual report forms on
related-party transactions (RPT Forms), along with the annual corporate income tax return, by May 31
of every fiscal year.37
Bulletin 42 recognizes five types of related-party transactions: (i) Transfer of the right to use or
ownership of tangible assets, including commodities, products, buildings and structures, means of
transportation, machinery equipment, tools and instruments; (ii) transfer of financial assets, including
accounts receivables, notes receivables, other receivables, equity investment, debt investment, and the
assets formed by derivative financial instruments; (iii) transfer of the right to use or ownership of
intangible assets, including patent right, know-how, trade secrets, trademark right, brands, list of
clients, sales channels, franchised rights, government licensing, and copyright; (iv) accommodation
of funds, including all types of long-and short-term loans (including capital pool of the group),
guarantee expenses, all types of prepayments with accrued interest, delayed receipts and payments;
(v) trading of services, including market investigation, marketing planning, agency, design, consulting,
administration, technical services, contracted R & D, maintenance, legal services, financial management,
auditing, recruitment, training and centralized procurement.38
Under Article 11 of Circular 2 and Circular 114, there were nine old RPT Forms. To enhance the
global transparency of the BEPS picture of the MNE group, Bulletin 42 increased the lengths of RPT
Forms to 22 items, including: Reporting entity information form (compulsory); annual summary form
on related party transactions (compulsory); related party relationship form (compulsory); transfers of
ownership in tangible assets form; transfers of ownership in intangible assets form; transfers of rights
to use tangible assets form; transfers of rights to use intangible assets form; financial assets transaction
form; financing form; related party services form; equity investment form; cost contribution agreement
form; outbound payment form; overseas related party information form; financial analysis form of
annual affiliated transactions between enterprises (unconsolidated); financial analysis form of annual
affiliated transactions between enterprises (consolidated); form on the global allocation of income,
taxes and business activities; list of entities within the multinational group; and additional information.
The last three forms on the CbC report should be prepared in both Chinese and English.
Given the fact that not every table/form in the 22 RPT Forms is mandatory for the taxpayer to file,
and given the different thresholds for the taxpayers to prepare certain forms, this author speculate
that, although some MNEs need to file all the RPT forms, most taxpayers will be only required to
file not more than nine forms as before the release of Bulletin 42. The SAT also expressed the same
idea (State Administration of Taxation 2016).
As envisaged by the BEPS Action 13 Report, the CbC report will provide annually the amount of
revenue, profit before income tax, income tax paid and accrued, number of employees, stated capital,
retained earnings, tangible assets, business activities of each entity of the MNE group in each tax
jurisdiction. Following the model legislation of the BEPS Action 13 Report, Bulletin 42 made it
mandatory for large MNEs to file the CbC report in three forms/tables, as part of RPT Forms of 2016,
for the purpose of disclosing the global allocation of the income, taxes paid and economic activity
among countries.
In the past decades, Chinese tax authorities have complained about the difficulties in acquiring
the full global picture of MNEs’ value-creating activities and profit allocations. With the help of the
CbC Report, tax authorities will obtain a preliminary understanding of the allocation of a MNE’s
37 Article 1 of Bulletin 42, Article 54 of the CITL.
38 Article 4 of Bulletin 42.
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profits around the globe, the distribution of the entities/jurisdictions engaging specific activities along
an MNE’s value chain, and the relevant tax positions for each of the tax jurisdictions. Of course,
the authentic, accurate and complete CbC report will also help the MNEs to demonstrate their
compliance with the arm’s length principle on their transfer pricing activities. Therefore, CbC report
will benefit both the tax authorities and the taxpayers.
The primary reporting entity is the ultimate holding company of the MNE group with annual
consolidated group revenue in the immediately preceding fiscal year of not less than 5.5 billion RMB,
roughly equivalent to the threshold of Euro 750 million as specified under the BEPS Action 13 Report.
The ultimate parent entity is able to consolidate the financial statements of all constituent entities
under its umbrella, while its own financial statements cannot be consolidated by any other enterprises.
The secondary reporting entity is the constituent entity nominated or designated by the MNE group to
file the CbC Report.39
Chinese tax authorities may also request a taxpayer under special tax investigation to provide a
CbC report in any of the following circumstances: (i) The MNE group has not provided a CbC report to
any country; (ii) although the MNE group has provided a CbC report to another country, China has not
established the information exchange mechanism on the CbC report with that country; or, (iii) despite
the fact that the MNE group has provided the CbC report to another country with such mechanism
with China, China has not successfully obtained the CbC report.40
Bulletin 42 requires qualified taxpayers to prepare the CbC report by completing three specified
forms/tables under the BEPS Action 13 Report, including: (i) Overview of allocation of income,
taxes and business activities by tax jurisdiction; (ii) list of all the constituent entities of the MNE group
included in each aggregation per tax jurisdiction; and (iii) additional information.
As recommended by the BEPS Action 13 Report, the first CbC Reports would be filed by
31 December 2017. For MNEs with a fiscal year ending on a date other than 31 December, the first
CbC Reports would be required to be filed later in 2018, twelve months after the close of the relevant
MNE fiscal year, and would report on the MNE group’s first fiscal year beginning after 1 January 2016.
Thus, inter-government exchange mechanism is expected to be ready for the exchange of the first
CbC Reports.
In response to the three-tier structure for transfer pricing documentation as set out in BEPS Action
13, Bulletin 42 restructured the contemporaneous documentation into a three-tier structure, including
master file, local file and special file. The qualified taxpayers should prepare and file contemporary
documentation on related party transactions in the fiscal year at the request of the tax authority.41
As each file has its own filing thresholds, it is possible for one taxpayers to file two or three of the
contemporaneous documents.
5.5. Bulletin 6 of 2017 on the Special Tax Investigations and Adjustments
To further streamline and improve the transparency and predictability of transfer pricing
investigations undertaken by Chinese tax authorities, SAT released its long-awaited Bulletin on Special
Tax Investigations, Adjustments and Mutual Agreement Procedures (“Bulletin 6”) on 28 March 2017,
as another step in converting the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports into domestic regulations on transfer
pricing. Bulletin 6 was effective from 1 May 2017, and replaced Chapters 4, 5, 11 and 12 of Circular 2,
Circular 188, Circular 363, Bulletin 54 and Bulletin 16.
Bulletin 6 not only reflects the outcome of the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, but also consolidates
previous regulations and existing practices on transfer pricing. It is expected that the introduction
of Bulletin 6 will greatly improve the predictability, reliability and transparency of transfer pricing
39 Article 5 of Bulletin 42.
40 Article 8 of Bulletin 42.
41 Article 10 of Bulletin 42.
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investigations by clarifying the focus points and the rationale of Chinese tax authorities, standardize
the transfer pricing investigation practices, and indirectly force the corporations to take initiatives on
voluntary and honest self-adjustments.
Embedded in treaties and appears as Article 9(1) of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions,
interpreted by OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the arm’s length principle (ALP) is re-emphasized
by the BEPS package. To help tax authorities and taxpayers evaluate transfer prices between associated
enterprises, and to prevent double taxation, China also uses the ALP as the cornerstone of transfer
pricing rules. Article 37 of Bulletin 6 authorized tax authorities to “make adjustments to the full amount
of payments made to overseas related parties that have performed no function, assumed no risk or
carried out no substantive activities, which are not in compliance with the arm’s length principle”.
Article 4 of Bulletin 6 listed 9 categories of target corporations with the risk features to be
investigated by tax authorities: (i) Enterprises with significant amount or substantially multiple types
of related-party transactions; (ii) enterprises with longtime losses, low profitability or fluctuating
profitability; (iii) enterprises with profit levels lower than average levels of the same industry;
(iv) enterprises whose profit levels do not match their functions performed and risks assumed,
or whose shared benefits do not match their allocated costs (CCA); (v) enterprises that transact with
related parties in low tax jurisdictions (tax havens); (vi) enterprises that fail to file their related-party
transaction reporting forms or to prepare contemporaneous documentation; (vii) enterprises whose
related-party debt-to-equity ratio exceeds the standard ratio (thin capitalization); (viii) enterprises
incorporated in a jurisdiction where the effective tax rate is lower than 12.5%, controlled by Chinese tax
resident companies, or by Chinese tax resident companies and Chinese nationals, having either failed
to distribute profits or reduced the distribution of profits without reasonable business needs (CFC);
(ix) enterprises who engage in tax planning schemes or tax arrangements that lack reasonable business
purposes (general anti-avoidance, GAA).
Under Article 4 of Bulletin 6, both residents and non-residents shall be subject to investigation. This is
likely to happen in the cases involving CFC or GAA issues. Tax authorities may deal with non-residents
either directly or through a resident related party. According to the interpretation of SAT, the legal
basis for the investigation of the foreign tax residents is the CIT (State Administration of Taxation 2017b).
Such a legal basis should be Article 43 of the CITL, which said, “When the tax organ investigates
into the affiliated transactions, the enterprise and its affiliates, as well as other enterprises relating to
the affiliated transactions under investigation, shall provide the pertinent materials according to the
relevant provisions”. Article 114 (2) of the CITLR further referred the term “other enterprises relating
to the related transaction under investigation” to those enterprises that are similar to the enterprise
under investigation in the contents and pattern of production and business management.
The special tax adjustment is generally not applicable to wholly domestic related party
transactions. Based on the approach of Article 30 of Circular 2, Article 38 of Bulletin 6 provides
that, “as a general principle, no special tax adjustment shall be made with respect to the transaction
between domestic affiliates whose actual tax burdens are the same, provided the transaction has not
directly or indirectly decreased the overall tax revenue of China”.
The process of special tax investigation would be generally launched in case of the failure of
appropriate self-adjustment of the taxpayers. Therefore, Bulletin 6 encourages the taxpayers to take
initiative to adjust its transfer pricing on its own. Tax authorities may also remind the taxpayers
of any taxation risk in question, based on verification of the RPT reporting, administration of the
contemporaneous documentation and monitoring of corporate profit level. When taxpayers choose to
self-adjust, they should file the newly introduced “Special Tax Adjustments Self-Payment Form”.42
Tax authorities shall initiate special tax investigations in cases where taxpayers request tax
authorities to confirm the principles and methods of the transfer pricing. Despite any self-adjustments
42 Article 3 of Bulletin 6.
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by taxpayers, tax authorities may use their discretion to initiate a special tax audit process if they deem
the self adjustment is insufficient.
Based on the presumption that there would be profits attributable to LSAs, Bulletin 6 requires
Chinese tax authorities to analyze LSAs such as the cost savings and market premiums, and select
appropriate and reasonable transfer pricing methods to determine LSAs’ contribution to profits, where
the comparable corporation and investigated corporation operate in different economic conditions.43
Chinese tax authorities have long emphasized the significance of LSAs, and endeavored to ensure
Chinese taxpayers are compensated for LSAs that allow the MNE group to earn higher profits.
The significance of LSAs’ impact on transfer pricing analysis has been expressly recognized by Bulletin
42 and Bulletin 64. For instance, the LSAs requirement is reflected in the local file documentation as
the factors affecting transfer pricing and profits in the value chain under Bulletin 42.
Consistent with the OECD Guidelines, Article 111 of the CITLIR recognized the comparable
uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method (RPM), the cost-plus method (CPM),
the transactional net margin method (TNMM), the profit split method (PSM), and other methods in
compliance with the arm’s-length principle. Article 16 of Bulletin 6 continues to authorize the tax
authorities to choose one of the above-mentioned reasonable transfer pricing methods, based on the
comparable analysis, to analyze the related party transactions. The detailed guidance of Bulletin 6 on
the methods generally reflected the positions of the OECD Guidelines.
Article 22 of Bulletin 6 introduced three frequently used asset valuation methods, including cost,
market and income, to support transfer pricing analysis of the transactions of either individual pieces
of corporate assets, including intangible assets, or entire corporate assets as a whole.
This Article also introduced a broad language “Other methods in compliance with the arm’s
length principle” as to include any other reasonable methods that comply with the arm’s length
principle, and can appropriately reflect the principle that profits should be taxed where economic
activity takes place and where value is created. The broad wording of “other methods” will offer
necessary discretion and flexibility for tax authorities to employ any reasonable methods available to
reflect the principle that profits should be taxed where economic activity takes place and where value
is created, for the purpose of fair and reasonable special tax adjustment.
The controversial term value contribution allocation method (VCAM) or value chain apportionment
method introduced in Article 35 of Discussion Draft of 2015, which was considered akin to formulary
apportionment by some, has been dropped from Bulletin 6. Some consultants interpreted this
major change as a response to criticisms made by commentators on the Consultation Draft (EY n.d.).
This author argues that the silence of Bulletin 6 on VCAM does not imply that VCAM will never be
used by Chinese tax authorities. Quite contrary, the term “Other methods in compliance with the
arm’s length principle” is broad enough to empower Chinese tax authorities to directly or indirectly
use the VCAM or similar terms when necessary.
A further good example is the GVCAM advocated by the Jiangsu Provincial Office of SAT.
Based on the practice of transfer pricing investigation, APA and consensus with some MNEs, Jiangsu
Office urged the MNEs to change their mindset and try a new transfer pricing method based on
the analysis of global value chain. GVCAM can be divided into three steps: (i) Collecting sufficient
information including the Group’s master file, CbC report, commercial databases, internal financial
data, etc. The subsidiaries should strengthen intra-group communication and to promote full
understanding of the substance of relevant information; (ii) analyzing the operation and profit of the
group value chain, clarify the functions and relevant undertakers on the value chain, and identify the
core elements in value creation, such as intangibles, fixed assets, personnel and market; (iii) allocating
the total profit on the value chain to different function bearers according to a set of core indicators
(such as assets, sales, expenses, costs, etc.) to ensure that the allocation match the functions performed
43 Article 27 of Bulletin 6.
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and the risks assumed by these parties on the value chain (Jiangsu Provincial Office, Sat 2016).
As Jiangsu is one of the economic power houses with active operations of MNEs in China, it is likely
that other Chinese tax authorities would follow Jiangsu’s pioneer model. The reason is very simple.
5.6. Transfer Pricing of Intangible Property Transactions
Different from the traditional unilateral approach to the payment of royalties paid by Chinese
enterprises to the oversea affiliates, Bulletin 6 introduced the bilateral approach to the payment of
royalties between Chinese enterprises and their affiliates, including the payment received by Chinese
corporations from their oversea affiliates. As the new rules on transfer pricing of intangible property
transactions covers both transferors and transferees of intangibles, Chinese tax authorities will give
enough attention to the BEPS risks associated with intangibles transactions between the members of
China-based MNE groups. Therefore, it is essential for China-based MNE groups to ensure the arm’s
length nature of the royalties received by Chinese taxpayers from their oversea affiliates as licensees of
intangibles. It is expected that there will be serious discussions on the BEPS risk associated with the
royalty received by Chinese taxpayers from their offshore affiliates. Of course, Chinese tax authorities
will not weaken their priority focus on the traditional BEPS risks arising from the payment of the
royalties from Chinese corporations to their oversea affiliates.
In addition to duplicating the five functions (DEMPE) outlined by the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports
and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Bulletin 6 identifies “Promotion” of intangibles as another key
function for the purpose of “DEMPEP” analysis. As Chinese tax authorities will conduct six-function
(DEMPEP) analysis of the intangibles transactions under the new rules, the value contribution by and
through marketing and promoting activities undertaken by Chinese companies will be appropriately
rewarded. This innovation further reinforced Chinese traditional emphasis on the huge value of
marketing and promotion efforts in attracting Chinese consumers to buy international brands at the
price of generous premiums.
The DEMPEP analysis depends on different facts and circumstances, including business models of
the MNE group and intangibles natures of the related party transactions. However, Bulletin 6 is silent
on further quantification and weighting of the performance of various contribution in considering
the arm’s length adjustment of income related to intangible property between and among various
members of the MNE group. The necessary discretion should be controlled by rule of law especially the
due process of law, so as to strike a good balance between sophisticated taxpayers and tax authorities
in the process of arm’s length analysis of transfer pricing of intangibles transactions.
To warrant the predictability of tax audit and adjustment, the SAT would be well advised to
develop detailed guidance based on Chinese specific circumstances and the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports
in the future. Neither ignorance of the significant functions of design and control, nor ignorance of the
significant functions of exploitation and promotion is rationale and convincing without regard to the
facts and circumstances in specific individual cases in question.
Under Bulletin 6, an entity that merely owns the legal ownership of intangible assets, but has not
contributed towards the value creation of the intangible assets, should not be entitled to any benefit
arising from the exploitation of such intangible assets.44 Such position reflected the recommendations
of the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, which indicates that, “For intangibles, the guidance clarifies that
legal ownership alone does not necessarily generate a right to all (or indeed any) of the return that
is generated by the exploitation of the intangible”; “Legal ownership of intangibles by an associated
enterprise alone does not determine entitlement to returns from the exploitation of intangibles”.45
44 First paragraph, Article 30 (2) of Bulletin 6.
45 Actions 8–10 Reports, pp. 10, 64.
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Under Bulletin 6, an entity that has merely funded intangible development activities but has not
performed any DEMPEP functions or assumed any risks in the creation and exploitation of intangible
assets, should only be entitled to a reasonable financing return.46
Under Bulletin 6, tax authorities may conduct special tax adjustment on the royalties received
or paid as a result of intangibles licensing transactions, in case of the failure of timely adjustment by
the taxpayer on one of the following situations: (i) The value of intangible assets have changed
fundamentally; (ii) an adjustment mechanism on royalty for comparable transactions between
unrelated parties would have been in place, pursuant to usual and normal business practices; (iii) the
functions performed, risks assumed and assets used by the enterprise and its related parties have
changed during the course of the exploitation of intangible assets; (iv) the enterprise and its affiliates
have not been appropriately compensated for the ongoing DEMPEP of intangibles.47 These rules are
generally consistent with recommendations under the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, although discussions
there are much more detailed.
Tax authorities are expected to pay particular attention to whether the value of the licensed
intangibles has declined since the royalty was initially established, whether price adjustment clauses
are commonly found in uncontrolled comparable transactions, whether the related parties have
changed their functions as well as assets and risks have changed, and whether the transferee or the
licensee has performed further additional DEMPEP functions for which it has not been reasonably and
fairly compensated.
The core spotlight of Article Bulletin 6 is the recognition of the principle of benefit commensurate
with the royalty rate. Bulletin 6 declares that the royalty paid or received for the transaction of
intangibles should match the economic benefits generated by the intangibles for the enterprise or its
affiliates. If the royalty does not match the economic benefit derived to the enterprise or its affiliates,
and thus result in a reduction in the taxable gross income or taxable income of the enterprise or its
related party, tax authorities may initiate special tax adjustment on such royalty. Assuming the licensed
intangibles have generated no economic benefit, and assuming the transactions are not arm’s length, tax
authorities may make adjustments up to the full amount of the royalties paid. Assuming an enterprise
pays a royalty to a related party that merely has the ownership of the intangibles, and assuming the
royalties are not arm’s length, tax authorities may make special adjustments up to the full amount of
the royalty.48
These rules have reinforced the substance principle reflected in the BEPS package and the
recommendations of the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, including “legal ownership of intangibles by
an associated enterprise alone does not determine entitlement to returns from the exploitation of
intangibles, and associated enterprises performing important value-creating functions related to the
development, maintenance, enhancement, protection and exploitation of the intangibles can expect
appropriate remuneration”.49 The substance principle requires the magnitude of royalty specified
in the contracts to be commensurate with the economic benefit in substance, and thus ensures arm’s
length pricing.
5.7. Transfer Pricing of Intra-Group Service Transactions
Articles 34–36 of Bulletin 6 are designed to determine the nature and level of the arm’s length in
related party service transactions, based on Article 4 of Bulletin 16 and existing enforcement practice,
and inspired by the internationally accepted and OECD sanctioned “benefits test”.
As indicated by the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, there are two issues in the analysis of transfer
pricing for intra-group services. One issue is whether intra-group services have in fact been provided.
46 Second paragraph, Article 30 (2) of Bulletin 6.
47 Article 31 of Bulletin 6.
48 Article 32 of Bulletin 6.
49 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 64.
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The other issue is what the intra-group charge for such services for tax purposes should be in accordance
with the arm’s length principle.50
Following the same line of thinking, Article 34 of Bulletin 6 introduces two interrelated principles
for the transfer pricing of intra-group service transactions to follow: The benefit principle and the ALP.
First, the related-party services should be beneficial to the service recipient. Second, the service fee paid
or received should be arm’s-length. In case of the failure to satisfy the two interrelated requirements,
a special tax adjustment shall be made.
To determine whether intra-group services have been rendered, the second paragraph of Article
34 of Bulletin 6 introduces benefits test recommended by the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports. The arm’s
length related party service transactions should be beneficial service transactions that are priced
according to business practices and fair prices for transactions conducted between unrelated parties in
the same or comparable circumstances. The term “beneficial service” is defined as the service activity,
which is able to deliver direct or indirect economic benefit to the recipient, and which an independent
enterprise would have been willing to pay for or would have performed the activity in-house for itself,
in the same or comparable circumstances.
The first paragraph of Article 34 of Bulletin 6 authorizes tax authorities to make a special tax
adjustment by disallowing the deduction of the service fee, where an enterprise pays the service fee to
its related parties for services that are not beneficial.
Although Bulletin 6 has not provided any detailed documentation requirements on the intra-group
service transactions, it will be very helpful for the recipient and the provider of services to prepare and
maintain genuine and reliable documents, including the books and records, to support the existence
of beneficial services and the compliance of the ALP. It is irresponsible for the taxpayers and the tax
consultants to wait for the SAT guidance before preparing the documents. The rationale is that the
burden of proof on the compliance of the ALP is on the shoulder of the parties to intra-group service
transactions, instead of the tax authorities.
Article 35 of Bulletin 6 listed 6 categories of non-beneficial intra-group service: (i) Duplicative
services (services that has already been procured or carried out by the enterprise itself); (ii) shareholder
activities (services that is carried out to exercise control, management and supervision of the enterprise
with a view to protecting the investment interests of a direct or indirect investor); (iii) services that
benefit solely from being part of the group (service not specifically carried out for the recipients,
although the enterprise has obtained an incidental benefit by belonging to a particular group);
(iv) services that have already been compensated in another related party transaction; (v) services that
are irrelevant to the functions performed or risks assumed by service recipients, or do not meet the
business needs of the service recipients; (vi) any other services that cannot bring direct or indirect
economic benefit to the service recipient, or that an independent enterprise would have been unwilling
to pay for or would not have performed the activity in-house for itself.
Based on the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports, Article 36 of Bulletin 6 introduced the direct and indirect
charging methods for related party services, except for the elective, simplified approach introduced by
the BEPS Actions 8–10 Reports for low value-adding intra-group services of Chapter VII of the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines. The elective, simplified approach specifies a wide category of common intra-group
services which command a very limited profit mark-up on costs, applies a consistent allocation key
for all recipients for those intra-group services, and provides greater transparency through specific
reporting requirements including documentation showing the determination of the specific cost pool.51
The reason is that SAT has long considered all intra-group service transactions are highly risky.
Article 36 of Bulletin 6 requires the reasonable pricing methods to be selected based on the
consideration of the concrete content and features, the functions, risks, cost and expense undertaken by
50 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 144.
51 Actions 8–10 Reports, p. 14.
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the service provider, the benefits and market circumstances of the recipient, the financial situation of
the transactions parties, and the pricing level of comparable transactions. Where the direct “reasonable
cost” is unavailable, the indirect “apportioned cost” shall be identified based on the match between the
benefit enjoyed by the recipient and the outcome of the apportionment. Compared with the Discussion
Draft, Article 36 of Bulletin 6 deleted the language “plus an arm’s length mark-up” on calculating a
service fee.
The impact of Article 36 of Bulletin 6 is that the ALP will be actively applied to the intra-group
service transactions, and the MNE groups have to reflect and readjust their existing unreasonable
transfer pricing policies correspondingly. For example, where an overseas affiliate has outsourced all
of the service that it used to provide to a corporate taxpayer in China, the outsourcing affiliate may not
charge the Chinese taxpayer for the serve provided by external unrelated parties any more.
6. Conclusions
As indicated above, China has actively participated in both developing and implementing the
BEPS project. China’s tax base has been seriously eroded by aggressive international tax planning
that has the effect of artificially shifting profits to locations where they are subject to non-taxation or
substantially reduced taxation.
In the first three earlier decades since the late 1970s, China had received more inbound foreign
direct investments including advanced technologies and intangibles than the outbound investment of
Chinese investors. However, as China started to implement the “Going-out” strategy in the 21st century,
in particular the initiative of “one belt and one road” (OBOR), more and more China-based corporations
are increasingly active in outbound investment and intangibles export oversea. In response to the
new scenario of increasingly accelerated globalization of China-based MNE groups, China has to
take a very holistic approach to deal with the BEPS challenges from different perspectives, including
domestic action items (items 2–5), treaty-based action items (items 6–7) and transfer pricing measures
(items 8–10 and 13).
In the post-BEPS era, China is expected to implement the BEPS project in a more consistent and
coherent way, and will take whatever measures necessary to guarantee the successful implementation
of the BEPS package in collaboration with the global community. That is why the SAT has quickly
translated many minimum standards and recommendations of BESP project into domestic regulations.
China has been one of most active countries in endorsing its international obligation created
under the BEPS project. For instance, on 7 June 2017, China joined other 67 jurisdictions in Paris for the
official signing ceremony for a new multilateral tax instrument (MLI).52 China signed the MLI not only
by itself, but also on behalf of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic
of China. China and other 47 Signatories agreed to modify their 47 bilateral treaties among the existing
102 bilateral treaties China entered with 102 contracting countries (OECD 2017c).
In China, the bilateral treaties prevail over the domestic law. For instance, Article 91 of the LATC
of 2015 states that, “If the provisions of the relevant tax treaties or agreements concluded between
the People’s Republic of China and foreign countries are in conflict with the provisions of this Law,
the relevant matters shall be handled in accordance with the treaties or agreements”. Article 58 of
the CITL declares that, “Where any provision in a tax treaty concluded between Chinese government
and a foreign government is different from the provisions in the CITL, the provision in the treaty
shall prevail”. Despite the controversial debate of the legal effect of the tax treaties, the SAT tends
to argue that the tax treaties are not only legally binding on the governments of the contracting
52 (OECD 2017a); see also (OECD 2017b) (listing the 68 jurisdictions, plus eight other countries that intend to sign soon).
The Signatories include the major OECD and EU members (except for the US), China and India, as well as many important
treaty shopping jurisdictions (e.g., the Netherlands and Mauritius) and tax havens (e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong).
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parties, but are also directly applicable to the taxpayers (State Administration of Taxation n.d.).
Therefore, we believe that China will implement the BEPS project in a serious manner.
Of course, the implementation of BEPS project might invite new uncertainty both for taxpayers and
for administrators during the short transitional period between the articulation and the implementation
of the action plans. It is also possible for some taxpayers to design new tax planning strategies of
regulatory arbitrage in the transitional period, in order to avoid the application of both traditional
norms and new norms. The Chinese government could address the new challenges by modernizing
its tax governance with the help of big data and big analysis of its own domestic information platform
and the international information sharing system.
Author Contributions: Reuven S. Avi-Yonah proposed the topic of this paper, discussed its outline with
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